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7Bioethics – The study of the ethical and moral implications of biological discoveries, 
biomedical advances and their applications, as in the fields of genetic engineering 
and drug research (World Health Organisation [WHO], 2006). Bioethics within the life 
sciences is not limited to animal and clinical research ethics, but encompasses many 
interlinking areas of responsible conduct of research including research misconduct, 
obligations to society, responsibilities towards creation of beneficial research and 
avoidance of maleficence.
Biological laboratory – A facility within which biological agents, their components 
or their derivatives, and toxins are collected, handled and/or stored. Biological 
laboratories include clinical laboratories, diagnostic facilities, regional and national 
reference centres, public health laboratories, research centres (including academic, 
pharmaceutical, environmental) and production facilities (including the manufacturing 
of vaccines, pharmaceuticals, large-scale genetically modified organisms [GMOs]) 
for human, veterinary and agricultural purposes (WHO, 2006).
Biosafety, or more specifically laboratory biosafety – In the context of this 
document ‘biosafety’ refers to practices, procedures and proper use of equipment 
and facilities, in order to assure the safe handling, storage and disposal of (potentially) 
harmful biological material (including pathogens and their products) (adapted from 
WHO, 2006). This includes measures to prevent harm caused by inadvertent or 
accidental exposure to dangerous pathogens and toxins (WHO, 2004 and European 
Commission for Standardisation, 2008). It should be noted that the term biosafety 
can also be used to describe the efforts to assess, manage and communicate the 
potential risks resulting from biotechnology and its products and in particular GMOs, 
but this falls outside the scope of this document.
Biosecurity – refers to measures to protect against the inadvertent, inappropriate, 
intentional and malevolent use of (potentially) dangerous biological material (including 
pathogens and their products) or the malevolent use of biotechnology against humans, 
livestock or crops. This also includes the protection of valuable biological material 
(adapted from WHO, 2006).
Biorisk – The risk (risk is a function of likelihood and consequences) of occurrence 
of a particular biological event (including naturally-occurring diseases, accidents, 
unexpected discovery, or deliberate misuse of biological agents and toxins) which 
may adversely affect the health of human populations (WHO, 2004 and 2007a). An 
assessment of these risks can be both quantitative and qualitative.
Definitions 
8Biorisk spectrum – A continuum of biorisks ranging from naturally-occurring 
diseases (chronic and infectious diseases) to accidents, to the deliberate misuse of 
biological agents and toxins with the intention to cause harm (WHO, 2007a).
Biorisk reduction – The reduction of the occurrence of risks associated with 
exposure to biological agents and toxins, whatever their origin or source, 
encompassing the full spectrum of biorisks (WHO, 2007a).
Laboratory biosafety – The containment principles, technologies and practices 
that are implemented to prevent unintentional exposure to biological agents and 
toxins, or their accidental release (WHO, 2004 and European Commission for 
Standardisation, 2008).
Laboratory biosecurity – The protection, control and accountability for valuable 
biological materials within laboratories, in order to prevent their unauthorised access, 
loss, theft, misuse, diversion or intentional release (WHO, 2006).
Dual-use life sciences research – Knowledge and technologies generated by 
legitimate life sciences research that may be appropriated for illegitimate intentions 
and applications (WHO, 2005 and 2007a).
Life sciences – All sciences that deal with organisms, including humans, animals 
and plants, and including but not limited to biology, bio-technology, genomics, 
proteomics, bioinformatics, pharmaceutical and biomedical research and techniques.
Global health security – The activities required, both proactive and reactive, 
to minimise vulnerability to acute public health events that endanger the collective 
health of populations living across geographical regions and international boundaries 
(WHO, 2007b).
Public health – The science and art of preventing disease, prolonging life, and 
promoting health through the organised efforts and informed choices of society, 
organisations, communities and individuals in both the public and private spheres 
(Winslow, 1920). Health is defined by the Constitution of the World Health 
Organisation as a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not 
merely the absence of disease or infirmity.
Research excellence – Research that is of high quality, ethical, rigorous, original 
and innovative.
9The Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf) has a mandate to provide evidence-
based scientific advice to South African policymakers and this consensus report is in 
fulfilment of this mandate. 
This consensus study was initiated by the ASSAf Standing Committee on Biosafety 
and Biosecurity. The key objective was to undertake a consensus study in which the 
findings and recommendations will contribute to policy development/modification 
and to inform practice in relation to the improvement of biosafety and biosecurity in 
the country.
This consensus report provides a review of the state of the biosafety and biosecurity 
in South Africa. This review includes an overview of existing legislation, regulations 
and practices as they relate to biosafety and biosecurity; an evaluation of existing 
measures and capacity to detect, control and prevent the natural, accidental and 
spread of infectious agents; and a critical overview of current practice in relation to 
the implementation of biosafety and biosecurity measures and the application of 
ethics in South African laboratories. 
Key findings from the study include the poor education and/or training on research 
ethics for life scientists, inadequate compliance with the statutory obligations to 
report Notifiable Medical Conditions, the lack of a database of both public and 
commercial laboratories in the country and a low level of awareness among life 
scientists about national and international conventions, laws and regulations related 
to their research.
Based on these findings, the report makes a number of recommendations which are 
under these four themes: 
1. Improving the capacity to detect and respond to infectious disease outbreaks.
2. Education and awareness raising.
3. Ethics review. 
4. Scientific openness and transparency. 
The report provides guidance on how the relevant stakeholders can implement these 
recommendations in a manner that can improve the state of biosafety and biosecurity 
in South Africa. 
Foreword 
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This consensus study report presents the findings of a systematic assessment of the 
state of biosafety and biosecurity in South Africa, including an evaluation of legislation, 
regulations and practices at both national and institutional levels. The findings report 
on strengths, weaknesses and gaps in the laws and in their implementation, and the 
practices relating to biosafety and biosecurity at laboratory level. Recommendations 
are made to address the weaknesses and gaps identified.
Research and development in the life sciences are important elements of South African 
growth and development and are essential to address the needs of the country. It was 
thus imperative that ASSAf contributes towards ensuring that life science research in 
South Africa is conducted safely, securely and ethically. This is in the interests of all 
South Africans and in the interests of the life science community. 
With this broad objective, ASSAf constituted a Biosafety and Biosecurity panel of 
experts to assess and comment on the relationship between science and security 
in South Africa. While it is deemed important to extend an assessment of biosafety 
and biosecurity to the greater southern African region, this was not possible in the 
timeframe permitted for the study, but remains an important objective in the long term. 
The research conducted for this consensus study included:
1. An investigation into the applicability and balance of relevant ethical principles 
through a review of literature in order to establish a context for biosafety and 
biosecurity considerations.
2. An assessment of existing, relevant legislation and regulations in relation to biosafety 
and biosecurity in order to identify strengths, weaknesses and gaps in laws and in 
their implementation.
3. A critical overview of the implementation of biosafety and biosecurity measures in 
laboratories in South Africa and an assessment of the extent to which laboratory 
practices address safety and security concerns. 
4. An evaluation of existing measures and capacity to detect, identify, control and 
prevent the natural, accidental or deliberate spread of infectious agents.
The panel used a variety of methods to conduct the research, including but not 
limited to:
1. Convening a series of panel discussions on biosafety and biosecurity.
2. Assessing existing legislation and regulations in relation to biosafety and biosecurity 
to identify strengths, weaknesses and gaps in laws and in their implementation.
Executive Summary
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3. Conducting a survey of life scientists’ experience and perceptions of biosafety and 
biosecurity measures in laboratories in South Africa. 
4. Evaluating existing measures and capacity to detect, identify, control, and prevent 
the natural, accidental, or deliberate spread of infectious agents. 
5. Consultation with experts from a variety of disciplines (including experts with proven 
biosecurity expertise).
Ultimately, the goal of the study was to:
1. Make sustainable and evidence-based recommendations to the South African 
government and the scientific community to address the identified weaknesses in: 
existing legislation; the implementation of biosafety and biosecurity in laboratories; 
existing measures and capacity to detect and control spread of infectious diseases; 
and to raise awareness about existing measures (including practices and legislation) 
to reduce the risks associated with dual-use research and to engage the life science 
community in a dialogue about biosafety and biosecurity. 
2. Make recommendations to remove weaknesses and gaps in existing legislation 
and in the implementation of such legislation.
Outline of the report
Chapter 1 (background) introduces the context of the study and then continues 
to define its goals, approaches and methodologies.
Chapter 2 (ethical context) offers an introduction to the interface between science 
and social responsibility, both at the level of the individual scientist and the institutional. 
Morality and ethics are discussed and the distinction between these concepts is 
clarified. The dual-use problem, whereby science can be used for both good and 
bad purposes, is explained and examples pertinent to the biosafety and biosecurity 
field are provided. The chapter concludes with an overview of how ethics is currently 
institutionalised and managed in South Africa. 
Chapter 3 (regulatory framework) presents the results of the studies undertaken 
to explore legislation relevant to biosafety and biosecurity in South Africa. A desktop 
review of legislation currently governing South African biological safety as listed 
in the governmental submission to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1540 (UNSCR 1540) Committee is presented. The review also identified and 
analysed legislation and regulations pertinent to biological safety and security in 
the country not listed in the UNSCR 1540 submission, through consultations with 
government departments and ministries involved in the biological safety and security 
arena. The review revealed that the South African legislative framework is robust 
and comprehensive, but suffers from several limitations and challenges, including 
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coherence in the categorisation of pathogens, the lack of harmonisation of guidelines, 
and infrastructure and capacity challenges for implementation. 
In addition, the results of a systematic review conducted to identify, collate and review 
current South African governmental regulations, policies and guidelines for detecting, 
identifying, controlling and preventing the natural, accidental or deliberate spread 
of infectious agents. The review identified a complex set of South African regulations 
governing the detection, identification, control, and prevention of human, animal and 
plant diseases caused by infectious agents. The panel noted that the development 
of a single, locally relevant list of infectious agents which is regularly updated could 
potentially enhance the utility and cross-referencing of future regulations. 
Chapter 4 (implementation) outlines the survey used to map and compile a 
database of all functional life science facilities in the country. This included public 
and private sector facilities engaged in life science research, development or both. 
The final database comprises 979 facilities, of which 22% conduct research, 72% 
perform diagnostic services and 6% provide both. 
At the start of this survey there was no comprehensive database of public and 
commercial life sciences facilities in South Africa. Therefore, the panel recommends 
that the database compiled during this survey be considered a national asset and 
that its ongoing development and maintenance (including the development of a 
geographic information system map of all facilities) becomes the responsibility of the 
Department of Science and Technology (DST). In the view of the panel, the DST is 
correctly placed to take on this responsibility because laboratories work in the fields 
of human, animal and plant health and thus fall neither neatly into the scope of the 
Department of Health (DoH) nor the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
(DAFF). In the interim, the database is available from ASSAf on request, but not for 
commercial use.
In addition, a comprehensive overview is presented of the findings from a survey of 
350 life scientists in South Africa regarding the safety and security rules and regulations 
pertaining to their work. The survey found significant gaps in the training of scientists 
pertaining to ethics, biosafety, biosecurity and dual-use issues, as well as in relation to 
how and where to report possible breaches. There also appear to be gaps in relation to 
the implementation of existing rules and regulations, including in relation to standard 
operating procedures (SOPs), tests of competence (in biosafety and biosecurity) and 
even in some instances in the maintenance of laboratory equipment. The panel agreed 
that this survey highlighted an urgent need to ensure that life scientists are informed 
about national and international laws and policies relevant to their work.
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Chapter 5 (responsiveness) details the methods and results of a study of 
qualitative, key participant interviews, conducted with purposively-sampled experts 
in the field of infectious disease outbreaks in South Africa. The study highlighted the 
complexity of the systems required to manage infectious disease outbreaks in South 
Africa. The study participants identified significant strengths of the system, which 
provide a strong foundation for future improvements. Since many sectors and levels 
of workers are involved, it was often difficult to navigate these complex systems. 
The panel recognises that the voices of the participants provide clear advocacy for 
meaningful engagement between sectors with the shared aim of reducing the incidence 
of potential infectious disease outbreaks in the future. 
Chapter 6 summarises the key findings and recommendations arising from the 
different chapters. Specific recommendations were made under four distinct themes: 
1) Improving the capacity to detect and respond to infectious disease outbreaks.
2) Education and awareness raising.
3) Ethics review.
4) Scientific openness and transparency.
17
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1.1  Introduction
Research and development (R&D) and service delivery within the life science sector in 
South Africa are important elements in ensuring the well-being of its citizens and the 
continued growth and development of the sector. Discovery and innovation within the 
life sciences hold great potential benefits to humankind, but also potential risks, which 
should be proactively considered and managed to ensure the safe, sustainable and 
ethical advancement of these sciences and their applications. The considered, safe and 
ethical conduct of life scientists is not only imperative to ensure safety within the R&D 
environment, but also that of the societies and world within which they work and live.
The concepts and practices of biosafety and biosecurity relate directly to the activities 
and conduct of life scientists and intend to safeguard against exposure to, or the 
deliberate or inadvertent development or release of, living organisms and/or biological 
material that may harm humans and/or the environment. Biosafety and biosecurity 
have a common, general goal, i.e. protecting people and the environment against 
hazardous living organisms and biological materials, but they mitigate different risks. 
Biosafety, or more specifically laboratory biosafety, 
is a fairly well-established concept that refers to the 
containment principles, technologies and practices that 
are implemented to prevent unintentional exposure 
to (potentially) hazardous biological material, e.g. 
pathogens and toxins, or their accidental release.1 
More recently the term has also become synonymous 
with GMOs – specifically referring to the food/feed 
and environmental safety of these organisms. The 
biosafety of GMOs as assessed through food/feed 
and environmental risk assessments has developed 
into a separate discipline with related, but distinct, 
objectives, methodologies and regulatory frameworks. 
Although there are references to GMO biosafety, this 
consensus study focuses on laboratory biosafety.
In general, biosecurity refers to management systems designed to protect society and 
the environment against potentially harmful organisms and biological materials, but 
it too has divergent meanings depending on the context in which it is used. In an 
agricultural context, i.e. veterinary and plant health disciplines, the term has come 
___________________________________________________________________________________
1 WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 2004.
Biosafety and 
biosecurity 
measures safeguard 
against exposure 
to, or the deliberate 
or inadvertent 
development or 
release of, living 
organisms or 
biological material 
that may harm 
humans or the 
environment.
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to represent the protection of valued biological resources from foreign, harmful 
or invasive organisms.2 In contrast, in a public health context it is used to refer to 
systems that establish and maintain the security and oversight of potentially hazardous 
organisms and biological materials – especially those that could be misused to cause 
deliberate harm. Again, this consensus study will focus only on the latter.
This consensus study report presents the findings of a systematic assessment of the 
state of laboratory biosafety and biosecurity in a public health context in South 
Africa. It includes an overview and evaluation of the national legislative framework 
as well as institutional implementation and practices. The findings report on strengths, 
weaknesses and gaps in the legal framework and in its implementation at laboratory 
level. Recommendations are made to address the weaknesses and gaps identified. 
The study was completed at the time of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa (September 
2014), underscoring the importance of recommendations aimed at ensuring the safe, 
secure and ethical conduct of research in South Africa. 
1.2  Goal of the study
The overall goal of the study was to:
Make sustainable and evidence-based recommendations to the South African 
government and the scientific community to address the identified weaknesses in: 
existing legislation; the implementation of biosafety and biosecurity in laboratories; 
existing measures and capacity to detect and control the spread of infectious diseases; 
and to raise awareness about existing measures (including practices and legislation) 
to reduce the risks associated with dual-use research and to engage the life science 
community in a dialogue about biosafety and biosecurity.
1.3  Approach and methodology
The Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf) constituted a Biosafety and Biosecurity 
panel comprising ten national experts to assess the state of biosafety and biosecurity 
in South Africa. Brief biographies of the panel members are presented in Appendix 1. 
The panel used a variety of methods to conduct the research, including but not 
limited to:
i) Convening a series of Biosafety and Biosecurity panel meetings.
ii) Conducting a survey of life scientists’ experience and perceptions of biosafety and 
biosecurity measures in laboratories in South Africa. 
iii) Assessing existing legislation and regulations in relation to biosafety and biosecurity 
to identify strengths, weaknesses and gaps in laws and in their implementation.
___________________________________________________________________________________
2 FAO Biosecurity Toolkit, 2007.
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iv) Evaluating existing measures and capacity to detect, identify, control, and prevent 
the natural, accidental, or deliberate spread of infectious agents. 
v) Consultation with experts from a variety of disciplines (including experts with proven 
security expertise).
The research conducted for this consensus study included:
i) An investigation into the applicability and balance of relevant ethical principles 
through a review of literature.
ii) A critical overview of the implementation of biosafety and biosecurity measures in 
laboratories in South Africa and an assessment of the extent to which laboratory 
practices address safety and security concerns. 
iii) An assessment of existing relevant legislation and regulations in relation to biosafety 
and biosecurity in order to identify strengths, weaknesses and gaps in laws and 
in their implementation.
iv) An evaluation of existing measures and capacity to detect, identify, control and 
prevent the natural, accidental or deliberate spread of infectious agents. 
A number of studies were commissioned and contributed to the evidence available to 
the panel when compiling their recommendations. Commissioned studies included:
1. A critical overview of current practice in relation to the implementation of 
biosafety and biosecurity measures, and the application of ethics in South African 
laboratories. This study took the form of a survey, based on the application of a 
self-assessment tool developed by WHO3 adapted for local circumstances.
2. An evaluation of existing measures and capacity (nationally and regionally) to 
detect, identify, control, and prevent the natural, accidental, or deliberate spread 
of infectious agents, using a list of selected agents and toxins as a guideline. This 
evaluation included the engagement of scientists to discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses in their own facilities.
3. An overview of the existing relevant legislation and regulations in relation to 
biosafety and biosecurity and the identification of strengths, weaknesses and gaps 
in laws and implementation. 
In addition to the tasks undertaken as part of the scope of work, the panel investigated 
the applicability and balance of relevant ethical principles through a review of 
literature, and developed measures to raise awareness about existing measures 
(including practices and legislation) to reduce the risks associated with dual-use 
research and engage the life science community in a dialogue about biosafety and 
biosecurity.
___________________________________________________________________________________
3 WHO, Responsible life sciences research for global health security, 2010.
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2.1  Introduction
Discovery and innovation in the life sciences are booming based on significant, 
recent technological advance and the benefits it holds for health-care provision, food 
production, sustainable energy generation, environmental protection, etc. Although 
R&D within the life sciences promise a better future for all people, it is easy to 
also contemplate scenarios where negative impacts could result from such work. In 
particular, the intentional misuse of biological material and biotechnologies to develop 
harmful agents should be proactively considered in an effort to establish well-balanced 
frameworks that will effectively prevent misuse without hampering legitimate R&D. It 
is therefore inevitable that any reflections on biosafety and biosecurity will require a 
strong ethical dimension. 
The purpose of this chapter is to reflect on the morality and ethics of R&D and how 
this relates to the responsibilities of scientists in the life sciences. Dual-use research 
and the challenges it pose are discussed in particular and mechanisms of how 
ethics review should be institutionalised and managed with respect to biosafety and 
biosecurity are proposed.
2.2  Defining morality and ethics
Although the terms ‘morality‘ and ‘ethics’ are often used interchangeably, it is generally 
useful and conceptually desirable to distinguish between them. Morality refers to the 
widely perceptible societal phenomenon that people in all known societies submit 
their behaviour to normative evaluation. This submission of their behaviour to the 
judgment of obligation or normativity is the key distinguishing difference between 
humans and animals. Humans do not simply act in certain ways without the ability 
to choose to act differently – in contrast to the instinctual actions of animals. People 
accept that they ought to act in a certain way as informed by societal norms.4
Ethics, in contrast, refers to an intellectual activity in which we consciously reflect on 
the nature of our moral behaviour, as well as the norms that guide that behaviour, 
the sources of our moral judgements and the theories in terms of which we think and 
argue when we engage in moral deliberation. The kind of normative ethics that relates 
to the content of this report is referred to as applied ethics, where ethics theories and 
approaches to moral reasoning are applied to immediate, serious moral issues that 
require urgent attention because of their potential impact on society. Ethics comes into 
play particularly in a context where it is evident that callous, deliberate malicious or 
careless research behaviour could potentially harm or endanger human life and/or 
___________________________________________________________________________________
4 Norms are strong and widely acknowledged action guides, sometimes also strongly linked to 
a certain society, though often valid in most societies.
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the environment. Concerns regarding life science research and development work, 
as embodied in biosafety and biosecurity management systems, therefore arise from 
a widespread realisation that these activities require morally responsible behaviour 
to guard against their danger and misuse. 
The abuse of biological material for harmful actions against humans is indicative of a 
phenomenon long recognised in philosophical and ethics literature, i.e. that science 
is not value-free (Feyerabend, 1975; Kuhn, 1962). It is increasingly agreed that 
value orientations cannot be divorced from the legitimate and responsible practice 
of science (Rossouw, 1980; Van Niekerk, 1992). Values are in play in particular 
when the aims of science are to be decided and evaluated. Objectivity and truth are 
regulative ideals that ought to guide the progresses of science and innovation and 
at times these ideals do act as important bulwarks against the threat of ideological 
derailments of science. However, under the direction of malicious intentions and aims, 
science and its products can also be used as very destructive forces, as illustrated by 
the infamous use of Zyklon B during the Holocaust to murder millions of people and 
the development of nuclear weapons during the Second World War.
2.3 Dual-use research – the main moral dilemma related to 
biosafety and biosecurity
Dual-use research (DUR) is defined as life sciences research that can be reasonably 
anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products or technologies that could be 
directly misapplied to pose a significant threat, with broad potential consequences to 
public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, 
materiel or national security.5 The dual-use problematic has evolved in response to 
ever-growing fears that certain areas of the life sciences are vulnerable to misuse 
and that research conducted within these areas may be used to develop biological 
weapons. More specifically, the dual-use literature is driven by concern elicited by the 
publishing of the results in scientific academic journals of several experiments involving 
deadly viruses (Cello et al., 2002; Jackson et al., 2001; Tumpey et al., 2005), which 
could be replicated by nefarious individuals or groups, with catastrophic results. 
Due to this potential for misuse, there is a distinct polarisation within the scientific 
community regarding whether or not the results should have been published, which 
has implications for future research of a similar nature. 
The debate is comprised, on the one hand, by the position that scientific freedom of 
enquiry, scientific transparency, the right to publish and the need to replicate and verify 
research are good or valuable things in themselves and should thus be protected; 
___________________________________________________________________________________
5 NIH, Office of Science Policy (www.osp.nih.gov). 
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and on the other hand, by security concerns related to the potential for harm that 
could result from the misuse of such research. Most of life science research which 
possesses the potential for harmful misuse also results in tangible benefits related 
to the understanding and treatment of illnesses and diseases and thus for human 
health in general. The two opposing sets of values, the awareness of an intention 
to do good in the presence of a possible intention to cause harm, the problems of 
control and regulation of scientific research to which they give rise to and who must 
bear responsibility for this, are all aspects of what is generally understood as the 
dual-use dilemma. 
Choice of research focus compels the scientist and associated scientific institution 
to decide on behalf of society between different, but equally compelling, goods. On 
the one hand there is the good associated not only with the benefits that could arise 
from successful research, such as the promotion of human health and flourishing, 
but also the good associated with the freedom or right of the scientist to pursue and 
generate knowledge itself and on the other hand, there is the good that arise from 
avoiding potential casualties associated with the possible misuse of research, materials 
or technologies. The main issue thus lies in how these competing values or goods 
should be balanced or adjudicated, who is responsible for this endeavour and how 
it should be regulated. 
The burden of this responsibility must be placed not solely upon the individual scientist, 
but upon the scientific community as a whole. There is an implicit obligation that exists 
between the institution of science and the public which enables the former to secure 
particular privileges such as autonomy, public funding and public trust, in exchange 
for the fulfilment of certain responsibilities and duties. When there is a threat to public 
safety, safety concerns must override those related to the right to freedom of scientific 
enquiry. However, such a conclusion presupposes that it is possible to ascertain clear 
evidence of a threat.
It may be helpful to discern between the risk that particular dual-use research may 
represent and the presence of a clear threat that it will in fact be developed for illicit 
use by nefarious individuals or groups. The presence of such a foreseeable threat 
would require the enactment of more stringent regulatory measures (Forge, 2010). 
The real question therefore becomes whether or not it is possible to establish the 
credibility of a threat regarding the possible misuse of dual-use research. Of course, 
complexity is added if the manner in which a threat is portrayed serves a particular 
political agenda.
The way in which a threat is perceived will have direct relevance for how it is 
addressed – not only at the level of government, but also in terms of the reactions 
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of scientists who are the key proponents in the dual-use dilemma. In order to ensure 
that scientists abide by any regulatory measures that are required, they must concur 
with the established threat credibility. This implies that scientists must not only be 
informed of relevant information but must also be involved in the process of threat 
identification. Perceptions of and the degree of threat posed by dual-use research is 
highly variable and as such, regulations must be flexible and innovative in order to 
encompass changes in science, as well as possible changes in threat.
Miller and Selgelid (2007) argue against control resting solely in the hands of either 
scientific institutions or government. They favour a system where dual control is shared 
between the two, with the formation of an independent body constituted by both 
scientific and security experts with ultimate power. Development of a mandatory code 
of ethical conduct for the life sciences as a profession in order to prevent the misuse 
of research, akin to the Hippocratic Oath to do no harm which is taken by doctors, 
has received much attention in the literature (Revill and Dando, 2006). 
The intention to commit harm will always be present and in this regard, very little 
control exists. Where control and regulation are possible, it is vital to ensure that 
absolute vigilance and due care be taken. Such control and regulation is impossible 
to achieve without the participation of the scientific community. Rather than requesting 
that the scientific community blindly adheres to a set of rules or accepts concerns 
that are viewed as foreign to the ethos of science as an institution, it would be more 
effective to impart knowledge regarding the dual-use dilemma. Acceptance of scientific 
responsibility will ensure the necessary participation and cooperation of the scientific 
community in devising strategies to address the possibility of misuse. There is a far 
greater likelihood of preventing the misuse of research if those working in vulnerable 
areas are attuned to the nature of the threat and are committed to taking the necessary 
precautionary steps required of them. 
2.4  Ensuring ethical research and development
Experimentation in and the application of biological weapons have been described 
long before the start of the First World War in 1914. Although international limitations 
and prohibitions on the abuse of microbes and pathogens for harmful and lethal 
intent, including the 1925 Geneva Convention and the Biological and Toxins Weapons 
Convention, were set in place during the 20th century, serious concerns remain. These 
include concerns regarding the availability and accessibility of microorganisms as 
well as the technologies based on their use and applications.
The increasing recognition of the role and application of moral values in science 
practice encouraged the development of various broad ethics guidelines for scientists, 
which can also be used to assess the ethical standing of R&D projects – especially in 
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the life sciences. For example, the Singapore Statement on Research Integrity6 states 
that “the value and benefits of research are vitally dependent on the integrity of the 
research” and then lists honesty, accountability, professional courtesy and fairness and 
good stewardship as the fundamental principles on which research integrity is based. 
It continues to list 14 different responsibilities of researchers to ensure the integrity 
of their research, of which adherence to regulations, reporting and responding to 
irresponsible research practices and societal considerations have particular bearing 
on biosafety and biosecurity matters as discussed in this study.
Similarly, a “universal ethical code for scientists” developed by the United Kingdom’s 
(UK’s) Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills endeavours to “renew the 
trust relationship between scientists and society”.7 In this case the code of conduct 
is based on the societal values of rigour, respect and responsibility (See text box).
___________________________________________________________________________________
6 www.singaporestatement.org.
7 www.dius.gov.uk.
A UNIVERSAL ETHICAL CODE FOR SCIENTISTS
Rigour
Rigour, honesty and integrity
Act with skill and care in all scientific work. Maintain up-to-date skills and 
assist their development in others. Take steps to prevent corrupt practices and 
professional misconduct. Declare conflicts of interest. Be alert to the ways in 
which research derives from and affects the work of other people, and respect 
the rights and reputations of others.
Respect
Respect for life, the law and the public good
Ensure that your work is lawful and justified. Minimise and justify any adverse 
effect your work may have on people, animals and the natural environment.
Responsibility
Responsible communication: listening and informing
Seek to discuss the issues that science raises for society. Listen to the aspirations 
and concerns of others. Do not knowingly mislead, or allow others to be 
misled, about scientific matters. Present and review scientific evidence, theory 
or interpretation honestly and accurately. 
From “A universal ethical code for scientists”, UK Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills.
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2.5 The institutionalisation and management of research ethics 
in South Africa
Ethics awareness and the ethical review of scientific research in South Africa have 
increased exponentially over the past 30 years following trends abroad – particularly 
in the United States of America (USA). In terms of the South African National Health 
Act (Act 61 of 2003), all scientific research with human participants and animal 
subjects has to undergo ethical review by a legitimate research ethics committee 
(REC). All RECs have to be accredited by the National Health Research Ethics Council 
of South Africa (NHREC).8 The NHREC is appointed by the Minister of Health for a 
period of three years and is the highest policymaking body for research ethics in the 
country. The NHREC formulates and publishes extensive guidelines for ethical research 
with human participants and animal subjects, drawing on established international 
guidelines including the Nuremberg Code, the Belmont Report and the (often revised) 
Declaration of Helsinki.
Ethical review of research protocols involving research with human participants and 
animal subjects is standard practice globally. Assessing the impact of research and 
potential harms on human and animal health, as well as on the environment, is a 
necessary part of the research process. In the light of earlier comments that science 
is not always value-neutral and acknowledging its potential adverse effects, it is 
imperative to set procedures and practices in place that aim to protect the legitimate 
interests of humans, animals and the environment. This needs to be done in such a 
way that the progress of science is not hampered or unnecessarily delayed.
It is notable that in South Africa the formulation of guidelines for research on other 
organisms, and in particular microorganisms, that may negatively impact human 
health, well-being and/or the environment, has been lagging behind relative to the 
formulation of guidelines for research with human participants and animal subjects. 
This is increasingly recognised, and efforts are underway within some government 
departments, e.g. DAFF and some national research agencies to rectify the situation. 
For the purposes of this report, the panel acknowledges that much work must still be 
done to improve the applicability of the current system of ethics review to research 
on microorganisms. 
The panel noted that specific RECs to assess the nature of microorganism research must 
be appointed at, or be made available to, all research facilities. Guidelines to determine 
which kinds of research require ethical assessment and what the ideal composition of 
an REC would be for such purposes need to be developed. The term office for REC 
___________________________________________________________________________________
8 http://www.ethicsapp.co.za.
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members and accompanying terms of reference 
(TOR) and standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) require formulation. 
The panel is of the opinion that members of 
such an REC should include, first and foremost, 
experts in the field, as well as people with 
expertise in ethics, representatives of the 
community and people with experience in 
ethical review. It is essential that members of an 
REC be properly trained for their work. There 
are a number of relevant certificates, diplomas 
and Masters programmes available at several 
South African tertiary institutions. It is important 
that there not be any direct conflicts of interest 
in the appointment and practice of members 
of such an REC. 
South Africa should 
establish clear, 
encompassing and 
balanced ethical 
guidelines for all life 
science research and 
development work to 
ensure our safety and 
the integrity of the 
environment we live in.
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3.1  Introduction
The South African government is committed to protecting the health and safety of 
the South African people. Improved socio-economic conditions, effective vaccination 
programmes, education and hygiene measures are key to reducing the incidence 
of communicable diseases in the general population. However, the risk of infectious 
disease outbreaks and full-scale epidemics is recognised as a major public health 
threat both nationally and internationally. Emerging pathogens, such as the severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) virus, and increasing resistance to antibiotics in 
existing pathogens contribute to this risk. Global travel and the rise of bioterrorism 
are additional factors threatening public health and safety (Frieden et al., 2014).
Frieden et al. (2014) outline three components of government responsibility essential 
to ensuring public health security: 1) prevention; 2) early detection, and 3) timely and 
adequate response. Prevention includes having systems, policies and procedures in 
place to mitigate avoidable outbreaks. Detection requires a national surveillance and 
laboratory system capable of reliable testing for five or more of ten core tests relevant 
to the country’s epidemiological profile, as well as electronic reporting systems and 
a multidisciplinary public health workforce. Adequate response is reflected by an 
established national public health emergency operations centre able to activate an 
emergency response to suspected outbreaks within 120 minutes. 
The International Health Regulations (IHR) were revised by the WHO in 2005 and 
address directly new and emerging epidemic threats (WHO, 2008). South Africa is 
one of 194 signatory countries that have committed to improving capacity to better 
meet the requirements of the IHR (Frieden et al., 2014). 
The South African government has also adopted the measures laid out in UNSCR 
1540 that requires all member states of the United Nations (UN) to address issues 
relating to nuclear, biological and chemical materials and their associated research, 
developmental and stockpiling through domestic legislation. Relevant domestic 
legislation, once developed and ratified, has to be submitted in the form of matrices 
to a UNSC Committee responsible for the enforcement of Resolution 1540. It is then 
scrutinised for how it addresses the production, storage, use, accounting and securing 
of nuclear, biological and chemical materials, as well as the import and export and 
border controls of such materials.
Despite South Africa’s participation in the above conventions, its current ability to 
prevent, detect and respond to an emerging pathogen outbreak or a bioterrorism 
attack is not fully known. This study was therefore undertaken to first scope all the 
South African legislation broadly relevant to biosafety and biosecurity (Section 3.2) 
and then to address those directly related to the prevention, detection, identification 
31
and control of infectious agents (Section 3.3). In both sections, the strengths and 
weaknesses of the existing legislation and regulations are critically discussed and 
improvements proposed.
3.2 An assessment of existing legislation and regulations 
relevant to biosafety and biosecurity in South Africa
3.2.1  Aim
The aim of this study is to assess existing relevant legislation and regulations in 
relation to biosafety and biosecurity considerations and to identify associated strengths, 
weaknesses and gaps in the laws and their implementation. The basis for the legislative 
overview was South Africa’s submission to the UN Committee responsible for the 
implementation of UNSCR 1540.
3.2.2  Specific objectives 
The specific objectives of the first part of this study were as follows:
i) A desktop review of South Africa’s submissions to the UNSCR 1540 Committee 
and associated matrices.
ii) Identification of all relevant legislation and regulations pertinent to biosafety and 
biosecurity within South Africa either directly or indirectly mentioned or listed in 
the above-mentioned legislation.
iii) Consultations with relevant South African government departments in order to 
discuss their successes and challenges with regard to the drafting, legislating and 
implementation of the laws.
iv) Analysis of the findings from the desktop review and consultations in order to 
make recommendations consolidated into this report.
3.2.3  Methods
The study was conducted primarily by means of an analytical desktop review of 
available listed and recorded legislation and the documentation of such legislation in 
tabular format. This format was then presented to relevant South African government 
departments who were asked to provide input and their comments were subsequently 
incorporated into the table and the final report.
3.2.3.1  Desktop review of current legislation
The study commenced with an assessment and analysis of the South African submission 
to the UNSCR 1540 Committee. The submissions, in the form of matrices, were 
submitted by the South African government to the UNSCR 1540 Committee in 2005, 
2006 and 2007 and each was assessed and analysed. All three years’ submissions 
were taken into account in order to ensure that no legislation was neglected or missed 
in each subsequent submission. All identified legislation was obtained from either the 
South African government department websites or from other independent sources.
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The legislation was then assessed, analysed and tabulated, listing the relevant 
chapter/s or articles using the following characteristics:
1. Biological safety and security as listed in the UNSCR 1540 matrix.
2. Relevance and applicability to biosafety and biosecurity.
3. Relevant department or ministry responsible for the implementation of the 
legislation or relevant department or ministry listed in the legislation. 
3.2.3.2  Identification of additional legislation not included in UNSCR 1540
Once the above table had been completed, legislation and regulations not mentioned 
in the South African submission to the UNSCR 1540 matrix were identified. The 
majority of these laws were identified through scrutinising legislation listed in the 
UNSCR 1540 matrix to identify additional legislation. Once this legislation was 
identified, the same process as for the UNSCR 1540 legislation was conducted, 
whereby each piece of legislation or regulation was individually assessed, analysed 
and tabulated according to the same criteria.
3.2.3.3  Consultation with relevant government departments
After identification, assessment and analysis of the legislation and regulations had 
been completed, a workshop was held in March 2014 where representatives from 
relevant government departments were invited to discuss various aspects relating to 
the legislation and regulations. Even though personnel from all relevant government 
departments/organisations were invited to this workshop, not all were able to 
participate.9 The participants were provided with the tables of legislation and asked 
to comment on aspects such as challenges regarding implementation, perceived 
strengths and weaknesses in the legislation and regulations, and how these could 
be better improved or addressed. Their inputs were analysed and incorporated into 
Table 3.1.
3.2.4  Results
3.2.4.1  Legislation related to the UNSCR 1540 Matrix
Twenty-two pieces of legislation were identified and acquired. On further inspection, 
two pieces of legislation had in fact been withdrawn and replaced domestically, and 
one piece of legislation was unobtainable from the various sources under which it 
was listed. Full details of the legislation are provided in Table 3.1.
___________________________________________________________________________________
9 The following departments and agencies were represented at the workshop: Department 
of Health, Department of Environmental Affairs, Department of Science and Technology, 
Department of International Relations and Co-operation, Department of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries; Protechnik Laboratories.
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3.2.4.2  Additional legislation not included in UNSCR 1540
A further nine pieces of relevant legislation were identified which do not form part of 
the UNSCR 1540 matrix. These are detailed in Table 3.2.
3.2.4.3  Workshop discussion and feedback 
The workshop provided useful insights into the reality of the implementation of 
biosafety and security legislation in the country, indicating various limitations. Workshop 
participants noted that several of the laws and regulations that should support the control 
of bio-hazardous agents have deficiencies. These deficiencies are outlined below. 
1.  Categorisation of hazardous pathogens is unclear and inconsistent 
This can complicate the inclusion of some pathogens in the lists produced by different 
departments and create uncertainty regarding which department or ministry is responsible 
for these.
2.  Responsibilities are divided between departments 
There are cases where multiple departments have responsibilities for different aspects 
of control. For example, the control of GMOs is required by the GMO Act (Act 15 of 
1997), while research with GMOs may also be subject to the Clinical Trials Regulations 
Act (Act 101 of 1965) and the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Act (Act 87 of 1993). In the case of an experimental HIV vaccine using genetically 
modified Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis Virus as a vector which was submitted for 
use in a clinical trial, permits were required from each of the responsible bodies. Such 
a situation, which makes the system difficult to navigate for researchers or institutions, 
may result in duplication and prolongs the process of acquiring permits. This may 
impact on the use, production and storage of GMOs for commercial purposes. 
Table 3.1: Legislation listed according to the South African government’s submission 
to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 matrix
Legislation Chapter/Article 
as listed in 
UNSCR 1540 
Matrix
Relevance/Applicability Ministry/
Department 
Responsible
Agricultural 
Pests Act (Act 36 
of 1983)
Account for 
Production, Use 
& Storage
Mentions import and export 
regulations and control measures 
for certain pathogens.
Lists the right to inspection and 
how it should be executed.
Lists offences and penalties.
Department 
of Agriculture, 
Forestry and 
Fisheries
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Legislation Chapter/Article 
as listed in 
UNSCR 1540 
Matrix
Relevance/Applicability Ministry/
Department 
Responsible
Animal Health 
Act (Act 7 of 
2002)
Account for 
Production, Use 
& Storage
Mentions biological experiments.
Lists export and transit limitations.
Lists inspection and search criteria 
as well as offences and penalties 
associated with deviating/
breaching the Act.
Department 
of Agriculture, 
Forestry and 
Fisheries
Customs and 
Excise Act (Act 
91 of 1964) as 
amended of 
2009
Section 4
Section 6
Section 113
Unclear. South African 
Revenue Service
Export Control 
Regulations 
Notice 672 of 
2008
Schedule 1: 
Munitions of War
Notice was withdrawn in 
2012 and replaced by the 
Import Control Notice R92 of 
10 February 2012.
N/A
Export Control 
Regulations 
Notice R92 of 
2012
Whole notice 
but focus on 
export controls 
for Weapons of 
Mass Destruction 
and specifically 
Biological 
Weapons
Lists exports that require licensure.
Specific mention of human blood 
products.
Lists classification of export 
according to schedules (I-III).
International 
Trade 
Administration 
Commission
Geneva 
Protocol of 
1925
Whole Protocol Deals with accession notification.
Prohibits the use of biological 
agents during war or peace.
Various
Genetically 
Modified 
Organism Act 
(Act 15 of 1997)
Enforcement
Section 21
Addresses facilities (all 
encompassing).
Mentions the need for accidental 
notification.
Lists the need to import and 
export permits.
Lists the need for routine 
inspections of facilities to ensure 
compliance with the Act.
Lists offences and penalties for 
deviation/breaching from the Act.
Department 
of Agriculture, 
Forestry and 
Fisheries
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Legislation Chapter/Article 
as listed in 
UNSCR 1540 
Matrix
Relevance/Applicability Ministry/
Department 
Responsible
Hazardous 
Substances Act 
(Act 15 of 1973)
Transport Classifies substances according to 
their Groups (I-IV).
Prohibits the use, sale, and 
production of certain substances/
pathogens according to their 
classification.
Mentions licensure and 
transportation criteria and the 
powers of inspection.
Lists offences and penalties for 
deviation/breaching the Act.
Department of 
Health
Health Act 
(Act 61 of 2003)
Account for 
Production, Use 
& Storage
Mentions production, use and 
storage of blood, blood products, 
tissues and gametes.
Specifies the legal procedure for 
removing tissues from alive/dead 
patients.
Details legal procedure for 
experimentation/research on 
humans.
Lists standards and norms 
required at institutions dealing 
with biological materials.
Mentions powers of inspection 
and environmental health 
investigations should biological 
materials be thought/seen to be 
affecting a population’s health.
Department of 
Health
Import 
Regulations 
Notice R206 of 
2009
Schedule 1: 
Munitions of War
Notice was withdrawn in 
2012 and replaced by the 
Import Control Notice R91 of 
10 February 2012.
International 
Trade 
Administration 
Commission
Import Control 
Regulations 
Notice R91 of 
2012
Whole notice 
but focus on 
import controls 
for Weapons of 
Mass Destruction 
and specifically 
Biological 
Weapons
Lists imports that require licensure.
Mentions weapons systems in 
general (may be dual-use).
Mentions the Montreal Protocol 
and the 1988 UN Convention.
International 
Trade 
Administration 
Commission
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Legislation Chapter/Article 
as listed in 
UNSCR 1540 
Matrix
Relevance/Applicability Ministry/
Department 
Responsible
International 
Trade 
Administration 
Act (Act 71 of 
2003)
Section 6
Part E
Lists regulations relating to the 
import and export and powers 
to investigate, search and seize 
materials of a general nature 
and this can include biological 
materials as well.
Department 
of Trade and 
Industry
Non-
Proliferation 
of Weapons 
of Mass 
Destruction 
(WMD) Act (Act 
87 of 1993)
Section 13
Section 26
Section 27
Focus on controlling goods, 
issuing permits and registering 
materials that could possibly 
(dual-use) be used for the 
development of a weapon of 
mass destruction.
Mentions threat of use and 
punishment associated with it.
Details governments’ responsibility 
to enter into and ratify treaties, 
conventions and agreements.
Lists offences and penalties for 
deviation/breaching the Act.
Attached to the Act is the 
Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Biological and Toxic 
Weapons.
Department 
of Trade and 
Industry
Amendments 
to the Non-
Proliferation Act 
(Act 87 of 1993)
Whole 
Amendment
Attached to the above Act. Department 
of Trade and 
Industry
Notice 16 of 
3 February 
2010
Whole Notice Registration form for individuals/
companies seeking to make use 
of controlled goods.
Relates to all materials (dual-use) 
that could be used to develop 
weapons of mass destruction.
Department 
of Trade and 
Industry
Notice 19 of 
3 February 
2010
Whole Notice Deals with import and export 
of all materials of a biological 
nature.
Specific mention made of 
licensure and facility requirements.
Lists all materials according to the 
group classification.
Department 
of Trade and 
Industry
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Legislation Chapter/Article 
as listed in 
UNSCR 1540 
Matrix
Relevance/Applicability Ministry/
Department 
Responsible
Notice 22 of 
3 February 
2010
Whole Notice Deals with missile technology and 
components (could be applicable 
when looking at dual-use).
Department 
of Trade and 
Industry
Notice 429 of 
10 April 2002
Delivery Deals with missile technology and 
components (could be applicable 
when looking at dual-use).
Department 
of Trade and 
Industry
National 
Security 
Information 
(NSI) Act (Act 
30 of 2004)
Personnel Security 
Checks
Deals with background checks, 
etc.
South African 
Police Service, 
Ministry of Safety 
and Security
Protection of 
Constitutional 
Democracy 
Against 
Terrorists 
and Related 
Activities Act 
(Act 33 of 2004)
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Act deals with terrorist acts against 
the state but does mention that 
material provision (pathogens, 
etc.) can be punishable.
Lists offences/penalties for 
deviating/breaching the Act.
South African 
Police Service, 
Ministry of Safety 
and Security
Road 
Transportation 
Act (Act 74 of 
1997)
Transport Act unobtainable. Unclear
South African 
Police Service 
Amendment Act 
(Act 57 of 2008)
Where Applicable Mainly deals with the 
establishment of the Directorate of 
Priority Crimes Investigation.
New sections (amendment) 
dealing with violations of the 
Non-Proliferation of WMD Act 87 
of 1993.
South African 
Police Service, 
Ministry of Safety 
and Security
Space Affairs 
Act (Act 84 of 
1993)
Section 22
Section 23
Mentions dual-use technologies 
and their applicability to weapons 
of mass destruction.
Department 
of Trade and 
Industry
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Table 3.2: Legislation additional to that listed in UNSCR 1540
Legislation Relevant 
Chapter/
Article 
Relevance/Applicability Ministry/
Department 
Responsible
Animal Diseases Act 
(Act 35 of 1984)
Selected Import and export permits.
Experiments, research and 
quarantine guidelines.
Department 
of Agriculture, 
Forestry and 
Fisheries
Health Act (Act 61 of 
2003): Regulations relating 
to Artificial Fertilisation of 
Persons, R175 of 2012
Selected Deals with the artificial 
fertilisation (insemination 
and removal of gametes) of 
human beings.
Department 
of Health
Health Act (Act 61 of 
2003): Regulations 
regarding the Rendering of 
Clinical Forensic Medicine 
Services, R176 of 2012
Selected Deals with sexual 
assault and the forensic 
examinations that follow 
from reporting cases of 
sexual assault.
Department 
of Health
Health Act (Act 61 of 
2003): Regulations relating 
to the use of Human 
Biological Material, R177 
of 2012
Selected Deals with biological 
materials for testing and 
research.
Department 
of Health
Health Act (Act 61 of 
2003): Regulations 
relating to the Registration 
of Microbiological 
Laboratories and the 
Acquisition, Importation, 
Handling, Maintenance 
and Supply of Human 
Pathogens, R178 of 2012
Selected Deals with legislation 
regarding possession, 
handling, etc. of biological 
pathogens.
Outlines facility 
requirements such as safety 
standards, transport criteria, 
etc.
Department 
of Health
Health Act (Act 61 of 
2003): Regulations relating 
to Blood and Blood 
Products, R179 of 2012.
Selected Mainly the transfer of blood 
and blood products.
Department 
of Health
Health Act (Act 61 of 
2003): Regulations 
regarding the General 
Control of Human Bodies, 
Tissue, Blood, Blood 
Products and Gametes, 
R180 of 2012
Selected Deals with the removal of 
blood, gametes and tissue 
from living persons, the 
establishment of death, 
the disposal of unclaimed 
bodies and the handling, 
conveyance and burial of 
bodies.
Lists the institutions 
authorised to do removal of 
the above.
Department 
of Health
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Legislation Relevant 
Chapter/
Article 
Relevance/Applicability Ministry/
Department 
Responsible
Health Act (Act 61 of 
2003): Regulations relating 
to the Import and Export 
of Human Tissue, Blood, 
Blood Products, Cultured 
Cells, Stem Cells, Embryos, 
Foetal Tissue, Zygotes and 
Gametes, R181 of 2012
Selected Deals with import and 
export permits and 
registration of companies, 
etc. that deal with 
biological materials.
Department 
of Health
Health Act (Act 61 of 
2003): Regulations relating 
to Tissue Banks, R182 of 
2012
Selected Outlines facility 
requirements and storage 
conditions for biological 
materials.
Department 
of Health
Another example refers to shipments containing materials that fall under the control 
or regulation of DAFF and DoH. In such cases it is unclear whether one department 
should be responsible for inspecting the entire shipment mentioned or whether each 
department should send an individual inspector and inspect the shipment together. 
It was noted that there have been liaison challenges in the past with regard to 
inspections requiring multiple departments and that this has led to delays in delivery 
of final shipments. It is unclear how such challenges could be overcome given that 
the guidelines of each department deal with biological materials specifically under 
their purview, especially given the significant amount of time it takes to amend and 
implement legislative changes. 
Workshop participants suggested that a “hierarchy of legislation” be developed. This 
would allow for the identification of ‘primary’ legislation in such a situation. Participants 
did not determine how such a hierarchy could be developed and acknowledged that 
departments may be reluctant to defer their responsibilities to another department. 
Participants agreed that changes to existing legislation to make it more ‘user-friendly’ 
would be welcome, but described the difficulties and delays in the passing of new 
legislation as a significant barrier. 
3.  Varied interpretations surrounding domestic and international differences with 
regard to biological safety levels (BSL) 
Domestic guidelines in respect of BSLs are not as stringent and/or detailed as those 
of international bodies such as the WHO. This could result in domestic BSLs being 
of a different standard when compared internationally. Workshop participants 
recommended that domestic legislation be regularly reassessed and harmonised so 
as to align with international norms and regulations. 
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4.  Uncertainty regarding implementation of the available domestic legislation
Inadequate infrastructure and capacity, in particular the capacity to inspect facilities 
and identify plants at border control points, are two major issues affecting the 
implementation of biological safety and security legislation. 
5.  Insufficient funding, personnel and facilities with respect to quarantine 
and inspection 
Workshop participants identified limited resources with respect to 1) maintenance of 
adequate quarantine and inspection of facilities; 2) appointment, training and retention 
of well-qualified inspectors, and 3) identification of the responsible department for 
the enforcement of inspections. 
It was noted that due to limited infrastructure and capacity at ports in South Africa, 
a significant number of incoming inspections are not conducted at port facilities but 
rather at end facilities, where there is greater infrastructure and capacity. 
This is a potential problem as materials are first transported to the end facility and 
then inspected. Should a hazardous material be discovered in a shipment or should 
an incident occur during the transport of such materials to an end facility it would 
make containment extremely difficult to put into operation. 
6. Limited human resources to inspect shipments entering and exiting the 
country 
Workshop participants mentioned shortages of funding to appoint, train and maintain 
personnel with the technical knowledge necessary to inspect, detect and deal with 
hazardous materials and that this is significantly affecting the ability of the country to 
maintain effective safety and security measures.
The responsibilities for conducting inspections and resource allocations for inspections 
are poorly defined. Given the wide range and number of departments and ministries 
involved with biological materials, exact responsibility for various materials can 
become blurred and difficult to assign. An initiative to strengthen and formalise 
inter-departmental cooperation in the field of biosecurity would be of benefit to 
South Africa.
3.2.4.4  Additional data-gathering
Following the presentation of the results of this study and the feedback from the March 
2014 workshop, members of the panel collated further relevant legislation specific to 
agriculture and biodiversity. This supplementary information is in Appendix 2.
41
3.2.5  Conclusions
This study sought to review legislation currently governing South African biological 
safety as listed in the governmental submission to the UNSCR 1540 Committee. 
The study furthermore sought to identify legislation and regulations pertinent to 
biological safety and security in the country not listed in the UNSCR 1540 submission 
through consultations with governmental departments and ministries involved in 
the biological safety and security arena. 
The study revealed that although the South 
African legislative framework is in fact 
robust and comprehensive, it suffers from 
some significant limitations and challenges. 
Through a desktop analysis of this legislation 
and the conducting of a workshop that 
brought together experts in the field, it 
was revealed that the majority of these 
challenges centred on the categorisation 
of pathogens, the lack of harmonisation, 
and infrastructure and capacity challenges 
in the field.
3.3  Review of infectious agents and related regulations
3.3.1  Aim
The aim was to identify, collate and review current South African governmental 
regulations, policies and guidelines for detecting, identifying, controlling and 
preventing the natural, accidental or deliberate spread of infectious agents.
3.3.2  Specific objectives
The specific objectives of the second part of this study were as follows:
i) Compile a list of all infectious agents relevant to South Africa.
ii) Compile a list all of relevant government departments and institutions responsible 
for or involved in infectious agent detection, identification, control and prevention.
iii) Identify relevant national regulations, policies and guidelines for detecting, 
identifying, controlling and preventing each listed infectious agent.
iv) Review each regulation to determine where gaps exist for detection, identification, 
control and prevention of infectious agents.
3.3.3  Methods
The study used a methodological approach employed by systematic reviews to 
ensure that the results were comprehensive and wherever possible, reduced bias. 
Although the South African 
regulatory framework for 
biosafety and biosecurity- 
related issues is robust and 
comprehensive, it suffers 
from significant limitations 
and challenges that should 
be addressed to ensure 
effective regulation without 
impeding research and 
development.
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A protocol detailing the search strategy, inclusion criteria and analytical methods 
was developed. 
3.3.3.1  List of infectious agents
It was not possible to identify a single, comprehensive list of infectious agents relevant 
to South Africa. The panel proposed the development of a consensus list of infectious 
agents relevant and important to South Africa. The list would include infectious agents 
targeting humans, animals, and/or plants and comprising bacteria, viruses, parasites, 
fungi, prions and toxins. The final compiled list of all infectious agents was based on 
two international and four local sources (Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3: International and local lists used to develop a single, comprehensive list 
of South African relevant infectious agents
List Name Source Issuing Authority URL1
List of Tests for 
International 
Trade2
Manual of Diagnostic 
Tests and Vaccines for 
Terrestrial Animals. 
Terrestrial Manual 7th 
Edition, 2012 Volumes 
1 and 2
World Organisation 
for Animal Health 
http://www.oie.int/
fileadmin/Home/eng/
Health_standards/
tahm/0.02_
PRESCRIBED_
TESTS_2012.pdf 
Select Agents and 
Toxins List3
United States Select 
Agent Regulations (42 
CFR Part 73, 9 CFR 
Part 121, and 7 CFR 
Part 331)
United States 
Departments 
of Health and 
Human Service and 
Agriculture
http://www.
selectagents.gov/
resources/List_of_
Select_Agents_and_
Toxins_2013-09-10.pdf 
List of controlled 
and notifiable 
animal diseases
South African Animal 
Diseases Act 35 of 
1984, 18 June 2010
Department of 
Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries
http://www.daff.gov.za/
vetweb/Disease Control 
List of controlled 
notifiable Animal 
Diseases 2007.pdf
List of notifiable 
human diseases
South African Health 
Act 63, 1977
Department of 
Health 
Link on www.doh.gov.
za not operational. List 
obtained from Western 
Cape Department of 
Health Communicable 
Disease Control
Annexure A, 
Non-Proliferation 
of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction 
Act
South African Non-
Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Act 87 of 
1993, amended 2010
Department of 
Trade and Industry
http://www.thedti.gov.
za/nonproliferation/
pdf/GN19_English.pdf 
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List Name Source Issuing Authority URL1
Annexure B, 
Hazardous 
Biological Agents 
Guidelines
South African 
Occupational Health 
and Safety Act, 
1993, Regulations for 
Hazardous Biological 
Agents. 27 December 
2001
Department of 
Labour
http://www.labour.gov.
za/DOL/downloads/
legislation/regulations/
occupational-
health-and-safety/
Regulation2013-2020 
Hazardous Biological 
agents.pdf 
1 All of the above lists and URLs were accessed during January and February 2014.
2 The List of Tests for International Trade is produced by the World Organisation for Animal 
Health and includes prescribed and alternative which are considered optimal for determining 
the health status of animals and are required for the international movement of animals and 
animal products. 
3 The Select Agents and Toxins List produced by the United States Departments of Health and 
Human Service and Agriculture includes all organisms which potentially pose a severe threat 
to both human and animal health, to plant health, or to animal and plant products.
Each infectious agent was classified as follows:
1.  Type of infectious agent:
1.1  Bacteria 1.2  Virus 1.3  Parasite 1.4  Fungi
1.5  Mite 1.6  Prion 1.7  Toxin
2.  Target of infectious agent (can be a single target or multiple targets, e.g. 
human and animal):
2.1 Human 2.2 Animal 2.3 Plant
If the type or target of an infectious agent was unclear, information for each organism 
was sourced from internet sites using the hierarchical process outlined in Figure 3.1 
to ensure the quality of the information retrieved.
Figure 3.1: Hierarchical process to determine type and target of infectious agent.
Medscape
http://emedicine.
medscape.com
US Centres for 
Disease Control & 
Prevention
www.cdc.org
US National  
Library of Medicine
http://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pubmed
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If the above hierarchical process did not yield relevant information for a named 
infectious organism, the search was broadened to searching www.google.com. This 
often yielded academic papers (journal articles) which were then read for further 
information. Where there was an indication from the scientific literature that an 
infectious agent previously considered only pathogenic to animals, may also affect 
humans, the target would be recorded as ‘animal and human’. 
3.3.3.2  List of South African government departments and other institutions
Two researchers worked together to identify all relevant national government 
departments and other institutions responsible or involved in infectious agent 
detection, identification control and prevention. This was done initially using expert 
knowledge sourced from the panel to identify relevant departments. The researchers 
then searched departmental websites and used a snow-balling technique where 
government departments and institutions cross-referenced other relevant departments 
or sources. A saturation point was reached when no further departments or institutions 
were identified in this way. Website and contact details, together with information on 
whether the institution was state-owned or private, were recorded on an MS Excel 
spreadsheet. 
3.3.3.3  Identification of relevant national regulations, policies and guidelines
Two researchers searched each government website for all regulations relevant to the 
detection, identification, control and prevention of infectious agents in South Africa. If 
policies and guidelines were also available these were recorded. Where regulations 
were not available electronically, the relevant departments were telephoned for further 
information and electronic copies of the relevant regulations were requested. The 
panel provided copies of relevant documents to supplement the search and identified 
policies under development and/or regulations which were not yet promulgated 
or were undergoing a consultative process. The list of regulations compiled in the 
previous section was cross-checked to ensure consistency.  
3.3.3.4  Review of relevant national regulations
Each identified regulation was reviewed for the following:
1.  Source of regulation 
• Department name
• Availability on website/electronic copy via telephone/hard copy
2.  Type of infectious agent covered if stipulated:
•  Bacteria •  Virus •  Parasite •  Fungi
•  Mite •  Prion •  Toxin
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3.  Target of infectious agent (can be multiple) if stipulated:
•  Human •  Animal •  Plant
4.  Focus of regulation (can be multiple):
•  Detection •  Identification
•  Control •  Prevention
The data were extracted and entered into an MS Excel spreadsheet and summarised 
in tabular format.
3.3.3.5  Analytical framework
All regulations that specifically included tables or appendices of infectious agents 
were selected. The single list of infectious agents compiled, was mapped against 
these regulations and a record made of each regulation, which included the infectious 
agent by name. 
Wherever possible, new taxonomic classifications were used regardless of the 
taxonomy used in the original regulations. For example, the bacteria previously known 
as Pseudomonas pseudomallei was recorded under its new name of Burkholderia 
pseudomallei and all the regulations were scrutinised for either name. 
Where regulations used disease terminology rather than the name of the causative 
agent, the name of the causative agent was sought and preferentially recorded, with 
the disease name in brackets. For example, the bacteria, Ehrlichia ruminantium is 
recorded as Ehrichlia species in the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA) 
(Act 85 of 1993), Regulations for Hazardous Biological Agents (RHB) R1390 of 
27 December 2001, whereas in the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) Terrestrial 
Manual for Animal Health List of Tests for International Trade the condition it causes is 
recorded as ‘Heartwater’. The infectious agent was captured as Ehrlichia ruminantium 
(Heartwater) and all regulation lists scrutinised for both names.
The list of infectious agents mapped against regulations was sorted by target 
and type of infectious agent and colour-coded accordingly to produce a visual 
representation of the coverage of infectious agents in the South African regulations. 
Each target list (human, animal, animal and human, plant) was sorted according 
to a reference list.
3.3.4  Results
A list of 451 distinct infectious organisms was compiled. Of these, 211 targeted 
humans, 118 targeted animals, 97 both animals and humans, and 22 targeted plants. 
For a further three, it was not possible to clearly identify the target. Infectious agents 
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comprised bacteria (162), viruses (162), parasites (74), fungi (14), insects (1), flies 
(2), mites (6), prions (4), toxins (20) and six others that were not clearly classified. 
The full lists are included in Appendices 3 to 6.
3.3.4.1  Regulations, policy and guidelines
Human health
In the public sector, three national government departments are responsible 
for developing and promulgating regulations and/or policy related to detecting, 
identifying, controlling and/or preventing infectious disease outbreaks in humans. In 
addition, three parastatal institutions were identified that either assist with developing 
guidelines and policy or conduct research in the field. One private association was 
identified as developing guidelines specifically for managing human infectious diseases 
(Table 3.4).
The DoH drafted revised Regulations regarding Notifiable Medical Conditions in 
2012 and requested comments from provincial departments. These have not yet 
been promulgated. We were unable to obtain further information regarding the due 
date for promulgation. 
Table 3.4: Human health: current regulations, policy and guidelines by issuing 
department
Department/
Institution
Regulations Policy and 
Guidelines
Government Departments
Department of 
Health
National Health Act (Act 61 of 2003). 
Regulations relating to the registration of 
microbiological laboratories and the acquisition, 
importation, handling, maintenance and supply 
of Human Pathogens (R178) (March 2012).
National Health Act (Act 61 of 2003). 
Regulations relating to Blood and Blood 
Products (R179) (March 2012).
National Health Act (Act 61 of 2003). 
Regulations relating to the use of Human 
Biological Material (R177) (March 2012).
National Health Act (Act 61, 2003). Regulations 
relating to Tissue Banks (R182)(March 2012).
Health Act (Act 63 of 1977). List of Notifiable 
Medical Conditions.1
The National 
Infection Prevention 
and Control
Policy and Strategy, 
2007
Guidelines for 
Management of 
SARS, 2004
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Department/
Institution
Regulations Policy and 
Guidelines
Department of 
Labour
Occupational Health and Safety Act (Act 85 
of 1993) Regulations for Hazardous Biological 
Agents (R1390) (December 2001).
N/A
Department of 
Trade & Industry
Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Act (Act 87of 1993).
N/A
Parastatal Institutions
Medical Research 
Council
Researchers use notifiable records to determine 
mortality data for national mortality survey.
National Institute 
for Communicable 
Diseases
Staff provide comments and feedback on DoH 
Regulations and Policy.
National Health 
Laboratory 
Services
The Quality Assurance Division is entrusted with 
the responsibility of setting and implementing 
policy with regard to research, quality 
assurance and accreditation of laboratories. 
Proficiency testing (also known as external 
quality assessment) is the evaluation of 
laboratory testing performance by means of 
inter-laboratory comparisons where the same 
items are tested by different laboratories.
Private Institutions
Federation of 
Infectious Disease 
Societies of 
Southern Africa
Guidelines for the optimal use of blood cultures, 
2010. Isolation precautions in hospitals, 2001 
(Incorporated into Regulations for Hazardous 
Biological Agents (R1390) December 2001).
1 The National Health Act of 2003 does not include a list of notifiable diseases so the Act of 
1977 applies.
Animal health
The DAFF is responsible for developing and promulgating regulations with respect to 
the detection, identification, control and prevention of infectious disease in animals 
(Table 3.5). As for human health, animal health is also protected under the Department 
of Trade and Industry’s (the dti) Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(NPW) Act (Act 87 of 1993). Only one parastatal, the Agricultural Research Council 
(ARC), conducts research in the field.
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Table 3.5: Animal health: current regulations, policy and guidelines by issuing 
department
Department/
Institution
Regulations Policy and 
Guidelines
Government Departments
Department 
of Agriculture, 
Forestry and 
Fisheries 
Animal Diseases Act (Act 35 of 1984).
List of Controlled and Notifiable Animal 
Diseases (Act 35 of 1984) (Jun 2010).
Animal Health Act (Act 7 of 2002).1
Meat Safety Act (Act 40 of 2000).
N/A
Department of 
Trade & Industry
Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Act (Act 87 of 1993).
N/A
Parastatal Institution
Agricultural 
Research Council
Oversees the animal and plant research 
institutions within the Council.
1 The Animal Health Act of 2002 repeals both the Animal Health Act of 1984 and the Animal 
Diseases Amendment Act of 1991 but it has yet to be promulgated.
Plant health
One government department is responsible for regulations on detection, identification, 
control and prevention of infectious disease in plants. One parastatal institution is 
active in research in the field (Table 3.6).
Table 3.6: Plant health: current regulations, policy and guidelines by issuing 
department
Department/
Institution
Regulations Policy and 
Guidelines
Government Departments
Department 
of Agriculture, 
Forestry and 
Fisheries
Agricultural Pests Act (Act 36 of 1983).
National Forest Act (Act 84 of 1998).
N/A
Parastatal Institutions
Agricultural 
Research Council
Oversees the horticulture and field crop 
research institutions within the Council.
A draft Plant Health (Phytosanitary) Bill was published in the Government Gazette on 
26 October 2012 and public comment was invited. The aim of the Bill is to provide 
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for phytosanitary measures to prevent the introduction, establishment and spread of 
regulated pests; for the control of regulated pests; for regulation of the movement of 
plants, plant products and other regulated articles into, within and outside of South 
Africa; and to provide for matters connected therewith. We were not able to establish 
the status of the Draft Bill. This is despite requests for further information from the 
relevant unit within the DAFF. 
There are no clear policy and guidelines issued by the DAFF on matters pertaining to 
the Agricultural Pests Act (Act 36 of 1983). However, the department issues permits 
on the basis of what pesticides may be used and conditions of how such may be 
produced. The department regulates the facilities for the production of such pesticides 
as well.
Other relevant national and international regulations
Transport of toxic and infectious substances is governed by additional regulations 
issued by the national Department of Transport and the International Association of 
Transport Aviation. In South Africa, the South African Bureau of Standards (SABS) 
publishes South African National Standards. Standard 10228 includes toxic and 
infectious substances and is referred to in the National Road Traffic Act (Act 93 of 
1996) regarding road transport of Dangerous Goods and Substances.
Table 3.7: Additional regulations governing infectious agents
Department/
Institution
Regulations
Government Departments
Department of 
Transport
The National Road Traffic Act (Act 93 of 1996). Chapter VIII of the 
Regulations: Transportation of Dangerous Goods and Substances by 
Road (with South African National Standard 10228 “The Identification 
and Classification of Dangerous Goods for Transport: Class Definitions”).
International 
Air Transport 
Association (IATA)
Dangerous Goods Regulations.
3.3.4.2  Mapping the list of infectious agents to the South African regulations
Four South African regulations include lists of specific infectious agents:
1. The List of Notifiable Medical Conditions is an annexure to the Health Act (Act 
63 of 1977) and includes 33 broad medical conditions. The first health-care 
professional or facility with whom a patient presenting with one of the medical 
conditions comes into contact, is legally obliged to notify the case or death to the 
authorities in the relevant provincial structures. 
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2. The OHSA (Act 85 of 1993), Regulations for Hazardous Biological Agents (R1390)
(Dec 2001) applies to all employers or self-employed persons at a workplace 
where hazardous biological agents are produced, processed, used, handled, 
stored or transported, or incidents which may result in persons being exposed 
to hazardous biological agents in the performance of his or her work. The Act 
contains an Annexure that lists specific organisms and the classification of each 
organism according to its level of risk of infection. 
3. The South African NPW (Act 87 of 1993), amended 2010, includes an Annexure 
of specific microbial or other biological agents and toxins maliciously used in the 
manufacture of biological and toxin weapons. The infectious agents listed in the 
Annexure are classified as controlled goods. 
4. The South African Animal Diseases Act (Act 35 of 1984), List of Controlled & 
Notifiable Animal Diseases (June 2010) includes a list of 1) controlled diseases 
(any animal disease in respect of which any general or particular control measure 
has been prescribed and any animal disease which is not indigenous to South 
Africa), and 2) notifiable diseases.
Appendices 3 to 6 indicate the coverage of each infectious agent included in the 
comprehensive list in the current list of the four South African regulations outlined 
above. The tables include the target of the agent and whether the agent is included 
in the US Select Agent List and for those agents targeting animals, whether the agent 
is included in the OIE Terrestrial Manual Test List.
Human infectious agents
Using 31 human agents included in the US List of Select Agents as a reference list 
(See Appendix 3), seven organisms are listed in the US Centres for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) List of Select Agents and in each of the three South African 
lists: two bacteria (Clostridium perfringens and Yersinia pestis) and five viruses (Ebola, 
Lassa, Marburg, Variola Major and Minor). Three organisms from the US CDC List 
are included in both the list of the NPW Act and in the OHSA RHB, but not in the 
South African Notifiable Disease List. A further 17 organisms listed in the CDC List 
are included in only the NPW List. The remaining four organisms listed in the US 
CDC List are not included in any of the South African lists. These four organisms 
are the Chapare Virus, the Reconstructed 1918 Influenza Virus, the SARS-associated 
Coronavirus and the South American Haemorrhagic Fever Virus. 
Of the remaining 181 organisms which are included in lists derived from South 
African acts and are not listed in the US CDC Select Agent List, six organisms are 
included in each of the three South African lists: five bacteria (Clostridium perfringens, 
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Clostridium tetani, Legionella pneumophilla, Salmonella typhi, Vibrio cholera), and 
one virus (Yellow Fever). Eighteen organisms are listed in both the OHSA RHB and are 
also a cause of a listed Notifiable Disease, but are not included in the regulations to 
the NPW Act. A further eight organisms are listed in the OHSA and in the regulations 
to the NPW Act, but not in the Notifiable Disease List. Three toxins are included in 
the regulations to the NPW Act and by default would also be included as causative 
disease agents in the Notifiable Disease List (Cholera, Clostridium perfringens, and 
Tetanus toxin). The remaining 131 organisms are listed in the OHSA RHB and are 
not detailed in any of the other lists.
Animal infectious agents
Using the 14 animal agents included in the US CDC List of Select Agents as a reference 
list (See Appendix 4), three viral diseases (African Horse Sickness, Rinderpest and 
Blue Tongue) are listed in the OIE Terrestrial Manual and in each of the three relevant 
South African lists, viz. the Animal Diseases Act (Act 35 of 1984), the regulations to 
the NPW Act and in the OHSA RHB.
Seven viral diseases are listed in the US CDC List, the OIE Terrestrial Manual List, the 
regulations to the NPW Act and the South African Controlled and Notifiable Animal 
Diseases List, but are not considered in the OHSA RHB. Four agents (two bacterial: 
Mycoplasma capricolum and Mycoplasma mycoides; and two viral: Goat Pox Virus 
and Peste des petits ruminants) are listed in the OIE Terrestrial Manual, the US CDC 
List and the regulations of the NPW Act, but are not controlled or notifiable in South 
Africa and do not appear on the OHSA RHB List. A single virus, Porcine Herpesvirus 
(Aujeszky’s Disease), is listed in the OIE Terrestrial Manual and is included in the 
South African Controlled and Notifiable List and the regulations to the NPW Act, but 
is not included in the US CDC List of Select Agents or the OHSA RHB. 
Three bacteria (Mycobacterium paratuberculosis [Johne’s Disease], Salmonella 
gallinarum [Fowl Typhoid] and Salmonella pullorum) are listed in the OIE Terrestrial 
Manual, are controlled or notifiable in South Africa and are included in the OHSA 
RHB, but are not considered select agents in the US CDC List or in the regulations 
to the NPW Act. Ten agents are included in the US CDC List and the OIE Terrestrial 
Manual, but are not considered in any of the South African regulations. Two viral 
agents (Porcine Enterovirus type 1 [Teschen Disease] and Vesicular Stomatitis Virus 
[VSV-IN2, VSV-IN3]) appear in the US CDC List, but are not included in the OIE 
Terrestrial Manual or in the NPW or the Controlled and Notifiable Animal Diseases 
List. Six agents appear in the OIE Terrestrial Manual List and are considered in the 
OHSA RHB but are not included in the US CDC List, the NPW List or the Controlled 
and Notifiable Animal Diseases List. 
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Human and animal agents
Using the 15 animal and human agents included in the US CDC List of Select Agents 
as a reference list (See Appendix 5), four bacterial agents (Bacillus anthracis, Brucella 
abortus, Brucella melitensis, and Brucella suis) are included in all the relevant lists 
including the OIE Terrestrial Manual, the regulations to the NPW Act, the OHSA RHB 
and are Notifiable Medical Conditions and included in the South African Controlled 
and Notifiable Animal Diseases List. The Pasteur strain of B. anthracis is included in 
the US CDC List and the OIE Terrestrial Manual but is not considered in the South 
African regulations. Rift Valley Fever and Newcastle Disease appear in all the lists, 
except they are not Notifiable Medical Conditions (they are included in the Controlled 
and Notifiable Animal Diseases). Coxiella burnetti (Q fever) is included in all lists 
except in the Controlled and Notifiable Animal Diseases List (it is a Notifiable Medical 
Condition). 
The Hendra Virus (originally Equine Morbillivirus) and Francisella tularensis are included 
in the OIE Terrestrial Manual, the US CDC List, the NPW regulations and the OHSA 
RHB, but are not Controlled or Notifiable Animal or Human Diseases in South Africa. 
Three viruses (Eastern Equine Encephalitis Virus, Nipah Virus and Venezuelan Equine 
Encephalomyelitis Virus) are included in the OIE Terrestrial Manual, the US CDC List 
and the NPW regulations, but are not in the OHSA RHB or Controlled or Notifiable 
Animal or Human Disease in South Africa.  
Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever is included in the US CDC List, the NPW 
regulations, the OHSA RHB and is a Notifiable Medical Condition. It is not included 
in the OIE Terrestrial Manual and is not a Controlled or a Notifiable Animal Disease. 
Burkholderia mallei and pseudomallei (formerly Pseudomonas mallei and pseudomallei) 
are included in the US CDC List, the NPW regulations and the OHSA RHB, but are not 
Notifiable or Controlled and are not included in the OIE Terrestrial Manual. Rabies Virus 
is included in the OIE Terrestrial Manual, is both a Notifiable Medical Condition and a 
Controlled Animal Disease and appears in the OHSA RHB and the NPW regulations. 
It is not included on the US CDC Select Agent List. 
Salmonella enteritidis is included in the OIE Terrestrial Manual and the OHSA RHB and 
is both a Notifiable Medical Condition (falls under food poisoning) and is included 
in the South African Controlled and Notifiable Animal Diseases List. It is not on the 
US CDC select agent list or in the NPW regulations.
Japanese Encephalitis and Western Equine Encephalitis Virus are included in the OIE 
Terrestrial Manual and in the NPW regulations, but not considered in other South 
African lists or the US CDC Select Agent List. 
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Eighteen infectious agents are included in the OIE Terrestrial Manual and in the 
OHSA RHB only. Two parasitic agents (Cystercosis and Cryptosporidiosis) are only 
included in the OIE Terrestrial Manual. Salmonella paratyphi is included as a Notifiable 
Medical Condition (under food poisoning) and is also captured in the OIE Terrestrial 
Manual under Salmonellosis. Chlamydia psittaci (avian strains) are included in the 
OIE Terrestrial Manual (as Avian Chlamydiosis), the NPW regulations and the OHSA 
RHB, but are not Notifiable or Controlled Diseases in South Africa. Lyssaviruses as a 
group are included in the NPW regulations, but not included in other lists (Rabies is 
a Lyssavirus and is recorded as a specific organism within the lists).
The remaining 54 agents which can cause animal and human disease are only 
recorded in the OHSA RHB.
Plant infectious agents
Two plant bacteria, Ralstonia solanacearum (race 3, biovar 2) and Xanthomonas 
oryzae, are included in both the US CDC select agent list and in the NPW regulations. 
Five infectious agents included in the US CDC select agent list are not included in 
the relevant South African regulations. The remaining 15 organisms are included in 
the NPW regulations (See Appendix 6).
3.3.5 Discussion
3.3.5.1 Main findings
This review identified that multiple South African regulations govern the prevention, 
detection, identification and control of disease due to infectious agents. Five different 
government departments are responsible for the regulations which ensure public safety 
with respect to infectious diseases. The lists of specific infectious agents included in 
the relevant regulations differ depending on the focus of each regulation. 
We did not identify cross-references between relevant regulations and were not able 
to locate all relevant regulations at one source. The dates of the promulgation of 
regulations span 35 years from 1977 to 2012. We noted that some lists of agents 
do not include current taxonomic classification indicating that regulations are likely 
to be out-of-date. There are fewer plant diseases listed in the regulations than human 
and animal diseases. 
1.  Relevance of current lists of infectious agents
We were not able to identify a single, comprehensive list of all infectious agents 
that pose a threat to public health relevant to South Africa, be it from accidental or 
deliberate spread. It is arguably appropriate for each regulation to include a list of 
agents relevant to the aim and scope of the said regulation, e.g. an agent which may 
54
pose a threat to the safety of laboratory workers may not be sufficiently infective to 
necessarily apply to the general population, to be classified as a Notifiable Medical 
Condition. However, apart from the Notifiable Medical Condition List (Humans) and 
the Controlled and Notifiable List of Animal Diseases, it is unclear how relevant the 
lists of agents included in the regulations of the NPW Act (Act 87 of 1993) and the 
OHSA RHB (Act 85 of 1993) are to the South African context. Interviews with the 
accountable individuals based in the relevant government departments suggest that 
the lists included in these regulations were imported from other international lists. 
These observations suggest that a single, regularly updated and publicly accessible 
list of agents based on the South African epidemiological risk profile of each agent 
would be a helpful tool for policymakers to cross-reference during the development 
of regulations. 
2.  Delays in drafting and promulgating regulations
Several of the regulations are no longer current and are due to be replaced. The DoH 
has drafted Regulations regarding Notifiable Medical Conditions to be included in the 
National Health Act (Act 61 of 2003) to replace the 1977 Notifiable Medical Condition 
List. The draft was sent for provincial comment in 2012 and no further information 
regarding its progress was available to us. The Animal Health Act was drafted in 
2002 to replace the Animal Disease Act of 1993 but has not been promulgated. 
It is difficult to identify a specific reason for the delay in the process and given the 
length of time which has passed since the 2002 draft; it is likely that a major revision 
is again required. 
Drafting, revising and promulgating laws requires several stages (See Figure 3.2) and 
public participation and stakeholder workshops are necessary during the law-making 
process. As a result, a reasonable length of time is required to ensure the integrity 
of each stage. However, our review has identified several instances where the delay 
is of several years rather than months in duration which may reflect inefficiencies in 
the system. In addition, there is a lack of public information regarding the process as 
evidenced by our inability to confirm when departments were planning to promulgate 
the draft regulations. It is important that South African regulations can address the 
potentially rapid changes in the profile of infectious diseases, and provision for this 
needs to be made within the current regulatory processes.
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3.  Terminology
In general, acts include definitions of terms used in the regulations. Despite this, we 
identified several instances where there is potential confusion regarding terminology. 
The meaning of a ‘controlled disease’ is clearly defined in the Animal Health Act 
___________________________________________________________________________________
10 The diagram was informed by the legislative process outlined on the government website: 
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, How a law is made (http://www.parliament.gov.za/
live/content.php?Item_ID=1843).
Discussion document drafted in the Ministry or 
Department:
1) provides general thinking around a policy 
2) published for comment, suggestions or ideas
Draft version of the law drawn up by Department under 
Ministerial direction
1) published in Government Gazette for public comment
2) debated by committees in both Parliamentary houses
Law of the land
1) Bill becomes law once signed by the President
Green 
Paper
Bill
Act
White 
Paper
Figure 3.2:  Flow diagram of the legislative process in South Africa.10
Broad statement of government policy drafted by 
Department or Task Team
1) provides more refined discussion document
2) relevant Parliamentary committees may propose amendments
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(Act 7 of 2002) as any animal disease in respect of which any general or particular 
control measure has been prescribed, as well as any animal disease which is not 
indigenous to South Africa. However, it does not provide a definition for the term 
‘notifiable disease’ and how this differs from a controlled disease in terms of the 
actions required either by government or by the farmer. 
In the case of human health, the 1977 Notifiable Medical Condition List and 
the associated Health Act is not clear whether a Notifiable Medical Condition is 
also a Controlled Disease, if indeed this is possible for human diseases. While 
human diseases cannot necessarily be controlled through quarantine measures or 
extermination as for animal diseases, notifiable diseases require immediate action 
on the part of the health professional. The Acts are intended to govern the behaviour 
primarily of health professionals, but consideration needs to be given to the fact that 
most are not well-versed in legal terminology and may struggle to fully understand 
their legal requirements without additional simplification and a comprehensive 
implementation process. The current (2014) DoH website does not have a functional 
operational link to the Disease Notification System.
4.  Taxonomic classifications 
As detailed in the Results section, the names of many organisms have changed as 
taxonomic classifications evolve and this is likely to be an increasing challenge in the 
future. To ensure consistency and avoid confusion, it is imperative that mechanisms 
exist to ensure that lists can be updated regularly. This will allow for changes in 
the taxonomic classifications to be easily adopted and, in the case of Notifiable 
Medical Conditions and Controlled and Notifiable Animal Diseases, for emerging 
pathogens to be rapidly included when necessary. For example, SARS is not included 
as a Notifiable Medical Condition in the 1977 List. We note that the draft Notifiable 
Medical Condition Act, once promulgated, will facilitate this via the establishment 
of a Notifiable Medical Conditions Advisory Committee of experts who will meet at 
least twice a year. Responsibilities of the Committee will include review of the list of 
Notifiable Medical Conditions for emerging and re-emerging conditions of public 
health significance. 
5.  Prioritisation and identification of gaps
From the comparative analysis of the lists it is immediately evident which infectious 
agents are included most frequently in each of the lists. Such a process can assist in 
prioritising the importance of each agent. The aim of the US CDC Select Agent List 
and the lists associated with the NPW are prevention and control of those agents 
which can be used maliciously for acts of bioterrorism. Many of the agents included 
in both these lists cause diseases which are not controlled or notifiable in South Africa 
and are not included in the OHSA RHB. It is likely that the diseases caused by many 
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of these agents have not occurred in South Africa before and as a result were not 
included on the Notifiable Medical Condition List and arguably, depending on the 
epidemiological risk profile, will not need to be. However, the possibility of exposure 
in a laboratory setting would suggest that agents included in the NPW Lists should 
also be included in the OHSA RHB List. This would need to be explored further by 
those with expertise in disease epidemiology, risk profile and laboratory exposure. 
3.3.5.2  Strengths and limitations
The review has several strengths. We used systematic review methodology which 
included the development of an a priori protocol to guide the search process and 
the data collection and analysis. The search was comprehensive and iterative and 
undertaken by two researchers to reduce selection bias. Each researcher compiled the 
comprehensive infectious agent list and assessed all targets and agent classifications. 
This duplication aimed to reduce measurement bias.
As reported earlier, the issue of changing taxonomy created specific challenges for 
ensuring the lists were comparable. Each agent had to be checked to ensure that 
infectious agents were not captured in duplicate if more than one name had been in 
use in the past, such as Pseudomonas which is now known as Burkholderia. Several 
lists included only the genus and not the species names. For example, Rabies Virus is 
not included as a single virus term in the NPW Lists, but is captured under the broad 
genus name Lyssaviruses. In addition, many animal disease terms do not reflect the 
agent. For example the OIE Terrestrial Manual refers to Aujesky’s Disease, but does 
not include the infectious agent, viz. Porcine Herpesvirus.
The researcher had to ensure that despite the use of different nomenclature, each 
agent was correctly mapped to each list. Several checks were used including 
interrogating the lists after sorting them by a reference list to see where anomalies 
existed. However, further checking of the lists by a qualified taxonomist would enhance 
the reliability of the analysis. 
The development of the comprehensive list of agents was iterative but it was limited by 
the agents contained in the current lists and the choice of the lists that were included. 
The choice was pragmatic and based on what was available at the time. We used 
the 2012 List of Test for International Trade outlined in the OIE Terrestrial Manual 
and it must be noted that this is a list of prescribed diagnostic tests required by the 
OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code for the international movement of animals and 
animal products and may not contain prescribed tests for every disease. An example 
of this is Congo Crimean Haemorrhagic Fever, which does not have a prescribed test 
listed in the 2012 Manual but is an OIE-listed disease for 2014 (See http://www.oie.
int/en/animal-health-in-the-world/oie-listed-diseases-2014/).
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The review was required to be completed in 
a limited time-frame, and although efforts 
were made to ensure that all relevant depart-
ments and regulations were identified, 
it is possible that there are some missing 
data. It was not always possible to obtain 
confirmation of queries directly from the 
government departments as the review 
timeline overlapped with the financial year-
end period for government departments, 
which precluded staff from responding to 
requests. 
3.3.6  Conclusions
The study has identified a complex set of South African regulations which govern the 
detection, identification, control, and prevention of human, animal and plant diseases 
caused by infectious agents. Challenges exist in accessing the relevant regulatory 
information from government departments, and understanding and interpreting the 
requirements of the regulations. The development of a single, locally relevant list of 
infectious agents which is regularly updated could potentially enhance the utility and 
cross-referencing of future regulations. 
The development of a 
single, locally relevant and 
current list of infectious 
agents could enhance 
the utility of and cross-
referencing between all 
relevant regulations – 
thereby increasing the 
efficiency with which these 
are controlled.
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4
 IMPLEMENTATION
Biosafety and Biosecurity 
Practice in South African 
Life Science Facilities
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4.1  Introduction 
In order to reduce the exposure of laboratory personnel, the public, agriculture, 
and the environment to potentially infectious agents and other biological hazards, 
specific biosafety practices and procedures, specific construction features of laboratory 
facilities, safety equipment, and appropriate occupational health programmes should 
be implemented in life science research facilities (Bakandize et al., 2010). These 
facilities should also have systems in place to ensure research integrity and ethics and 
biosecurity measures to mitigate the potential for science to be misused. 
The aim of this part of the study was to determine the extent to which the research 
and diagnostic facilities in South Africa have systems in place to facilitate research 
excellence, their adherence to ethical guidelines and laboratory biosafety and 
biosecurity. A questionnaire that was developed and published by the WHO in 2010 
as part of the guidance document Responsible Life Science Research for Global Health 
Security (WHO, 2010), formed the basis of this investigation. The questionnaire was 
designed to assist health policymakers, health professionals, laboratory managers 
and scientists to assess the extent to which the above-mentioned systems are in place 
in the national public health system and in private laboratories. 
The principle that informed the development of the WHO questionnaire is that the 
best protection against misuse of science is the development and maintenance of 
a culture of scientific integrity and excellence characterised by openness, honesty, 
accountability, responsibility and relevance. This is also the best guarantee of progress 
and development. Good science and sound scientific research are inextricably linked 
with the health, development and good policies of a country. Moreover, the confidence 
of the people and their trust in government and policies depends to a large extent on 
trustworthy science (WHO, 2010). An early version of the questionnaire was piloted 
in 2009 in South Africa at the NICD. It was further successfully used in a WHO-
supported study in Kenya in 2011 to assess research and diagnostic laboratories in 
Nairobi (Kenya et al., 2012). 
At the commencement of the study there was no comprehensive database of public 
and commercial life science facilities in South Africa. Public life science facilities are 
facilities located within academic institutions, as well as state-run institutions that are 
funded by a combination of government and non-South African government donors 
and that undertake teaching and publish their results in peer-reviewed journals. 
Commercial facilities are those that perform for-profit services. As the first of a suite of 
empirical studies, a mapping survey was therefore undertaken to gather information 
about life science facilities according to their geographic location, focus of activities 
and main sources of funding. 
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4.2  Mapping of the life sciences facilities in South Africa
4.2.1  Aim
The aim of this survey was to understand the landscape of South African life sciences 
facilities and to map and capture the details of the facilities, institutions and companies 
that make up the life science community in South Africa, including animal, plant and 
human health facilities. 
4.2.2  Specific objectives
The specific objectives of this study were: 
1. To enable a point-in-time assessment of research and diagnostic capacity in South 
Africa.
2. To enable the determination of a representative sample for a perception survey 
about practice in relation to the implementation of biosafety and biosecurity 
measures and the application of ethics in South Africa (Section 4.3). 
3. To allow the identification of key participants who would be interviewed about 
measures to prevent, detect and respond to infectious disease outbreaks (Chapter 5).
4.2.3  Methods
Mapping was initially achieved by internet searches to identify facilities, which were in 
turn contacted telephonically in order to obtain the necessary information. The majority 
of the sites contacted were unwilling to release the information telephonically and 
thus project information sheets were mailed to the relevant people identified by such 
initial contact (See Appendix 7). A questionnaire was also made available online11 
and a request for responses and a link to the questionnaire was circulated widely.12 
This process was limited by the reluctance of the National Health and Laboratory 
Services (NHLS) laboratories to participate in the data-gathering without formal 
ethical approval from the NHLS REC. The NICD did however participate in the 
study. Furthermore, the private diagnostic facilities were similarly reluctant to release 
information without express endorsement of the survey by their head office. Delays 
in obtaining these permissions meant that neither the NHLS nor private diagnostic 
laboratories were approached directly for participation. The information on these 
laboratories that was freely available on the company websites was included in the 
mapping exercise. This is a significant limitation of the study that could be overcome if 
___________________________________________________________________________________
11 See www.surveymonkey.com/s/CB6JP65.
12 Circulation means were inter alia the ASSAf website, journal articles published in South African 
Journal of Science and the South African Medical Journal, appeals to scientific societies and 
through the circulation of a call for responses amongst contacts identified through internet 
searches.
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the database were to be updated and maintained by a central authority in accordance 
with the recommendation of this study.
In addition, although it was anticipated that scientific research and diagnostic 
facilities in South Africa would be familiar with ASSAf, and would therefore accept 
the credentials of the researcher and the credibility of the research, this proved not 
to be true and several institutions were reluctant to make information available. This 
meant that most of the information in the database was gathered through internet 
searches. The information available on institutional websites often did not include 
the detail we sought such as: sources of funding, number of staff members, range of 
research or diagnostic tests undertaken.13 Thus the final dataset described should be 
augmented with additional data as they become available, and should be regarded 
as a work in progress. 
4.2.4  Results
A database of facilities, institutions and companies that make up the life science 
community in South Africa was generated and is located at ASSAf, Pretoria, South 
Africa. In accordance with the commitments made on the project information sheet, 
these data will not be available for commercial reuse and will only be available to 
projects sanctioned by the Academy and the DST. The main findings from the survey 
with respect to geographic location, focus of activities and funding sources are 
summarised below.
The national database comprises 979 different facilities, of which 214 (22%) 
conducted research and 700 (72%) performed diagnostic services. Sixty-five facilities 
performed both research and diagnostic services. Each of these categories were further 
divided into business sector, i.e. public (as defined above) or commercial (for-profit) 
facilities (Figure 4.1). 
Most of the laboratories fall into the Human life science sector (64%), followed by 
those in the Animal (22%) and Plant (13%) sectors (Figure 4.2). A further breakdown 
by province (Figure 4.3) shows that over two-thirds of the laboratories in Gauteng 
focus on research and diagnostics in the human sector. A similar dominance of 
human sector laboratories is also notable for all the other provinces; although less 
pronounced in some cases. 
___________________________________________________________________________________
13 When analysing the responses it was noticed that many laboratories ticked more than one 
category for range of research (public/private research/diagnostics). It must be recognised that 
these multiple categories would often not be identifiable from facility websites, where one main 
category is normally highlighted (such as academic research). It is therefore possible that as 
the database is augmented additional categories may be added to a number of the facilities 
that were identified through web searches.
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Figure 4.1: Map of life science facilities: number of laboratories by business 
sector, activity and province.
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Figure 4.2: Number of laboratories by sector.
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Figure 4.3: Map of life science facilities: number of laboratories by life science 
sector and province.
The breakdown of funding sources is presented in Figure 4.4. Sixty percent of 
funding is from local private sources, while government provides 18% direct 
funding plus an additional 12% through the research councils.
Figure 4.4: Funding sources of life sciences laboratories.
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4.2.5  Discussion
This database represents the first comprehensive database of research and diagnostic 
laboratories in South Africa. Despite its limitations, it represents an important source of 
information in the event of a disease outbreak. It is important for relevant government 
departments and agencies to be aware of the research and diagnostic capacity that 
exists, and to be able to assess gaps in the provision of services in particular areas. It 
is recommended that the DST becomes the custodian of this database and that it be 
updated and audited on a regular basis – perhaps as part of the broader bio-portal 
initiative currently under development. The DST is correctly placed to take on this 
responsibility because laboratories work in the fields of human, animal and plant 
health and thus fall neither neatly into the scope of the DoH nor the DAFF.
Given the limitations of this survey it was not 
possible to develop a geographic information 
system (GIS) map of research and diagnostic 
facilities due to the inconsistent availability of 
the precise addresses of the laboratories on their 
websites. However, it is recommended that the 
creation of a GIS map be a future objective for 
a variety of reasons. For example, a GIS map 
with additional information overlays would be 
able to visually represent the ratio of diagnostic 
laboratories to human population and even to 
burden of disease. Such information may be 
valuable when determining the location for new 
laboratory services. In addition, information 
about the location and capacity of laboratories 
is necessary if any monitoring or inspection 
is to take place to ensure compliance with 
legislation. 
4.3 Assessment of measures to ensure ethical, biosafety and 
biosecurity practices in life science facilities in South Africa
4.3.1 Aim
The aim of this study was to assess the extent to which South African life science 
laboratories have implemented relevant ethical, biosafety and biosecurity measures 
to answer questions such as: 
1. Are South African life scientists adequately prepared to conduct quality life science 
research, while simultaneously being able to recognise and address research 
misuse?
It is recommended that:
• The DST becomes 
the custodian of this 
database of South 
African life science 
facilities and that it is 
updated and audited 
on a regular basis.
• This information is 
integrated into a 
comprehensive GIS 
map to improve 
the usefulness and 
accessibility of the 
information. 
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2. What systems are in place in the national public health system and in private 
laboratories to strengthen ethics, biosecurity and biosafety?
3. What are the knowledge, attitudes and practices of South African life scientists 
working in public and commercial laboratory facilities?
4.3.2  Specific objectives
The two specific objectives of this study were:
1. To assess the extent to which research and diagnostic laboratories have measures 
or systems in place to ensure and facilitate research excellence, adherence to 
ethical practices and laboratory biosafety and biosecurity requirements.
2. To raise awareness amongst laboratory scientists, laboratory managers and 
public health officials about the requirements for ensuring high-quality research, 
adherence to ethics and laboratory biosafety and biosecurity.
4.3.3  Methods
4.3.3.1  Ethics approval
Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the University of Cape Town (UCT) 
Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC), and the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University (NMMU) REC (Human).14 Approval to conduct the study was also granted 
by the National Manager: Academic Affairs and Research of the NHLS. 
4.3.3.2  Questionnaires
The questionnaire used for data collection was a revised form of the aforementioned 
WHO ‘self-assessment’ questionnaire (WHO, 2010). A pilot study consisting of five 
sites in the Western Cape province was conducted in July 2013 to test the local 
applicability of the WHO questionnaire for relevant sectors: commercial, academic 
and state-funded facilities in the animal, plant and human health sectors, and 
encompassing facilities undertaking both diagnostic and research. The pilot included 
facilities working in animal, human and plant health in the public and private sector.
Based on feedback from responses obtained in the pilot study, the aforementioned 
WHO ‘self-assessment’ questionnaire (WHO, 2010) was revised to be more in keeping 
with a South African audience particularly with respect to the appropriateness of the 
language used in the questionnaire, and to make it equally relevant to research and 
diagnostic laboratories.
___________________________________________________________________________________
14 Although the vast majority of facilities were satisfied by UCT ethics approval, a small number of 
institutions required in-house ethics oversight. All efforts were made to accommodate institutional 
preferences, including applying for formal ethics approval from Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University. The questionnaire and information sheets were also checked by the University of the 
Witwatersrand Research Ethics Committee (Human) prior to distribution.
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The final questionnaire consisted of three sections: 1) research excellence; 2) ethics, and 
3) biosafety and/or biosecurity. The questionnaire consisted of a set of statements with 
responses graded on a Likert scale (including options for the responses ‘not applicable’ 
or ‘don’t know’). The details within each section are outlined in Appendix 11.
4.3.3.3  Sampling
1.  Database sampling
A purposive sample of 50 facilities15 was drawn from the database developed as 
part of the first aim of this study of facilities to ensure geographic and sector16 
representation. This did not include NHLS laboratories as approval to undertake the 
survey at NHLS facilities was not granted until very late in the research process.17 
Of the 50 facilities that formed part of the sample, 12 were substituted due to an 
inability to establish communication with those facilities. The substitutions of the 
unreachable facilities were made purposively such that the facilities included matched 
those that were unreachable in terms of geographic location and sector. Saturation 
was reached when it was no longer possible to substitute laboratories as the number 
of applicable laboratories in a province had been exhausted. Five additional sites 
were then selected due to concerns about low response rates in some provinces18 
and to ensure that at least one laboratory from each province participated. These 
sites were selected at random from the provincial lists in the database of national 
laboratories (described earlier in Chapter 4). 
2.  Public sampling
In addition to the purposive sample, a public call for participation by diagnostic 
and research scientists was issued through the ASSAf mailing list, through journal 
articles, scientific society mailing lists, directed emails, and by placing advertisements 
in journals, and on society and commercial supplier websites. The advertisement 
invited practising life scientists to complete the online survey. 
___________________________________________________________________________________
15 The statistical analysis was conducted by the Consultant Statistical Services at UCT.
16 Public, commercial, research and diagnostic.
17 Permission was delayed by an inability to identify who was responsible for granting permission 
for the study, and by difficulties in obtaining responses from the responsible individuals by 
telephone or email. While private diagnostic laboratories were included in the sample, problems 
associated with getting permission meant that many of them subsequently refused to participate. 
They were left in the sample but noted as “declined to participate”. These problems are indicative 
of a larger problem related to social science research engaging natural scientists in that ethics 
committees are not designed to deal with sociological and anthropological studies of science 
cultures.
18 Sites that did not respond initially received at least two phone calls and five emails.
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4.3.3.4  Survey administration 
Each laboratory identified in the database sample was initially contacted telephonically 
to inform them of the survey and request their participation. An email was subsequently 
sent containing a copy of the survey and information sheet (See Appendices 7 and 
11 and the UCT ethics approval certificate). The email also contained details of 
the feedback report that would be produced for each laboratory on the basis of the 
results gathered from their students and staff. The contact person (usually the head 
of the facility) was invited to discuss their preferences with regard to participation 
and feedback.
The original intention was for the survey to be administered at each site by the study’s 
contracted researcher, and to provide each facility with a report of the findings from 
their facility shortly after completion of the survey process at that facility. Many of 
the heads of departments expressed willingness to participate in the survey, but had 
reservations about a site visit from the researcher, citing either concerns about the 
disruption to work routines or low staff numbers (a number of laboratories had between 
one and five staff members). 
These sites were provided with an opportunity to participate in the survey by completing 
the questionnaire electronically or through using a weblink to the survey.19 Sites 
choosing the online survey were issued with a project information sheet containing 
a site-specific number to circulate to their staff.20 This ensured that their responses 
could be collated into a site-specific report. Each site was provided with the findings 
from their facility.
The site-specific numbers ensured that completed questionnaires received in response 
to the open call could be kept distinct from responses from the purposive sample. 
The data collected from the open call were compared to data collected during the 
site-specific visits. As there was little difference in the distribution of the data, these 
two sample sets were combined.
4.3.3.5  Data analysis
The dataset of responses was analysed by the UCT Statistical Consulting Services, 
and descriptive statistics were provided to the researchers.
___________________________________________________________________________________
19 Available at www.surveymonkey.com/s/ASSAf_survey.
20 The combination of modalities offered for participation – site visits, completion of an emailed 
survey or online – assisted in recruiting sites, as sites were able to tailor their participation to 
the specific situation in their laboratory.
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4.3.4  Results
4.3.4.1  Response rate
In total, 161 individuals responded directly to the survey request. The public call 
yielded a further 222 responses. Together, the 383 individual responses were combined 
to form one final dataset for analysis. Of the 383 responses, 33 questionnaires had 
to be excluded as the questionnaires were not completed (only demographic data 
obtained). 
Of the 55 sites selected from the database, 31 sites participated in the survey and 
five refused, as shown in Table 4.1. Eight provinces were represented, with no facility 
from the Northern Cape participating. 
Table 4.1: Detail of survey sample and distribution
Province Number of 
sites (total)
Positive 
responses
Negative 
responses
No  
response
Eastern Cape 7 3 0 4
Free State 7 5 1 1
Gauteng 9 8 1 0
KwaZulu-Natal 8 7 0 1
Limpopo 4 1 1 2
Mpumalanga 5 1 2 2
Northern Cape 3 0 0 3
North West 5 2 1 2
Western Cape 7 4 0 3
Total 55 31 6 18
4.3.4.2  Mode of response
It was apparent that in order to ensure the participation of sites, it was important that 
they were allowed to dictate a manner in which the surveys could be distributed that 
would cause minimal interruption of work while fitting closely with the way in which the 
institution was run. There was thus a variation in the manner in which sites participated 
in the survey, organised their staff and dealt with feedback. For example, some sites 
organised a laboratory meeting at which the questionnaires were distributed, while 
others gave the researcher a tour of the laboratories while distributing questionnaires 
en route. 
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A number of the laboratories preferred to participate remotely and either sent 
back completed questionnaires or made use of the survey weblink. Of the sites 
that participated in the survey, nine sent back completed questionnaires directly, ten 
participated online, and 11 were visited in person. 
4.3.4.3 Demographic details of respondents
Most respondents worked in the public research sector. Additional details for sector 
by recruitment source are shown in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Sample demographics according to recruitment source and sector.
NOTE: Fifty-two respondents selected more than one sector for their work, e.g. ticked the 
boxes for commercial and public research; or public research and public diagnostic. Thus 
the numbers represented in the graph are higher than the total number of responses. Public 
diagnostic facilities refer mainly to those engaged in plant and animal life science activities.
The geographic spread and business sectors of the samples are outlined in Figure 
4.6. Responses from Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape considerably 
outnumbered those from other provinces.
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4.3.4.4  Selected findings
The findings are reported below for all responses and, where relevant, reflect responses 
specifically from the following groups:
• Senior staff: Including senior researchers and technologists and technicians, as 
well as NHLS laboratory managers and NHLS technologists.
• Junior staff: Junior researchers, junior technicians, NHLS technicians, postgraduate 
students, support staff.
• Technical staff: Senior technicians, junior technicians, NHLS laboratory managers, 
NHLS technologists, NHLS technicians, support staff.
• Research staff: Senior researchers, junior researchers, graduate students.
Limpopo
Gauteng
Mpumalanga
KwaZulu-Natal
Eastern Cape
Northern Cape
Western Cape
North West
Free State
Total number
Public Research 298
Public Diagnostic 39
Commercial Research 73
Commercial Diagnostic 38
Figure 4.6: Sample demographics according to province and sector.
NOTE: Due to multiple 
options, the total numbers 
represented in the map 
are higher than the total 
number of responses.
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The full response tables including denominators and percentages are included 
in Appendix 12. Percentages have been rounded off in the following report. The 
low response rate from NHLS diagnostic laboratories and commercial diagnostic 
laboratories means that the findings of the survey can only be generalised to 
commercial and public research facilities.
1.  Research collaboration 
Three statements were posed relating to respondents’ perceptions of the extent to 
which scientific collaboration is encouraged, within their department, within their 
institution and between institutions. 
• Three-quarters (261/350; 75%) of respondents agreed that intra-departmental 
collaboration is always or often encouraged. 
• Over 70% (254/348; 73%) of respondents said that scientific collaboration within 
their institution was encouraged always or often.
• Scientific collaboration between institutions was less likely to be encouraged with 
just over half (189/348; 54%) of the respondents saying that inter-institutional 
collaboration is encouraged and facilitated always or often.
2.  Financial and research accountability and transparency
Openness about funding sources at institutions was perceived to be less common 
than financial accountability. 
• Fifty-eight percent (202/350) of respondents said that their institutions always or 
often made an effort to reveal their funding sources.
• Eighty-nine percent (310/348) of participants said that their institution demands 
financial and research accountability through regular reporting. 
• Three-quarters (262/348; 75.2%) of respondents said that their institution always 
or often stated its research priorities.
• Eighty-three percent (288/349) of respondents agreed that research findings 
are routinely published, while 10% (35/349) said this was not the case at their 
institution. 
3.  Training and capacity building
A number of statements in the questionnaire sought responses to questions about the 
extent to which training is offered on key issues such as ethics and dual-use. 
• The majority of respondents agreed that on-going skills training does take place 
at their institution, with 77% (268/347) agreeing that this is always, often or 
sometimes the case. 
• Three-quarters (259/345) of all respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the 
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statement: Staff conducting life science activities have been properly trained, 
but there was less agreement about the extent to which training about dual-use 
issues was offered – 54% of all respondents (184/344) said that dual-use training 
was either not offered, or that they did not know whether it was offered at their 
institution. 
• Fewer than half of respondents (141/323; 44%) agreed with the statement: 
Education and/or training is offered on research ethics including issues such as 
scientific misconduct (falsification, fabrication and plagiarism). Junior staff were 
more likely than senior staff to indicate that ethics training happens rarely or never. 
• With respect to training in biosafety and biosecurity measures, two-thirds (198/300; 
66%) of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: Biosafety 
training is provided to all those working in laboratories when appropriate. 
• Only approximately a quarter (81/302; 27%) of respondents agreed that biosafety 
training always or often includes a test of competence. 
4.  Staff satisfaction
The statement: Junior researchers and/or staff are nurtured and supported sought to 
determine how respondents felt about the support offered to junior staff members.
• Senior staff were somewhat more likely to believe that junior staff were nurtured 
and supported with 56% (119/211) saying this was always or often the case and 
26% (54/211) saying this happened sometimes, while 45% (60/133) of junior 
staff felt that they were always or often nurtured and supported, and 35% (47/133) 
said this was sometimes the case. 
• Just under a third (110/347; 32%) of all respondents agreed with the statement: 
Skilled staff are valued and retained with 38% (132/347) stating that they were 
sometimes valued and retained.
5.  Policy and legislation
• Slightly more than half (182/347; 52%) of all respondents disagreed or strongly 
disagreed with the statement: Good communication exists between policymakers 
at a national level and the life science community.
• Respondents were divided on the statement: National legislation and policy fosters 
scientific development and freedom with 41% (139/336) agreeing and 40% 
(133/336) disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the statement. 
• Fewer than half (166/350; 47%) of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement: Researchers are aware of and informed about national and international 
conventions, laws and regulations related to their research. With regard to 
accessibility of information about the national and international conventions 
and regulations related to life science, 39% (135/350) of respondents agreed 
information was accessible, 33% (114/350) disagreed, and 21% (72/350) said 
they don’t know.
74
• Over two-thirds (196/304; 64%) of respondents agreed with the statement: National 
legislation/regulation exists that sets safety and security practices and procedures 
for laboratories, but only 35% (122/350) agreed that: National legislation and 
policy relevant to the life sciences provides protection against the misuse of science. 
6.  Application of ethics 
A series of statements sought to determine the extent to which respondents were 
aware of the existence of ethical guidelines and the application of these in decision-
making about life science research. Other statements sought to determine the scope 
of ethical review.
• Sixty-four percent (206/323) of all respondents agreed with the statement: 
Appropriate ethical research guidelines and practices have been published. Junior 
staff were more likely to say that such guidelines have been published.21
• Two-thirds (215/322; 67%) of all respondents reported that appropriate ethical 
research guidelines and practices are implemented always or often. 
• Forty-five percent (156/350) of respondents agreed that ethical approval process 
exists for studies not involving human or animal subjects.
• Only half of all respondents (170/350; 49%) agreed with the statement: Adequate 
mechanisms exist for investigating and responding to non-adherence to ethical 
standards. 
7.  Implications of research and work
• Seventy percent (246/350) of respondents agreed that scientists are competent 
to assess the societal implications of their work. There was no distinction between 
responses from junior and senior staff or technical and research staff.22
• Less than half (142/320; 44%) of respondents agreed with the statement: 
Research is subject to a risk assessment that includes considerations of the broader 
implications of their life science activities for the environment.
• More than half (192/350; 55%) of all respondents agreed with the statement: 
Researchers know how to assess whether the risk outweighs the benefit of continuing 
with their research activities, with 19% (67/350) of respondents disagreeing. 
___________________________________________________________________________________
21 It must be noted that this response may in some way reflect a contrast in what junior and 
senior staff members consider ‘appropriate’ guidelines – something that may be influenced by 
experience and visits to other research institutions. 
22 It is interesting that there is little differentiation across the career trajectory in the responses to 
this question. What scientists perceive as ‘competent’ should be investigated in further detail, 
as should their perceptions on what such an assessment would comprise.
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8.  Biosafety and biosecurity
• Over 60% (219/350; 63%) of respondents agreed with the statement: Measures 
are in place to prevent non-laboratory individuals from obtaining access to samples 
or biological materials. 
• Half of all respondents (175/350; 50%) agreed with the statement: Potential for 
misuse of the research is considered at all stages of research/diagnostic processes 
and appropriate action taken if necessary.
• Almost three-quarters of all respondents (222/305; 73%) agreed with the 
statement: Facilities and equipment are appropriate to the level of work being 
done and are adequately maintained.
• Close to 80% (237/304; 78%) of respondents agreed with the statement: Training 
of staff is appropriate to the facilities and equipment and the work being conducted. 
• Forty-four percent (133/305) of respondents stated that assessment of the biosafety 
and biosecurity risk associated with research activities is conducted always or often.
• Almost 60% (177/298; 59%) of respondents agreed with the statement: Risk 
assessments are able to identify requirements for risk reduction measures including 
the level of containment required. 
• Three-quarters (225/300; 75%) of respondents agreed that SOPs exist, with two-thirds 
(200/301; 67%) agreeing that staff were trained to implement these procedures. 
Thirty percent (91/304) of respondents agreed that staff are regularly tested to ensure 
competence in SOPs, with 48% (147/304) saying this is not the case.23
• Almost two-thirds (186/303; 61%) of respondents agreed or strongly agreed 
with the statement: Occupational health surveillance mechanisms exist and are 
followed (at institutional level). 
• Less than half (132/299; 44%) of respondents agreed that occupational health 
reporting mechanisms are always or often effective at institutional level. 
• The great majority (269/302; 89%) of respondents agreed that staff are required 
to report laboratories incidents and accidents. 
• Just over half (207/302; 52%) of respondents agreed with the statement: A record 
of hazardous biological materials exists and is maintained at institutional level and 
more than two-thirds (208/305; 68%) said that hazardous biological material is 
always or often safely and securely stored.
• With regard to whistle-blower protection, 64% (194/302) of respondents agreed 
or strongly agreed that there are measures to report irregular or unlawful conduct, 
but only approximately half of these (111/298; 37%) agreeing that measures exist 
to protect whistle-blowers. 
___________________________________________________________________________________
23 While the issue of SOPs is important, it is possible that the disjunction between the existence of 
and the training for SOPs may reflect traditions of academic research. While many laboratories 
have standardised protocols from which many laboratory activities are conducted, they are 
developed and taught in-house informally by staff. Thus, the training and testing questions 
might not reflect the true nature of this situation. 
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4.3.5  Discussion
Scientific integrity is most often considered to refer to accuracy and honesty in relation 
to the collection, management and reporting of research data, and to accurate and full 
citation of texts in publications (Barr, 2007). But it also encompasses the management 
and communication of science and protection against misconduct. In short, scientific 
integrity is required to establish and maintain trust amongst scientists, between scientists 
and the policymakers, and between scientists and citizens. In recognition of the 
importance of scientific integrity, the US Department of Interior developed a policy 
on scientific integrity, the Scientific and Scholarly Integrity Policy (US Department of 
Interior, 2011). The policy has as its stated goals:
• Decisions based on science and scholarship are respected as credible.
• Science is conducted with integrity and excellence. 
• Science has a culture of scientific and scholarly integrity that is enduring. 
• Scientists and scholars are widely recognised for excellence. 
• Employees are proud to uphold the high standards and lead by example.
The US Departmental Manual developed to give effect to this policy identifies 
management, communication, collaboration and information-sharing as relevant to 
scientific integrity. Integrity is further ensured by guidelines for reporting of misconduct, 
protection of those who report such misconduct, and safeguards to ensure that 
recruitment is based on a candidate’s integrity, knowledge, credentials, and experience 
relevant to the responsibility of the position (Office of the Deputy Secretary Department 
of the Interior, 2011).
The questionnaire used for the purposes of this consensus study offers insights into 
each of these issues, as well as the scope of ethical review and the extent to which 
communication is perceived to take place between the policy community and the 
scientific community in South Africa. The survey offers an opportunity for us to establish 
a baseline assessment of scientific integrity in South Africa.
4.3.5.1  Openness and transparency
Resnik stated that: “Openness is one of the most important principles of scientific 
research. It is necessary for achieving the goals of science and for enabling society to 
benefit from the results of research. It plays a key role in confirmation and collaboration, 
and it promotes innovation and discovery. Additionally, openness is important for 
holding scientists publicly accountable and for developing well-informed public policy” 
(Resnik, 2006).
While openness and transparency are regarded as important for scientific progress, 
there are a number of legitimate reasons why researchers may not be able to be 
77
entirely open about their research or findings. Reasons may range from the need 
to protect intellectual property (IP) to the need to protect the identity of research 
participants.24 While these constraints on openness may be legitimate and even 
necessary, the norm should be towards openness and sharing of information, as 
openness and knowledge-sharing serve the interests of scientific progress. Given 
South Africa’s past experience where medical professionals, microbiologists and 
veterinarians were recruited into a secret military programme aimed at developing 
biological assassination weapons (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998), 
South Africa has a special responsibility to prevent the recurrence of such activities.
Globally there is a move towards open science with many scientists and scholars 
choosing to publish their findings in open-access journals25, or the editorial boards 
of journals themselves choosing to remain freely available rather than have their 
content available only to subscribers. ASSAf promotes quality open-access publications 
through its precise, full-text, open access journal database, SciELO SA. Other forms 
of openness include open funding (where funding is sought using public platforms, 
such as through so-called crowd-sourcing) or where applications for funding are 
opened for review beyond the staff or collaborators of funding institutions. Other 
initiatives to promote openness in the sciences are outlined in Box 4.1 (Eisfeld-
Reschike et al., 2014).
We will consider the findings of the survey in relation to the following forms of 
openness: 1) scientific collaboration; 2) transparency about funding; 3) publication 
of research results; 4) openness about the research priorities of institutions.
1.  Scientific collaboration
According to the US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease (NIAID), 
collaborations occur when scientists in different laboratories work together to move 
their research forward by investigating common research questions and sharing 
resources and information (United States National Institute for Health, 2014). The 
South African National Research Foundation (NRF) and the DST also identify scientific 
collaboration as a necessary requirement for the advancement of South African science 
and have established systems to encourage such collaboration.26
___________________________________________________________________________________
24 For example, see the special edition of The British Journal for the History of Science, Vol 
45, 2012 titled “The states of secrecy”, available at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/
displayIssue?jid=BJH&volumeId=45&seriesId=0&issueId=02 (Last accessed 25 May 2014).
25 See the 2012 Budapest Open Access Initiative recommendations http://www.budapestopen 
accessinitiative.org/boai-10-recommendations.
26 See http://www.nrf.ac.za/risa.php?fdid=13 (Last accessed 24 May 2014).
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The results of the survey indicate that research scientists in South Africa are supported 
and encouraged to collaborate less often with researchers from other institutions 
than they are with colleagues from their own institutions. The reasons for this can 
only be speculated, but are likely to include the effect of competition, particularly 
between academic institutions. Since most survey respondents were from research 
institutions receiving public funds, the finding that only slightly more than half of the 
respondents felt that collaboration with colleagues outside of their institution was 
routinely facilitated or encouraged suggests that such collaboration is not considered 
a priority and support for such collaboration could be increased. 
2.  Transparency about funding
While financial accountability appears to be the norm in research facilities, and would 
be demanded by funders and academic institutions, openness about the sources of 
funding is not routine, or recognised by scientists. There are several ways in which 
such openness could be encouraged at institutional level, including requiring staff 
who received grants to list these on their staff profiles, through the maintenance of 
Box 4.1: Initiatives to promote openness in science 
1. Open Review, which includes both review of funding proposals and 
articles that are submitted for publication, the latter traditionally 
conducted as a peer review. Open Review does not so much aim 
for Openness according to the Open Definition or the Open Source 
Principles, rather it is meant to make the review processes more 
transparent, impeding cliquishness between colleagues as submitting 
scientists and reviewers. 
2. Open Metrics as a tool for establishing metrics for the scientific 
relevance of publications and data that are independent from 
proprietary databases like the Web of Science or the SCOPUS 
database which do not only charge fees, but also disallow unrestricted 
access to their raw data.
3. Open Access to scientific data according to the Panton Principles 
(available at http://pantonprinciples.org/).
4. Open Access to scientific publications.
5. Open Bibliography, meaning Open Access to bibliographic data.
6. Open Data.
7. Open Notebook Science (practice of making the entire primary record 
of a research project publicly available online as it is recorded).
From: http://book.openingscience.org/vision/research_funding.html 
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an online open access list of projects and their donors, or by encouraging funders 
themselves to require grant recipients to declare the source of their funds when 
publishing or presenting research results. Similarly, creating awareness about funding 
information within the science community may offset such perceptions. 
3.  Publication of research results
It can be expected that there would be routine publication of research results by 
scientists at research facilities, and indeed this is the case. In the interests of assessing 
the extent to which South African scientists are supported to embrace the move towards 
open access, it would be useful to conduct an assessment of the extent to which 
scientists do, or are encouraged to, publish in open-access journals. Moreover, the 
extent to which universities in South Africa provide curated and searchable repositories 
in which staff can upload research as ‘find-able’ and open content is unclear. This is 
an important element of open research and something that is becoming increasingly 
topical in data discussions as a means to satisfy data-sharing requirements of funders 
and priorities of institutions.
4.  Openness about the research priorities of institutions
Openness about the research priorities of an institution is also important, not only 
to ensure alignment between work undertaken and identified priorities, but also to 
ensure alignment between national developmental priorities and needs and work 
undertaken at institutional level. One in five respondents to the survey said that their 
institution did not make their institutional research priorities clear, or they were not 
aware of such priorities at institutional level. 
4.3.5.2  Staff retention and confidence in staff capacity 
As noted earlier, one of the goals of the US Department of Interior policy on scientific 
integrity was to establish scientific excellence, and pride amongst scientists to be 
associated with the Department (US Department of Interior, 2011). There was some 
doubt expressed by respondents about the capacity of some staff to conduct research, 
with 17% disagreeing with the statement: Staff conducting life science activities have 
been properly trained. Since confidence in the excellence of science is both in the 
national interest and in the interest of individual research institutions, this aspect 
needs to be addressed.
Equally important, given the need to develop a strong national capacity to undertake 
life science research is to ensure that junior research staff are supported and 
encouraged and that senior staff with experience are retained. The survey finding 
that fewer than half of all junior research staff feel consistently supported and nurtured 
suggests that at institutional and national levels, attention needs to be paid to develop 
the capacity of senior staff to mentor junior staff. Perhaps even more concerning is 
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the perception that senior staff are not valued, nor are efforts made to retain their 
skills. More than half of the respondents in this survey felt that senior staff are not 
consistently valued by their institutions, indicating an imperative to incentivise and 
encourage staff to remain in the life sciences. 
4.3.5.3  Ethics
The integrity of the life sciences in South Africa relies on scientists understanding, 
being conscious of, and adhering to the basic principles of scientific practice of inter 
alia not falsifying data and ensuring proper citation of others’ work. Yet, one of the 
most concerning findings from the survey was that South African research scientists do 
not perceive training and education about basic research ethics – including scientific 
misconduct – as routine. While ethics review of research and experimentation involving 
human participants or animal subjects are routine, this does not extend to all research, 
including research on micro-organisms. 
There is a clear need for the scope of ethics training and review to be examined both 
at national and institutional level. In addition, findings from the survey show that gaps 
exist in knowledge about dual-use issues, biosafety and biosecurity. 
1.  Ethics training
Much reflection has gone into the question as to how to adequately train scientists in 
moral matters, and how successful or efficacious such training can be (Van Niekerk, 
2003). There seems to be a growing consensus that ethics training ought not to be 
a small ‘add-on’, attached to the ‘real’ scientific training that a scientist undergoes. 
Scientists, particularly in the life sciences, ought to be made aware at the outset of 
the possible harm that could arise from their work, and ought to be encouraged to 
be sensitive not only to the possible misuse of results, but also to discuss these issues 
amongst colleagues throughout the development of each research project. Science 
that is not responsible science is bad science (Van Niekerk and Nortjé, 2013). It might 
yield new insights and it might have numerous applications, but if it is prone to be 
utilised for harmful purposes, it loses its value and desirability.
Many theorists argue that it is futile to teach ethics (Van Niekerk, 2011; Van Niekerk, 
2003); they argue, ethics is “caught, not taught”. It is undoubtedly true that mere 
instruction in ethics does not guarantee more morality. Moral knowledge and the moral 
dispositions fostered by that knowledge are shaped by many influences, ranging from 
parents, teachers, friends, television, cultural practices, and books among others. 
This knowledge and dispositions are carried into the world of work. 
As a considerable amount of teaching within laboratories occurs with a highly 
technical focus at the hands of supervisors and senior colleagues, it is of paramount 
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importance that there be widespread recognition within the scientific community of the 
responsibility to foster ethical working environments and to reinforce and perpetuate 
the ethics of scientific research – including the implementation of codes of conduct.
Ethics education is likely to equip scientists to cope better with a world that is 
increasingly morally complex. To have the ability to analyse morally-problematic 
situations, to be able to identify the precepts that are applicable to them and the 
argumentative strategies that one might follow in order to make more sense of 
them and, in the end, to come to responsible judgements about them, is to become 
significantly better empowered for the world of work and for life in general.
2.  Ethics review
The system of ethical review by means of RECs is operational in South Africa as in 
most other countries. It is essential that all research in the life sciences be submitted 
to such committees, and that these committees are all registered, as required by 
law27, with the NHREC. If the size and scope of the work of a research laboratory 
warrants it, such a committee could be created for that institution. If not, permission 
can be obtained from committees at other, larger institutions to consider and approve 
research protocols originating from smaller institutions.
The NHREC identifies the following nine guiding principles for health research28:
1. Respect for persons.
2. Relevance and value of research.
3. Scientific integrity.
4. Risk of harm and likelihood of benefit.
5. Informed consent.
6. Distributive justice.
7. Investigator competence.
8. Privacy and confidentiality.
9. Publication of results.
The practice of submitting research protocols in the life sciences to ethical review 
raises the issue of which ethical guidelines ought to be utilised. In South Africa, no 
guidelines specifically formulated for life sciences that do not entail research on 
human participants have been formulated or published. When research does include 
human participants, such as in this survey, the guidelines can be very complicated in 
that they are designed to deal specifically with certain types of research (particularly 
___________________________________________________________________________________
27 Health Act 61, 2003, Chapter 9, Section 73.
28 See http://www.mrc.ac.za/ethics/DOHEthics.pdf. 
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medical research) and not social science research. The guidelines in Chapter 2 of 
the NHREC Research Guidelines, which are currently (2014) being revised (personal 
communication, Van Niekerk), are of general relevance to life sciences research on 
non-human subjects, but they need to be supplemented with more specific guidelines 
for the latter branch of science. The formulation of such guidelines should be a high 
priority for non-human life science researchers. Leadership for such an effort would 
likely require formally professionalising the life sciences. 
3.  Ethical conduct
It is advisable that a code of conduct (COC) be developed for every research institution 
dealing with research on non-human live entities. The possibility of devising a code 
of ethical conduct for the life sciences as a profession in order to prevent the misuse 
of research has received some attention in the literature. The myriad ethical breaches 
of the twentieth century, coupled with the aftermath of the creation and unleashing 
of the atomic bomb and the use of chemical agents in the Vietnam war, as well as 
unease regarding new areas of research, such as cloning and genetic intervention 
which developed in the second half of the twentieth century, solidified the notion that 
certain areas of research ought to be either prohibited or at least subject to restrictions 
(Badash, 2004). The unease created by these events prompted the formation of 
organisations such as the Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility created 
by the American Association for the Advancement of Science which aimed to establish 
the degree to which scientists are accountable for their activities. The possibility of a 
code of ethical conduct for scientists akin to the Hippocratic Oath taken by doctors 
to do no harm has also been considered as a means of addressing the dual-use 
problem (Keuleyan, 2010). 
In terms of developing a code of ethical conduct for the life sciences, Interacademy 
Partnership (IAP) has suggested five principles which may serve as guidelines for 
institutions wishing to devise their own codes of conduct (Atlas, 2009). These principles 
include: 1) awareness of possible harm and misuse; 2) safety and security in terms of 
conduct; 3) education and information referring to the knowledge that scientists should 
possess regarding the relevant legislation and other important areas; 4) accountability 
in terms of the fact that scientists must report breaches of the above areas; 5) oversight 
which refers to the duty of those in supervisory positions who should ensure the above 
principles are observed. 
Kant and Mourya (2010) discuss the possibility of a code of ethical conduct for 
scientists which would comprise three levels moving from general to specific principles 
and developed a toolkit to develop institution-specific codes of conduct. The toolkit 
provides examples of several complete codes that can serve as a useful point of 
departure for the process. The efficacy of an effective code largely depends on strong 
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leadership during development as well as buy-in from, and ownership by, all members 
of the organisation.
The development of a code of conduct, while no guarantee against unethical 
behaviour, may serve the purpose of both creating awareness about the ethical 
responsibilities of scientists, and the basis for holding scientists to account, at least at 
institutional level. However, it is not a substitute for more substantial ethics training and 
education that should include information about relevant national and international 
laws and agreements (such as the Biological Weapons Convention and the Non-
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act).
4.3.5.4  Science and policy
The survey has brought to light that gaps exist in scientists’ awareness of national and 
international conventions, laws and policies, with less than half of the respondents 
acknowledging awareness. Few respondents (35%) agreed that these conventions and 
regulations are easily accessible to scientists. This is supported by the observation that 
more than half of respondents (53%) indicated that there was poor communication 
between policymakers and scientists, pointing to an overall lack of knowledge and 
training in national and international laws relevant to the life sciences. 
While a large proportion of respondents (65%) agreed that national and international 
policies relating to safety and security protocols exist, it is of major concern that 
one-third had no knowledge of such mandatory practices. A single practice that 
does appear to be well understood is legislation pertaining to disposal of hazardous 
waste, although a worryingly 4% of respondents indicated that rules pertaining to its 
disposal are not followed. 
It is worth noting that there is a considerable discrepancy among life scientists with 
respect to their perception of the extent to which national and international policies 
facilitate scientific development and freedom. Forty-one percent of respondents agreed 
that policies foster these principles but a similar proportion (40%) disagreed that this 
was the case. This, together with findings outlined above, indicates a general lack 
of awareness and understanding in the life sciences communities about rules and 
regulations pertaining to scientific research and the opportunities such policies might 
afford to the advancement of science.
4.3.5.5  Biosafety and biosecurity
The survey revealed a slight disconnect between the perceived knowledge and 
appreciation of existing regulatory frameworks for biosafety and biosecurity matters 
and the practical implementation thereof. In general, life scientists seem to be 
confident in their theoretical knowledge and skills, but less so for some of the practical 
84
implementation requirements – especially in terms of risk assessments and the handling 
of accidents and/or security breaches. Hands-on professional development courses, 
as part of an effort to professionalise the life sciences as discussed elsewhere, could 
eliminate such disparity. 
4.3.6  Conclusion
The findings from the survey show that life scientists in South Africa lack adequate 
knowledge about the safety and security rules and regulations pertaining to their 
work. There are also significant gaps in the training of scientists pertaining to ethics, 
biosafety, biosecurity and dual-use 
issues, as well as in relation to how and 
where to report concern about possible 
breaches. There also appear to be gaps 
in relation to the implementation of 
existing rules and regulations, including 
in relation to SOPs, tests of competence 
(in biosafety and biosecurity) and even 
in some instances in the maintenance 
of laboratory equipment. 
In Chapter 3, reference was made to 
the comprehensive legal framework to 
control biological agents and to act 
against the malicious use of pathogens. 
Such a legal and policy framework is 
important, but its effect is limited if those 
who should know about it, do not. The 
findings of this survey suggest that there 
is an urgent need to ensure that life 
scientists are informed about national 
and international laws and policies 
relevant to their work.
The panel recommends:
1. Comprehensive ethical 
review of research and 
development in the life 
sciences is an appropriate 
tool which will also help 
ensure biosafety and 
biosecurity compliance.
2. Ethical review guidelines for 
the life sciences in South 
Africa should be formulated.
3. Education of scientists needs 
to include comprehensive 
ethics training which 
must make reference 
to the relevant national 
and international laws, 
regulations and conventions.
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5
 RESPONSIVENESS
Managing Infectious 
Disease Outbreaks in 
South Africa
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5.1  Introduction
The need to urgently recognise an infectious disease outbreak and coordinate 
surveillance and action responses is vital for the health of a country’s population. These 
responses are only possible if there is a thorough understanding of the transmission 
dynamics and resurgence of the disease. Developing, scaling-up and strengthening 
all aspects of the outbreak surveillance response system include contact-tracking, 
public information, community mobilisation, case management, infection prevention 
and control, and effective co-ordination (Thambo et al., 2014).
An assessment of existing measures and capacity to detect, identify, control and prevent 
the natural, accidental or deliberate spread of infectious agents in South Africa was 
performed by interviewing key role players in the field. The database of facilities that 
was prepared as an earlier part of this study provided a base from which to identify 
key informants who could be interviewed to provide insights into the management 
of infectious disease outbreaks in South Africa. These in-depth interviews, although 
limited in number, provided valuable insights that helped shape the recommendations 
of this study. 
5.2  Aim and objectives
The aim was to enhance the prior survey data by collecting and describing the detailed 
perceptions of key informants regarding the detection, identification, management, 
recording and prevention of infectious disease outbreaks in South Africa.
Specific objectives were:
1) To determine the current perceived ability of South African systems to detect, 
identify, manage, record and prevent infectious disease outbreaks in South Africa.
2) To identify challenges and opportunities specific to the South African system to 
detect, identify, manage, record and prevent infectious disease outbreaks in South 
Africa.
3) To provide recommendations to improve South African systems to detect, identify, 
manage, record and prevent infectious disease outbreaks in South Africa where 
necessary.
5.3  Methods
The study was qualitative in design and comprised semi-structured interviews with key 
informants widely representative of national key stakeholders either active in the field 
or with in-depth knowledge of the current South African systems to detect, identify, 
manage, record and prevent infectious disease outbreaks in South Africa. Individual 
interviews allow for more detailed exploration of the issues identified in the prior 
surveys, and provide rich, comprehensive data (Mays and Pope, 1995), which was 
not achievable by the use of the prior survey-driven approach. 
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5.3.1  Recruitment of interviewees
The first survey conducted by the panel mapped the life science community in South 
Africa (See Chapter 4). This survey yielded a comprehensive database of life science 
laboratories in the country including data on the type, location and funding of 
laboratories. This database also identified key government departments involved in 
related life science research, diagnostic facilities and management of disease outbreaks.
Key laboratories involved in biorisk management were categorised according to 
province, city and level of biorisk responsibility. We planned to include directors or 
senior managers of at least one key laboratory in each province. In addition, key 
officials in the relevant government departments responsible for outbreak control who 
were identified in the survey, were included as possible key informants. The panel 
checked the list and added additional potential participants based on their personal 
knowledge and expertise.
5.3.2  Sample size
Purposeful selection of the interview participants ensured that the sample included 
those individuals who were most knowledgeable and/or who were in positions with 
the greatest responsibility for addressing infectious disease outbreaks. The sample size 
was determined by balancing country, facility and department-wide representation 
against time and resource constraints.29 Each informant was also asked to recommend 
other potential informants using a snow-balling technique. We planned to continue 
to interview informants until a saturation point was reached with no new information 
forthcoming. The panel anticipated that the researcher would interview between ten 
and 20 individuals between February and May 2014 to reach this point. 
5.3.3  Instrument: semi-structured interviews
Participants were invited to take part in a semi-structured interview that would last 
approximately 15-20 minutes. A participant information sheet was provided to all 
invited participants (Appendix 8).
All interviews were conducted telephonically. Every effort was made to accommodate 
the preferences of the interviewee in terms of location and timing of the meeting. The 
interview was structured around specific questions (See Appendix 9), but interviewees 
were given the opportunity to comment on other related topics if they so wished. 
The researcher made use of probing techniques to obtain more detailed data when 
necessary. The researcher took notes during the interview and the telephonic interviews 
___________________________________________________________________________________
29 It was often difficult to identify the correct person to interview in a particular department, and 
in some cases when the correct person was identified they were unavailable for interview.
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were digitally recorded but not transcribed. The recordings were used as an aide 
memoire to the notes. 
5.3.4  Ethics and informed consent
The study received ethical approval as a Protocol Amendment from the UCT Faculty 
of Health Sciences’ HREC on 7 February 2014 (HREC REF Number: 294/2013). 
Interviewees provided written informed consent prior to study participation. The consent 
form is available in Appendix 10. Participants were given time to ask questions 
about the project and to discuss any concerns prior to the interview. The researcher 
highlighted that the interview was voluntary and could be terminated at any point by 
the participant. 
All data were thoroughly anonymised. Data were stored on a password-protected 
computer until loaded onto the ASSAf server in an access-restricted file and only made 
available to the panel chairperson, contracted researcher and ASSAf management. 
The data will not be deleted after the production of the final consensus report and 
will be securely stored for seven years at ASSAf.
5.3.5  Analysis: thematic content analysis
The recordings and notes from the interviews were reviewed for emerging themes 
and coded inductively. A code list was generated to identify the emergent codes and 
sub-codes associated with them in order to organise the data for analysis in terms 
of the major themes. Analysis identified key themes present in the responses, as well 
as highlighting important differences where these arose. 
A theme was noted to be ‘strong’ if the issue was raised repeatedly by different 
participants. In those cases where a participant was a single representative of an 
area of expertise, consideration was given to highlighting the responses if this was 
specific to that area of expertise only; for example, if there was only one participant 
with particular knowledge and experience in plant health. In this way, the qualitative 
nature of the responses informed the analysis, rather than the quantitative record alone. 
All data were entered into an MS Excel spreadsheet. 
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5.4  Results
The results are presented in themes and verbatim quotations are provided where these 
are illustrative of or provide additional insights into the identified themes. 
5.4.1  Sample
In total, 26 individuals who were eligible to be interviewed, were identified. This list 
included individuals who were initially identified from the mapping of laboratories, 
those suggested by the panel, those who were suggested as additional participants 
during interviews and those who were suggested by individuals who declined to be 
interviewed. Of the 26, 11 agreed to be interviewed, two expressed interest but were 
not able to commit to a time for the interview, and one agreed but failed to respond 
when called at the appointed time. 
Ten declined the invitation. Reasons for declining included requiring permission from 
or referral to a more senior manager (2), referral to a participant who had already 
been interviewed (1), not currently active in the field (3), not engaged specifically 
with infectious disease control (2), and the interview study period coinciding with a 
busy period for government departments (2). We were not able to make contact with 
a further three.
5.4.2  Dates and duration of interviews
Interviews took place between 24 February and 25 May 2014. Duration of interviews 
ranged from 29 to 82 minutes, with a median of 33 minutes and a mean of 39 minutes. 
5.4.3  Demographic and employment profile of key informants
The demographic and employment profile of the 11 participants is outlined in Table 5.1.
5.4.4 Participants’ contribution to regulations, policies and 
procedures
Six participants contributed to the development of either national or international 
regulations, policies and procedures for the detection, identification, response and/or 
recording of infectious disease outbreaks. Contributions included drafting legislation 
(4), updating legislation (4), commenting on drafts of regulation (3) and advising on 
health systems data collection nationally and/or internationally (3).
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Table 5.1: Demographic and employment profile of participants. (n = 11)
Profile Number
Gender
Male 7
Female 4
Institution
Government Department 5
Parastatal Institution 4
University 1
Private 1
Qualification/Background (as reported by participant)
Medical 2
Veterinary 3
Science 3
Public Health 1
Virology 2
Primary work focus
Government Policy 3
Research 3
Laboratory 5
National or provincial
National 9
Provincial
Eastern Cape 1
Mpumalanga 1
Primary agent target
Human 3
Animal 3
Human and Animal 3
Plant 1
Human, Animal and Plant 1
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Participants were not asked to list all relevant regulations but some chose to note their 
specific contributions to or involvement with the regulations and procedural bodies 
listed as follows:
• Notifiable Medical Conditions Act – draft regulations.
• South African Occupational Health and Safety Act (Act 85 of 1993) Regulations 
for Hazardous Biological Agents.
• The Controlled and Notifiable Animal Diseases Act (Act 35 of 1984).
• Guidelines for inspecting and grading meat (with reference to the Meat Safety 
Act 40 of 2000).
• Fertilisers, Farm Feeds, Agricultural Remedies and Stock Remedies Act (Act 36 of 
1947) as amended.
• Plant Improvement Act (Act 53 of 1976).
• Genetic Modified Organisms Act (Act 15 of 1997).
• Health Data Advisory Committee for monitoring the performance of the Minister 
of Health.
5.4.5 Summary of responses to interview questions and related 
discussions 
5.4.5.1 Assessment of the implementation strategies to detect, identify, record, 
manage and prevent disease outbreaks at a national level
1. Strengths
Participants were asked to speak from their experience about what is currently done 
well with respect to implementation of strategies to detect, identify, record, manage 
and prevent disease outbreaks at a national level. Four major strengths were identified:
1) South Africa is very experienced in responding to disease outbreaks (especially 
those caused by dangerous pathogens). Within human health, several participants 
mentioned the Outbreak Control Team situated within the Directorate for 
Communicable Diseases at DoH as a body that functions well. When there have 
been ‘false alarms’ of outbreaks, South Africa also responded well and such 
occasions offered an opportunity for the systems to be tested.
2) There are regulations in place. With respect to animal health, one participant 
reported that in addition to acts of Parliament, the Abattoir Association has its 
own self-governing body. In the case of abattoirs, licensing is linked to compliance 
outlined in the Meat Safety Act, with government inspections taking place regularly. 
It is thus in the commercial interests of industry to comply with the regulations. A 
system for approval and/or accreditation of diagnostic laboratories is in place.
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3) There is relatively good communication between sectors. One participant reported 
that the system of nation-wide notification for animal diseases is in place and is 
being done well. The system of notification internationally is also in place and 
as a result, it is acclaimed that South Africa is one of the countries in Africa that 
notifies the world and updates information as and when necessary. In terms of 
national/provincial collaboration a system is in place to make implementation of 
strategies efficient.
4) There is a good system for data collection and availability in some sectors. 
Informants noted that the NICD monitors laboratory data and provides online 
tracking of human outbreak response. Two participants noted that data collection 
is increasingly recognised as important to informing the response to human disease 
outbreaks, with the data for targeting outbreaks of malaria noted as being of 
high quality. The NICD maintains a 24/7 emergency hotline (082 883 9920) for 
disease outbreaks and related enquiries.  
2. Weaknesses
Participants were asked to outline if they had experience of, or had observed, problems 
with the implementation of strategies to detect, identify, record, manage and prevent 
disease outbreaks at a national level.
The following weaknesses emerged: 
1) A lack of adequately trained and available human resources. The lack of human 
resources was noted across all health target areas, with not only a lack of sufficient 
staff noted, but also of the necessary skills. The absence of sufficient highly-trained 
clinical staff for managing very large outbreaks in humans was of particular 
concern to one participant. Another raised the problem of ongoing high staff 
turnover within the relevant structures to address outbreaks, leading to continual 
changes to contact persons for notification of diseases. 
2) The absence of good surveillance data, especially for the human and plant sectors 
were recognised across all health target areas. Despite the acknowledgement by 
some participants that data collection was increasingly recognised as important 
by officials, most participants reported that the current state of surveillance is 
inadequate. One participant highlighted that there is a general perception that 
routine inspections within plant health are sufficient to adequately identify risks.
3) The lack of funding for outbreak control and prevention, with a lack of investment 
in supportive infrastructure noted. 
4) The indiscriminate transport of animals with no proper control of animal movement 
across the country and between South Africa and other countries. In the past this 
was more effectively managed by the Department of Transport when there was 
better communication between sectors responsible for animal health. Contradictory 
to this was the experience that legitimate requests for permits to transport animal 
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research specimens or conduct research itself were viewed with increasing suspicion 
by those responsible for issuing permits, with permits often being refused.
5) The lack of regular monitoring and inspection of facilities to ensure that laboratories 
adhere to the minimum requirements for biosafety. A participant noted that 
despite the regulatory environment governing laboratories, regular monitoring 
and inspection do not take place. 
6) There is confusion surrounding the lists of infectious agents included in the 
regulations governing laboratories due to changing taxonomies and the lists not 
being applicable to the local, South African epidemiological risk profile of the 
included organisms. One participant noted a complicated set of historical and 
political processes hindering progress in this area.
7) The role of the media was highlighted as a significant obstacle to managing 
outbreaks by a participant. So-called ‘fear-mongering’ among the general public 
by the media had led to clinical staff also becoming fearful and unwilling to engage 
with the field of outbreak control. 
5.4.5.2 Recommendations to improve the implementation of national strategies 
to manage disease outbreaks
Participants were asked what they thought could be done to improve the implementation 
of national strategies to manage disease outbreaks.
The following recommendations were made: 
1) Human resource capacity needs to be strengthened nationally, provincially and 
at a district level across all sectors and across all health targets. Gaps were 
noted at a national level where key co-ordinating roles are currently not filled or 
where posts have been decentralised to a provincial level. At a provincial level, 
many state veterinary posts are vacant and in the Eastern Cape, more personnel 
are required, especially with respect to policing, in order to ensure that there is 
no illegal transportation of animals. Nurses require more training to manage 
outbreaks, as well as to increase awareness of how to find relevant information 
on contacts and infection control when necessary. One participant suggested 
that practical steps at a clinic level had been forgotten and that posters of the 
notification process and lists of relevant staff to contact together with their details 
should be prominently displayed in health-care facilities. 
2) Shortcomings in the current legislation need to be addressed. Participants suggested 
that shortcomings in regulations could be addressed by ensuring that lists of 
infectious agents were current, classified with the correct taxonomy, relevant 
to local conditions, based on South African epidemiological risk profiles, and 
updated regularly. Regulations governing laboratory registration should include 
monitoring of the registered laboratories. A participant reported that current 
laboratory regulations focus on the safety of the laboratory worker rather than the 
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necessary bio-containment precautions. 
The legislation could be improved to 
also focus on bio-containment and 
would need to include clearer definitions 
for the biosafety levels of laboratories. 
With respect to legislation covering the 
transport of infectious agents in animal 
health research, a recommendation 
was made to audit facilities regularly to 
determine whether SOPs were in place 
and regular inspections were conducted.
3) Linkages between laboratories and the 
current notification systems need to be 
strengthened. Participants advocated that 
the linkages between the laboratories 
and the current disease notification 
systems be formalised and that active 
disease surveillance be implemented 
actively rather than only as a passive 
system. This was noted for both human 
and plant health. There was a perception among those working in human health 
and plant health that the system of disease surveillance, control and notification 
was simpler and more effective within animal health.
4) Communication structures between government and research institutions should 
be formalised. According to a participant, formalising current virtual networks, 
which are personality-driven, would lead to more sustainable communication. 
5) Awareness campaigns should be launched to increase public knowledge of disease 
outbreaks. 
5.4.5.3 Cross-sectoral co-operation with respect to implementation of policies 
and strategies
Participants were asked to comment, from their experience, on cross-sectoral co-
operation with respect to the implementation of policies and strategies. Two strong 
contradictory themes emerged: 
1) Good co-operation. Several participants reported good communication between 
sectors, especially with respect to laboratories. 
2) Poor co-operation. Some participants reported that cross-sectoral co-operation 
was historically poor and required departments to engage with each other on a 
one-on-one basis. Cross-sectoral co-operation with respect to transport of animals 
was reported consistently to be problematic.
Strengthening human 
resource capacity at 
all levels, addressing 
shortcomings in current 
legislation, increasing 
the linkages between 
the relevant laboratories 
and the current disease 
notification systems and 
formalising communication 
structures between 
government and research 
institutions will improve the 
implementation of national 
strategies to manage 
disease outbreaks.
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5.4.5.4 National and provincial co-ordination in detecting, identifying, 
responding, recording and preventing infectious disease outbreaks
Participants were asked to comment, from their experience, on national and provincial 
co-ordination in detecting, identifying, responding, recording and preventing infectious 
disease outbreaks. Experience of national co-ordination was varied, with strong 
favourable and critical themes emerging. 
1) Relationships between sectors are good and clear structures and guidelines exist 
for managing disease outbreaks. This was particularly the case for managing 
acute outbreaks.
2) National co-ordination in terms of planning and prevention is poor. Participants 
suggested that although acute management of disease outbreaks indicated 
good national co-ordination across health target areas, this was not the case 
for planning and prevention. Participants reported uncertainty that the necessary 
mitigations were in place at a provincial level to manage outbreaks and that co-
ordination was particularly poor for animal health, with devolution to control at 
a provincial level post-1994, raised as the reason for this. 
3) Notification of human diseases is poorly co-ordinated between national departments 
and provinces. An example of the Soccer World Cup 2010 surveillance system 
which depended on multiple cross-sector co-operation and national co-ordination 
was provided. The system required local authorities to report directly to a national 
web-based platform. The system was reportedly not felt to be useful to local 
authorities, despite being considered groundbreaking nationally. 
5.4.5.5 Information-sharing regarding the implementation of policies and 
strategies
Participants were asked whether there are opportunities for information-sharing 
between sectors and if not, what the obstacles to such information-sharing are. All 
informants believed that opportunities for information-sharing between sectors exist. 
Three strong themes emerged to allow for more information-sharing: 
1) More representation from each sector was required in decision-making structures. 
With respect to increasing representation of all sectors in decision-making 
platforms, participants noted that there needs to be a common goal between 
sectors for this to be achieved. The establishment of a new forum would require 
clear goals and structures to ensure that there was no duplication, given the 
scarcity of resources. One participant warned that more layers of bureaucracy 
would not necessarily be optimal.
2) Platforms were required to share ‘real-time’ data. Participants noted that some 
sharing of data already occurs and cited the NICD monthly communiques (http://
www.nicd.ac.za/?page=communique&id=56), the Medical Research Council 
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(MRC) GIS platform for mapping malaria, and the DAFF research and knowledge-
sharing platform. Participants noted that online resources were not accessible 
everywhere. The issue of lack of dissemination of research conducted in university 
settings and the delay to publication of research findings was noted as a significant 
reason to establish a platform in human health for ‘real-time’ data-sharing. A 
further obstacle that was noted is the need for data, not only to be collected but 
also to be interpreted meaningfully before it can be shared. A lack of skilled 
human capacity hampered this from taking place.
3) For some diseases, co-ordination should be done nationally. Several participants 
reported that information-sharing would be optimised between sectors if it was 
co-ordinated at a national level. Specific diseases required a national response. 
Participants mentioned that this was true for malaria and some plant diseases, 
given the inability to contain these within specific demarcated geographic areas 
or provinces. One participant stated that cross-sectoral government fora are in 
place for human health, but that there was room for improvement, with competing 
work priorities sometimes leading to the cancellation of these meetings. There is 
also an overall lack of co-ordination between sectors, with no specific government 
department specifically tasked with co-ordination. Another strong theme was the 
recognition that detecting, identifying, managing and preventing infectious disease 
outbreaks required the participation of multiple groups spread widely across the 
country. The reach and scale of the task is large. 
5.4.5.6  Recommendations to improve the management of disease outbreaks
Participants were asked what they would recommend for improving the management 
of disease outbreaks nationally. Three strong themes emerged across all health targets: 
1) Secure funding for the improvement and maintenance of infrastructure, human 
resources and technology. Specific areas requiring secure funding were: 1) the 
maintenance of established laboratory capacity, with South Africa hosting the 
only BSL 4 laboratory in Africa; 2) improving the output and quality of research 
in this area; 3) filling vacant positions within the State Veterinary Services, with 
possible consideration given to compulsory community service for graduate 
veterinarians. A participant suggested that international security systems and 
mechanisms could be utilised to obtain funding for research and infrastructural 
development, but acknowledged that military funding was often not palatable in 
the health-care sphere. Additional suggestions included training more workers to 
be knowledgeable about outbreak control as is currently underway by the DoH 
within the provinces.
2) Establish a better regional response to outbreak control and prevention. The 
issue of outbreak control in the region generated strong responses. Several 
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participants noted throughout the interview 
that historically, South Africa had played 
a significant role in managing regional 
outbreaks. Within Africa, local capacity had 
increased in recent years possibly reducing 
the need for South Africa to steward 
the region. The example of the US CDC 
establishing a purpose-built laboratory in 
Uganda for human health was mentioned. 
Across health target areas, participants 
stressed that infectious disease outbreaks 
in neighbouring countries impacted 
the biosafety of South Africans and that 
organisms were not easily contained within 
geographic borders. 
With respect to human health, a participant 
asked whether a list of criteria for allowing 
sick individuals to travel into South Africa 
specifically for receipt of intensive care 
existed. A further question included whether 
South Africa is ethically obliged to provide 
care to persons travelling from outside its 
borders and suspected of suffering from a 
dangerous infectious disease. The case of 
imported Ebola virus which was transmitted to South African nursing staff in 
1996 was noted, with the reflection that South Africans have paid the price of 
poor disease control in neighbouring countries. In terms of providing support to 
neighbouring countries, one participant noted that it was unclear what this would 
mean specifically in terms of notification, surveillance and resources.
With respect to animal health, the example of a 2011 outbreak of foot-and-
mouth disease was mentioned; South Africa was viewed as being able to help 
neighbouring countries which would in turn avoid the disease spreading to South 
Africa. Trans-frontier national parks which span across borders were flagged as 
a potential risk to biosafety. Although the official borders are controlled between 
South Africa and neighbouring countries, the transition areas within the park(s) 
could facilitate the illegal transportation of domestic and wild animals. This is 
of particular concern if neighbouring countries have limited capacity for disease 
prevention mechanisms. 
To improve the 
management of disease 
outbreak in South 
Africa, the following is 
recommended: 
- funding for the 
improvement and 
maintenance of 
infrastructure, human 
resources and 
technology, 
- the establishment 
of a better regional 
response to 
outbreak control and 
prevention, and 
- the improvement of 
systems for collecting 
data and managing 
data integrity.
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3) Improve systems for collecting data and managing data integrity. Participants 
commented that in order to protect the health of humans, animals and plants, 
reporting, surveillance and notification systems needed major improvement. Better 
linkages were required between laboratories, health practitioners and government 
departments. The statistical systems for analysing and presenting the data needed 
to be operational. The lack of compliance with notification of human disease 
was seen as a huge obstacle to the efficient operation of the current notification 
system and suggestions for utilising accessible technology such as cell phones 
and simplification of the notification process were recommended to improve the 
system. The data collection form employed by the Malaria Control Programme 
was simple and observational research suggested it was preferentially completed 
by health-care staff instead of the Notification GW 17/5 form. A participant 
suggested harmonising the different surveillance systems with the notification 
system so it could be all part of one integrated system. 
5.4.5.7  Other issues arising
Participants were asked to raise any other issues which they believed to be pertinent 
to the subject and the responses were diverse.
1) A concern was expressed that several terms are used broadly within this field 
(examples were ‘biosafety’ and ‘biosecurity’), but that different individuals and 
departments understood the terms differently. Laboratory workers understand 
‘biosafety’ to refer to protecting their health and preventing exposure in the 
laboratory setting, whereas the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (under the United 
Nations Environment Programme) defines biosafety as the protection of biological 
diversity from the potential risks posed by living modified organisms (LMOs) 
resulting from modern biotechnology (the focus is on GMOs ). It is important to 
gain clarity within government and agreement on terms. 
2) Two participants stated that there needs to be an increased focus on prevention 
and not only responsive management of outbreak control.
3) There was a request that the death notification system be evaluated. Currently at 
an operational level there was confusion about whether a pathologist or magistrate 
should complete the cause of death form. This has implications for reporting of 
Notifiable Medical Conditions and recording of such data within the national 
mortality statistics.
4) Several participants noted that all players in the field wanted the same outcome viz. 
to prevent infectious disease outbreaks. There was a request that future processes be 
developed and adopted in a respectful, conciliatory manner with broad consultation 
and recognition that health-care professionals, laboratory workers, farmers, industry, 
researchers, and government officials were all working towards the same goal. 
Mention was made that there is an undercurrent of suspicion in this area and that 
it needs to be addressed before meaningful progress can be made. 
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5.5  Discussion
5.5.1  Main findings
Each of the participants willingly and openly shared their knowledge, expertise and 
opinions based on their own experiences of working in the area of infectious disease 
outbreaks. Participants were highly qualified and worked in diverse settings, with each 
target health area (human, animal and plant) represented. Most participants worked 
in the human and animal area with only two having specific experience of the plant 
health field. Almost all participants had contributed to developing or revising relevant 
regulations and were active in the policy arena. 
5.5.2  Strengths and weaknesses of implementation strategies
Despite the diversity of participant knowledge and experience, participants voiced 
similar concerns regarding the strengths and weaknesses of implementing national 
strategies to manage disease outbreaks. 
Most participants recognised that South Africa continues to demonstrate an effective 
response to the control of disease outbreaks attributing this to institutional experience 
and expertise, the regulatory environment and good inter-sectoral communication 
during acute episodes. However, all participants noted that prevention, active and 
passive surveillance, effective data collection, statistical analysis and notification 
(specifically for human health) and regular planning within and between sectors 
are lacking. A shortage of skilled staff, vacant positions and limited funding for 
infrastructural support were key to the inability of South Africa to move from a reactive 
position to one of greater pro-activity. 
5.5.3  Human resources
Frieden et al. (2014) note that a well-trained workforce greatly augments effective 
epidemic responses and recommend a multidisciplinary public health workforce, with 
one or more epidemiologists per 200 000 population. There are no current figures 
on the numbers of epidemiologists in South Africa, but given the overall shortage of 
health-care workers it is highly unlikely to be as high as the recommendation. In the 
2006 Lancet Series on Health in South Africa, the authors challenged the DoH to work 
actively with regulatory authorities and training institutions to increase the numbers 
of health-care workers and to increase their professional abilities for implementation 
of an expanded range of services (Chopra et al., 2009). This would also need to 
include trained staff available to deliver not only an outbreak response, but also to 
engage with planning and prevention.
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5.5.4  Notifiable Medical Conditions
Within human health, poor compliance with the statutory obligation to notify Notifiable 
Medical Conditions was widely recognised. Reasons postulated included health 
professionals’ lack of awareness regarding notification, the complexity of the GW 
17/5 notification form and the rapid turnover of staff involved in managing outbreaks 
at a provincial level. These opinions are supported by Smith et al. (2007) who report 
that while outbreaks of food-borne disease (notifiable when a food poisoning incident 
affects ≥2 people) are common in South Africa, food-borne disease is markedly 
underreported (Smith et al., 2007). In 2011, Dunbar reported using capture-recapture 
methodology to evaluate notification of TB in two communities in the Western Cape 
province, demonstrating the limited accuracy and completeness of routinely collected 
TB-recording and reporting data (Dunbar et al., 2011). Nkgudi et al. (2006) published 
a detailed analysis of incidence and reporting of rheumatic fever (also a notifiable 
disease) and found that there appeared to be underreporting of cases by health-care 
professionals, and poor administration of the notification system. They recommended 
that health-care professionals need to be educated about the statutory requirements 
to notify and advocate for better co-ordination efforts to establish a seamless system 
for the accurate reporting of notifiable conditions. 
5.5.5  Control of animal diseases
It was noteworthy that several participants, who did not work in animal health, viewed 
the ability of the DAFF to control animal diseases and to provide data on such 
controlled diseases as superior to the human and plant health field. This was not 
directly contradicted by those working within animal health, but they pointed to a 
lack of state veterinarians at provincial level hampering implementation of national 
policy. In addition, transport of animals was poorly managed because it relied on 
inter-sectoral co-operation among DAFF, the Department of Transport and the South 
African Police Services (SAPS), which was noted by participants to be very poor. Better 
co-ordination between sectors was raised by most participants as key to fulfilling 
regulatory obligations and policy imperatives. This would also meet international 
imperatives for global health security. In their list of key global health security areas, 
Frieden et al. (2014) include policies and practices to reduce the risk of zoonotic 
disease transmission as necessary to mitigate avoidable outbreaks. 
5.5.6  Regulations
Participants observed significant shortcomings in current regulations with little cross-
referencing between regulations and some contradictory elements between different 
regulations. Definitions were noted to be unclear especially with respect to levels 
of bio-containment in the Regulations relating to the registration of microbiological 
laboratories and the acquisition, importation, handling, maintenance and supply of 
Human Pathogens (R178)(March 2012). Participants pointed out that lists of infectious 
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agents included in specific regulations were imported from other international lists, 
most notably the lists of the Australian Group, and may not have local relevance. 
Those working in the laboratory field recommended that lists of agents be based on 
the South African epidemiological-risk profile of each agent. Concerns were expressed 
that most regulations were out-of-date, with agent names not adhering to current 
taxonomic classifications. Provision for regular revisions needs to be made within the 
current regulatory processes to avoid confusion and aid detection and identification.
5.5.7  Surveillance and data systems
In their list of key global health security areas for prevention and detection of infectious 
disease outbreaks, Frieden et al. (2014) include a requirement for regional and 
national interoperable electronic reporting systems with timely reporting to WHO, the 
World Organisation for Animal Health, and the Food and Agricultural Organisation 
(FAO) of the UN. Given the comments made by the informants, South Africa is currently 
not meeting this key requirement, with non-existent linkages between reporting systems 
and laboratories and questionable data quality. There was uncertainty about whether 
South Africa is currently providing regular, high-quality reports to the international 
agencies. Several participants suggested an integrated system of active surveillance 
(looking for disease in the community) and passive surveillance (reporting on disease 
presenting to health-care facilities). These systems should be linked to laboratory data, 
should be updated regularly and be accessible publicly. 
5.5.8  Regional responsibility
There was consensus among the participants that South Africa must engage with 
neighbouring countries to prevent, detect, identify, control and record infectious 
disease outbreaks. The nature of this engagement was unclear. Participants recognised 
that ensuring that systems in neighbouring countries were optimal was self-serving 
in that it ultimately protects the public health of South Africans. There were few 
suggestions as to what specifically could be done to achieve this and whether or not 
South Africa should expend scarce resources on strengthening systems elsewhere. 
Nonetheless, there was a desire to see regional co-operation as a priority area for 
managing outbreaks.
5.5.9  Strengths and limitations of the study
The study is subject to limitations inherent in qualitative research (Britten, 1995). The 
participants were purposively sampled and so cannot be considered representative 
of all stakeholders. Nonetheless, given their cumulative knowledge and expertise (the 
reason for their inclusion) their voices and opinions provide comprehensive insights 
into the responses elicited by the prior survey and contribute to our understanding of 
the area under study. Perhaps most limiting were the voices missing from this study, 
notably those from several government departments who were not able to commit to 
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an interview due to time pressures. We were also not able to include representatives 
from at least one laboratory in each province. The limited time available in which to 
conduct the study significantly hampered our ability to include all those participants who 
could have provided additional meaning to the responses outlined here. Despite the 
short duration of the study, every effort was made to accommodate the preferences of 
participants and the researcher made herself available after hours when necessary. The 
cited time pressure of many government officials supports the commentaries that there 
is little time for strategic planning and preparation within government, again confirming 
a need for greater human resource deployment or evaluation of priority setting.
The study has highlighted the complexity of the systems required to manage infectious 
disease outbreaks in South Africa. Many sectors and levels of workers are required to 
navigate these complex systems to secure the health of the South African public, its 
animals and its plants. This study has identified significant strengths of the system which 
provide a strong foundation for future improvements. The voices of the participants 
provide clear advocacy for meaningful engagement between sectors with the shared 
aim of reducing the incidence of infectious disease outbreaks in the future. 
5.6  Summary and conclusions
This chapter reported on a qualitative key-informant 
interview study to garner expert opinion related to 
managing disease outbreaks. Valuable insights were 
gained into current perceptions within the scientific 
community regarding biosafety and biosecurity 
practices. 
It was revealed that many of these challenges are 
extremely complicated in nature and may require 
changes to existing legislation. However, improved 
inter-departmental communication and cooperation, 
together with adequate funding for legally-mandated 
responsibilities would improve biosafety and 
biosecurity in South Africa and enable the country 
to meet its agreed international obligations.
Improved 
inter-departmental 
communication 
and cooperation 
together with 
adequate funding 
for legally-mandated 
responsibilities would 
improve biosafety 
and biosecurity 
management in 
South Africa.
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6
 KEY FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
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Based on the findings from this study, the panel offers the following recommendations. 
Where possible, care has been taken to identify specific institutions or agencies that 
should take responsibility for implementing the recommendations; however, this 
is not always possible or applicable. It is our overall recommendation that these 
conclusions and recommendations be considered and discussed at a Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) regional symposium on biosafety and biosecurity 
where they can be refined and additions can be made.
6.1 Improving the capacity to detect and respond to infectious 
disease outbreaks
1. At the outset of this study, no comprehensive database of public and commercial 
research and diagnostic facilities existed in South Africa. One of the outputs of this 
study is a database that is a resource of laboratories for DoH, DAFF and DST. It can 
be a determination of national research and diagnostic capacity, and an assessment 
of gaps in the particular areas, particularly in relation to diagnostic capacity. 
In the view of the panel, the DST is correctly placed to take on this responsibility 
since it straddles the fields of human, animal and plant health. In the interim, 
the database is available from ASSAf on request, but not for commercial use. 
The development of a GIS map of facilities, together with additional information 
overlays, so as to be able to, for example visually represent the ratio of 
diagnostic laboratories per area or region, and even to the burden of disease, is 
recommended. Such information may be valuable when determining the location 
for new laboratory services. In addition, information about the location and capacity 
of laboratories is necessary if any monitoring or inspection is to take place to 
ensure adherence with legislation.
2. This study identified that multiple South African laws and regulations govern the 
prevention, detection, identification and control of disease due to infectious agents. 
Five different government departments are responsible for the regulations which 
ensure public safety with respect to infectious diseases. No single, regularly updated 
and publicly accessible list of agents based on the South African epidemiological 
risk profile of each agent currently exists.
The panel recommends that the database compiled during this survey 
be considered a national asset and that its ongoing development and 
maintenance (including the development of a GIS map of all facilities) 
becomes the responsibility of the DST.
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3. Within human health, the study found poor compliance with the statutory obligation 
to notify Notifiable Medical Conditions. Reasons postulated included health 
professionals’ lack of awareness regarding notification, the complexity of the 
GW 17/5 notification form and the rapid turnover of staff involved in managing 
outbreaks at a provincial level. 
6.2 Education and awareness raising
1. The survey of practising life scientists (reported on in Chapter 5) found that 
education and/or training on research ethics, including issues such as scientific 
misconduct (falsification, fabrication and plagiarism) is not routine for life scientists. 
Such training is essential to ensure the integrity of science in South Africa. 
2. With respect to biosafety and biosecurity training measures, it was found that 
biosafety training is not routine for staff working in laboratories, nor was a test of 
competence routinely required. 
It is recommended that the NRF and the Department of Higher Education 
and Training consider means to ensure the inclusion of research ethics 
training in the training of all life scientists in South Africa.
The panel recommends that DoH, DAFF and DST, along with other 
relevant agencies, collectively determine whether such a comprehensive 
list would be a helpful tool for policymakers to cross-reference during 
the development of regulations; and if so, to undertake the development 
and maintenance of such a list.
It is recommended that DoH ensure that health-care professionals are 
made aware of the statutory requirement to notify and improve the 
current system to ensure a seamless system for the accurate reporting 
of notifiable conditions. This could be done by providing training/
workshops to discuss how to report notifiable conditions or by providing 
access to training materials or information.
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Laboratory safety manuals, signed-for by all scientific and technical personnel, 
should be an obligatory requirement of all life science laboratories. 
3. It was found that there is a low level of awareness among life scientists about 
national and international conventions, laws and regulations related to their 
research; and that information about these instruments is not readily available. 
4. It was found that the terms biosafety, biosecurity and dual-use are neither commonly 
understood, nor is there consensus on the meaning or use of the term ‘biosecurity’. 
5. The study found that assessments of the biosafety and biosecurity risk associated 
with research activities are not routinely conducted, including assistance in 
identifying the level of containment required for the organisms being studied. 
The panel recommends that the DoH consider drafting regulations to 
require that relevant laboratory staff undergo biosafety training that 
includes an assessment of competence.
It is recommended that the NRF require researchers to demonstrate 
familiarity with these terms when submitting applications for research 
that could be considered ‘dual-use’.
It is recommended that institutional research ethics committees require 
evidence of such an assessment having taken place before ethical 
approval is granted for research, including research not involving human 
and animal subjects.
It is recommended that the Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction develop and disseminate (digitally and in print) 
details of the relevant national and international laws to all research 
and diagnostic facilities and all educational facilities in South Africa. 
This can also include an online guideline to relevant regulations on 
biosafety and biosecurity. 
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6. Given the need to develop a strong national capacity to undertake life science 
research, it is important to ensure that junior research staff are supported and 
encouraged and that senior staff with experience are retained. The survey finding 
that fewer than half of all junior research staff feel consistently supported and 
nurtured suggests that at institutional and national levels, attention needs to be 
paid to develop the capacity of senior staff to mentor junior staff. 
Perhaps even more concerning is the perception that senior staff are not valued, 
nor are efforts made to retain their skills. More than half of the respondents in this 
survey felt that senior staff are not consistently valued by their institutions, indicating 
an imperative to incentivise and encourage staff to remain in the life sciences. 
6.3  Ethics review
1. In South Africa, no ethical guidelines specifically formulated for life sciences that 
do not entail research on humans or animals have been formulated or published. 
The Research Guidelines of the NHREC are currently (2014) being revised. The 
guidelines in Chapter 2 of the revised Research Guidelines are of general relevance 
to life sciences research on non-human subjects, but they need to be supplemented 
with more specific guidelines for the latter branch of science. 
2. While a code of conduct itself may not prevent undesirable behaviour or actions, 
the process of developing such a code may have the effect of raising awareness 
and encouraging reflection. However, this should not be seen as a substitute for 
more substantial training that should include reference to the relevant national 
and international laws, regulations and conventions.
The panel recommends that universities and research institutions take 
note of this finding and seek to put in place measures to mentor junior 
staff.
The panel recommends that the NHREC take the findings of this study 
into consideration in the process of revising the research guidelines. 
It is also recommended that the funding agencies (such as NRF, MRC) 
take ownership of addressing the more general research guidelines 
for all life science research.
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6.4  Scientific openness and transparency
While openness and transparency are regarded as important for scientific progress, 
there are a number of legitimate reasons why researchers may not be able to be 
entirely open about their research or findings. Reasons may range from the need to 
protect IP to the need to protect the identity of research participants. 
While these constraints on openness may be legitimate and even necessary, the norm 
should be towards openness and sharing of information, as openness and knowledge-
sharing serve the interests of scientific progress. 
1. The results of the survey indicate that research scientists in South Africa are 
supported and encouraged to collaborate less often with researchers from other 
institutions than they are with colleagues from their own institutions. Since most 
respondents were from research institutions receiving public funds, the finding that 
only slightly more than half of the respondents felt that collaboration with colleagues 
outside of their institution was routinely facilitated or encouraged suggests that 
such collaboration is not considered a priority and support for such collaboration 
could be increased. 
We propose that every research institution undertaking life science 
research consider developing and applying  a code of conduct (COC) 
for researchers. We recommend that the training of life scientists should 
include a comprehensive ethics component and reference to all relevant 
national and international laws, regulations and conventions.
The panel recommends that the NRF actively encourages inter-
institutional collaboration through establishing incentives.
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2. While financial accountability appears to be the norm in research facilities, and 
would be demanded by funders and academic institutions, openness about the 
sources of funding is not routine, or recognised by scientists, this being confirmed by 
the survey data accumulated here. There are several ways in which such openness 
could be encouraged at institutional level. This includes requiring staff who received 
grants to list these on their staff profiles, through the maintenance of an online 
open access list of projects and their donors. Alternatively, by encouraging funders 
themselves to require grant recipients to declare the source of their funds when 
publishing or presenting research results. 
It is recommended that the NRF and the DST encourage universities and 
research institutions in South Africa to publish details of their research 
projects and the funders thereof in the interests of accountability and 
transparency.
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Appendix 1:  Biographies of panel members 
(in alphabetical order)
1.  Professor Daniel du Toit, PhD
Prof Du Toit joined Technikon Pretoria (now Tshwane University of Technology) in 
1997 after a career at the University of Pretoria. He holds a PhD in Medical Sciences 
(Human Physiology). His research expertise and focus is on bio-ethics and human 
reproduction. His academic outputs have included supervision of doctorate studies 
and supervision of Masters degree studies. He has authored and co-authored over 
42 publications, 150 papers and posters, focusing mainly on reproductive physiology, 
presented at national and international level. He is the Chairperson of the Medical 
Research Council Ethics Committee. 
2.  Professor Jill Farrant, PhD, MASSAf; FRSSAf; FTWAS – Panel Chairperson
Prof Farrant holds a Research Chair (Molecular Physiology of Plant Desiccation 
Tolerance) at the Department of Molecular and Cell Biology, University of Cape 
Town. She obtained an MSc and PhD from the University of Natal (now University of 
KwaZulu-Natal). Her MSc was with distinction and was awarded the South African 
Association for the Advancement of Science Bronze Medal and also the Junior 
Captain Scott Memorial Bronze Medal in 1986. She obtained the PhD in 1992 and 
the South African Association of Botanists (SAAB) Junior Medal for Excellence in 
Botany was awarded for that work. She has also received the SAAB Silver medal of 
excellence in Botany and has been President of the Society. She obtained the NRF 
President’s award in 1993, the Oppenheimer Memorial Trust Fellowship in 2009; 
the DST Distinguished Women in Science award in 2010 and the L’Oreal-UNESCO 
award in 2012 that recognises women “whose exceptional careers in science have 
opened up new and sometimes revolutionary ways of improving human well-being”. 
Her research is on the mechanisms of desiccation tolerance in rare and endemic 
South African flora and she holds an NRF A-rating. She has over 106 peer-reviewed 
publications in international journals and an excess of 200 conference abstracts. 
She has graduated a number of MSc and PhD students and is an Associate Editor 
for Plant Growth Regulation, South African Journal of Botany and Frontiers in Plant 
Biotechnology.
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3.  Dr Chandré Gould, DPhil
Dr Gould is a senior researcher in the Crime and Justice Programme of the Institute for 
Security Studies (ISS). Between 1996 and 1999 she was in investigator and evidence 
analyst for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, where she was involved in the 
investigation of Project Coast – the chemical and biological weapons programme of 
the apartheid government. After 1999 she continued researching Project Coast and 
co-authored a monograph published by the United Nations’ Institute for Disarmament 
Research, and numerous papers and articles. She also co-authored a commercially 
published book about the trial of Dr Wouter Basson in 2002. In 2004 and 2005, she 
was the global network coordinator for the BioWeapons Prevention Project. Her areas 
of expertise are: biological weapons control and prevention; social crime prevention; 
human trafficking and sex work. She is an Editor of South African Crime Quarterly, 
a quarterly journal that is accredited by the Department of Higher Education in 
South Africa and published by ISS. She’s an author and editor of several books and 
numerous papers on crime and criminal justice in South Africa; biological weapons 
control; South Africa’s apartheid chemical and biological weapons programme; small 
arms control and human trafficking. 
4.  Dr Petrus Jansen van Vuren, PhD
Dr Jansen van Vuren is a Medical Scientist at the Centre for Emerging and Zoonotic 
Diseases at the National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD). His research 
at NICD includes development and validation of new diagnostic tests for viral 
hemorrhagic fever and arbovirus infections. He is also responsible for supervision 
of work in the Biosafety Level 4 laboratory, production and quality control testing 
of diagnostic reagents, laboratory animal work for research purposes at Level 3 
and 4, and assisting in field research and outbreak response during outbreaks of 
arthropod-borne and hemorrhagic fever viruses and VHF ecology studies. His research 
towards his PhD included evaluation of a recombinant antigen of Rift Valley Fever 
virus as a possible vaccine candidate and pathogenesis on a gene expression level. 
He has an interest in the role that bats play in the maintenance and transmission of 
dangerous pathogens, in particular those causing VHF. He has been involved in field 
and laboratory studies involving bats, including the first experimental infection of the 
Egyptian fruit bat with Marburg Virus. He have published in international peer-reviewed 
journals, as well as presented results at various local and international meetings, He 
currently co-supervise one MSc student and one PhD student. He has a South Africa 
NRF Y2 researcher rating.
5.  Dr Shadrack Moephuli, PhD
Dr Moephuli is the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Agricultural Research 
Council (ARC). He is also a member of the Genetic Resource Policy Committee of 
the Consultative Group of International Agricultural Research. He has chaired the 
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National Agricultural Research Forum, a multi–stakeholder consultative initiative. 
Prior to joining the ARC, he served as acting Deputy Director–General responsible 
for production and natural resource management in the Department of Agriculture, 
South Africa. He has also served as the Chief Director for agricultural production in 
the same department as well as the country’s representative on various agricultural 
matters at the Convention for Biological Diversity, Cartagena Protocol for Biosafety, 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), International Treaty for Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. Prior to joining government, he was a biochemistry lecturer at the 
University of the Witwatersrand. To his credit are a number of research publications, 
including invited speaking events. He obtained his PhD from the University of 
Connecticut, USA.
6.  Dr Nhlanhla Msomi, PhD
Dr Msomi is a consultant and the former Chief Executive Officer for Technology 
Innovation Agency (TIA) and Executive Chairman for City Works (Pty) Ltd, an Indo-South 
Africa joint venture company. He competed his postgraduate training in biotechnology, 
science policy and innovation from Sussex. He also has qualifications in finance 
(CIBM), international executive development (Wits) and corporate governance. His 
professional career has spanned scientific research, lecturing, innovation management, 
corporate finance and entrepreneurship. He was previously a partner and Executive 
Director for Principal Investments at Africa Vukani Capital. He has founded and 
invested in a number of businesses in the medical biotechnology and ICT sectors. 
His recent career has included serving on the Investment Committee of the Southern 
African Intellectual Property Fund and the Boards of the National Advisory Committee 
on Innovation, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, KZN Government Central 
Procurement Committee, LIFELab (CEO and Deputy Chair), National Bioinformatics 
Network (Chair), and SA Bioproducts. He is a former Advisor to the Senior Vice-
Presidents of the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative. He still serves on the Boards of 
Trade and Investment KwaZulu-Natal, International Centre for Genetic Engineering 
and Biotechnology, SA Society of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, United World 
College- SA Trust, as well as the TIA. 
7.  Professor Iqbal Parker, PhD, MASSAf 
Prof Parker is the Director of the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and 
Biotechnology Cape Town Component. Previously he was the Head of the Division 
of Medical Biochemistry and Director of Research in the Health Science Faculty at the 
University of Cape Town. He obtained his PhD in Biochemistry in 1979, completed a 
postdoctoral fellowship with Gary Stein in the USA and returned to join the Department 
of Medical Biochemistry in 1981. He was President of the South African Society of 
Biochemistry and Molecular Biology (1998-2001), founder Secretary-General of the 
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Federation of African Societies of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology from 1996 to 
2003. He is a founder member of the Academy of Science of South Africa and served 
as General Secretary from 2000-2004 and Vice-President since 2010. He served on 
the international jury panel for the Loreal/UNESCO Awards for Women in Science 
for the period 1997-2002. In 2006, he was elected to the Executive Committee of 
the International Union of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology as the Chair of the 
Committee on Symposia since 2006. In 2004, he was awarded the South African 
Society for Biochemistry and Molecular Biology Gold Medal for his contributions to 
biochemistry and the National Science and Technology Forum award for Outstanding 
Contributions in Science, Engineering and Technology in 2003.
8.  Dr James Southern 
Dr Southern is currently a consultant to the biotechnology industry, advisor to the 
National Medicines Regulatory Agency (Biological Medicines, Clinical Trials & 
Pharmacovigilance) and temporary evaluator for WHO Prequalification of Vaccines. 
He is also the Chair of the Developing Countries Vaccine Regulators’ Network. He has 
worked in all aspects of vaccine development, production and control between 1968 
and 2000 and he has been a member of the Biological Weapons Working Group 
reporting to the Non-Proliferation Council since 1993, and was a member of the 
Non-Proliferation Council from 1994 to 2009. He advises the Biosafety Directorate 
of the Department of Agriculture on the safety of medicines incorporating genetically 
modified organisms.
9.  Professor Anton van Niekerk, DPhil, MASSAf
Prof Van Niekerk is a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Centre 
for Applied Ethics at Stellenbosch University. He specialises in the fields of bioethics, 
philosophy of religion and philosophy of the human sciences. He is the author, co-
author and editor of 18 books and more than 140 peer-reviewed journal articles 
and book chapters. He holds a B-rating as researcher by the NRF. He was awarded 
the Chancellor’s Medal of Stellenbosch University in 1980 and the Stals Prize for 
Philosophy in 1995. He is Chairperson of the Board of the Ethics Institute of South 
Africa, former member of the Ethics Committee of the Medical Research Council and 
a former Director of the International Association of Bioethics. He has recently been 
appointed as a member of the National Health Research Ethics Council of South 
Africa. He is a former President of the Philosophical Society of Southern Africa, a 
former editor of the South African Journal of Philosophy and a former member of the 
council of the Stellenbosch University. He has delivered 66 papers at international 
conferences and has supervised over 72 completed Masters and 21 completed 
doctoral dissertations.
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10.  Ms Delille Wessels
Ms Wessels is the Quality Assurance Manager at the Agricultural Research Council – 
Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute  responsible for the Quality Management Systems 
policy and accreditation of the Institute, standardisation of policies and procedures 
and the harmonisation and co-ordination of quality standards and procedures in 
all the laboratories. She is also the Acting Safety Officer. She is the President and 
Founder Member of the South African Biorisk Association. She is a member of several 
other committees/boards which include board member – Southern Africa Centre for 
Infectious Diseases (SACIDS), SACIDS Work Package Coordinator for Biosafety and 
Quality Management, member of various committees of the South African Bureau 
of Standards, member of various committees of the International Dairy Federation, 
SADC Subcommittee for Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratories, South African Veterinary 
Laboratory Scientific Forum, African Biological Safety Association and Consultant for 
the International Atomic Energy Agency on Quality Management Systems since 2003.
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od
uc
ts
 E
xp
or
t 
C
on
tro
l B
oa
rd
 
(P
PE
C
B)
 –
 a
 p
ub
lic
 
en
tit
y.
]
Th
is
 A
ct
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
co
nt
ro
l o
f p
er
is
ha
bl
e 
pr
od
uc
ts
 in
te
nd
ed
 fo
r 
ex
po
rt 
fro
m
 th
e 
Re
pu
bl
ic
 
of
 S
ou
th
 A
fri
ca
 a
nd
 fo
r 
th
e 
co
nt
in
ue
d 
ex
is
te
nc
e 
of
 a
 s
ta
tu
to
ry
 b
oa
rd
 to
 b
rin
g 
ab
ou
t t
he
 o
rd
er
ly
 
an
d 
ef
fic
ie
nt
 e
xp
or
t o
f p
er
is
ha
bl
e 
pr
od
uc
ts
 fr
om
 
th
e 
Re
pu
bl
ic
. 
Th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 b
od
y 
th
at
 it
 c
re
at
es
 t
he
 A
ct
 
af
fo
rd
s 
a 
pl
at
fo
rm
 fo
r 
1.
 P
ro
du
ct
 a
nd
 E
qu
ip
m
en
t C
er
tif
ic
at
io
n 
2.
 S
ys
te
m
s 
C
er
tif
ic
at
io
n 
an
d 
Au
di
tin
g
3.
 E
xp
or
t C
on
tro
l c
er
tif
ic
at
io
n
4.
 S
pe
ci
al
is
ed
 (S
te
ri-
C
er
tif
ic
at
io
n)
Ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 R
eg
ul
at
or
y 
Bo
dy
’s
 w
eb
si
te
 it
 a
ls
o 
of
fe
rs
:
1.
 C
ol
d 
C
ha
in
 M
an
ag
em
en
t 
2.
 L
ab
or
at
or
y 
Se
rv
ic
es
3.
 S
ta
tis
tic
al
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n
4.
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 &
 P
ro
to
co
l M
an
ag
em
en
t 
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Pi
ec
e 
of
 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
co
nc
er
ne
d
Th
e 
ke
y 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 o
f 
th
e 
ac
t
Le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
bu
si
ne
ss
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
Pe
rm
it 
or
 li
ce
nc
e,
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
or
 o
th
er
 f
or
m
al
 
au
th
or
ity
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
or
 ju
di
ci
al
-c
ou
rt
 p
ro
ce
ss
Ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l P
es
ts
 
Ac
t (
Ac
t 3
6 
of
 
19
83
)
Th
is
 A
ct
 in
tro
du
ce
s 
m
ea
su
re
s 
fo
r t
he
 p
re
ve
nt
io
n 
an
d 
co
m
ba
tin
g 
of
 a
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l p
es
ts
. 
It 
is 
re
qu
ire
d 
to
 k
ee
p 
en
su
rin
g 
in
 a
ll 
la
bo
ra
to
ry
 a
nd
 fi
el
d 
re
se
ar
ch
 p
ro
je
ct
s 
an
d 
op
er
at
io
ns
 th
at
 it
 c
on
tin
ue
s 
to
 
m
ee
ts
 o
r e
ve
n 
be
at
s 
th
e 
st
an
da
rd
s 
im
po
se
d 
by
 th
is
 A
ct
 
in
 r
es
pe
ct
 to
 th
e 
co
nt
ro
l o
f p
es
ts
. T
hi
s 
ex
te
nd
s 
to
 n
ee
d 
fo
r 
te
st
in
g 
va
rie
tie
s 
an
d 
cu
lti
va
rs
 a
nd
 r
el
at
ed
 m
at
te
r 
im
po
rte
d 
fo
r 
pu
rp
os
es
 o
f r
es
ea
rc
h 
to
 b
e 
pr
e-
cl
ea
ne
d 
an
d 
be
 fr
ee
 fr
om
 p
es
ts
.
Th
e 
A
ct
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
fo
r 
de
fin
ed
 c
on
tro
lle
d 
go
od
s 
to
 b
e 
im
po
rta
bl
e 
on
ly
 w
ith
 a
 p
er
m
it 
as
 a
 m
ea
su
re
 to
 c
on
tro
l 
th
e 
sp
re
ad
 o
f p
es
ts
.
In
 th
is
 v
ei
n,
 n
on
e 
of
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
m
ay
 b
e 
im
po
rt
ed
 
w
ith
ou
t s
uc
h 
pe
rm
it,
 to
 w
it,
 a
ny
 p
la
nt
, p
at
ho
ge
n,
 in
se
ct
, 
ex
ot
ic
 a
ni
m
al
, g
ro
w
th
 m
ed
iu
m
, i
nf
ec
tio
us
 th
in
g,
 h
on
ey
, 
be
es
w
ax
 o
r u
se
d 
ap
ia
ry
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t; 
an
yt
hi
ng
 d
et
er
m
in
ed
 
by
 th
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
by
 n
ot
ic
e 
in
 th
e 
G
az
et
te
.
An
im
al
 D
is
ea
se
 A
ct
 
(A
ct
 3
5 
of
 1
98
4)
Th
is
 A
ct
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
fo
r 
co
nt
ro
l 
m
ea
su
re
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
pr
ev
en
tio
n 
of
 d
is
ea
se
s 
an
d 
pa
ra
si
te
s 
an
d 
fo
r 
sc
he
m
es
 t
o 
pr
om
ot
e 
an
im
al
 h
ea
lth
. 
Th
e 
D
ire
ct
or
at
e 
of
 V
et
er
in
ar
y 
Q
ua
ra
nt
in
e 
an
d 
H
um
an
 
H
ea
lth
 is
 re
sp
on
sib
le
 fo
r t
he
 e
nf
or
ce
m
en
t t
he
re
of
.
Th
e 
co
nt
in
uo
us
 n
ee
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
to
 k
ee
p 
co
m
pl
yi
ng
 w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ec
ep
ts
 o
f t
hi
s 
st
at
ut
e 
in
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 
w
ith
 r
eg
ar
ds
 t
o 
its
 v
et
er
in
ar
y 
an
d 
an
im
al
 b
re
ed
in
g 
op
er
at
io
ns
 to
 th
e 
ex
te
nt
 it
 b
ec
om
es
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 to
 a
cq
ui
re
 
an
im
al
s 
fro
m
 o
ut
si
de
 it
s 
re
le
va
nt
 r
es
ea
rc
h 
st
at
io
ns
.
N
o 
pe
rs
on
 s
ha
ll 
im
po
rt 
in
to
 o
r c
on
ve
y 
in
 tr
an
sit
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
Re
pu
bl
ic
 a
ny
 a
ni
m
al
, p
ar
as
ite
 o
r 
co
nt
am
in
at
ed
 o
r 
in
fe
ct
io
us
 th
in
g 
ex
ce
pt
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
au
th
or
ity
 o
f a
 p
er
m
it 
an
d 
in
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 a
ny
 c
on
di
tio
n 
im
po
se
d 
in
 s
uc
h 
pe
rm
it.
 
G
en
et
ic
al
ly
 
M
od
ifi
ed
 
O
rg
an
is
m
s 
Ac
t (
Ac
t 
15
 o
f 1
99
7)
 a
s 
am
en
de
d 
in
 2
00
6
[A
dm
in
is
tra
te
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
D
AF
F, 
bu
t D
ST
, D
EA
, 
D
O
H
, D
TI
 &
 D
O
L 
pa
rti
ci
pa
te
s 
in
 
Ex
ec
ut
iv
e 
C
ou
nc
il 
an
d 
de
ci
si
on
s 
ar
e 
co
ns
en
su
s 
ba
se
d.
]
To
 p
ro
vi
d
e 
fo
r 
m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 p
ro
m
o
te
 t
he
 
re
sp
o
ns
ib
le
 d
ev
el
o
pm
en
t,
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n,
 u
se
 
a
n
d
 a
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
 o
f 
g
en
et
ic
a
ll
y 
m
o
d
if
ie
d 
or
ga
ni
sm
s;
 to
 e
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 a
ll 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 in
vo
lv
in
g 
th
e 
us
e 
o
f 
ge
ne
tic
al
ly
 m
o
di
fie
d 
o
rg
an
is
m
s 
(in
cl
ud
in
g 
im
po
rta
tio
n,
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n,
 re
le
as
e 
an
d 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n)
 s
ha
ll 
be
 c
ar
rie
d 
ou
t i
n 
su
ch
 a
 w
ay
 
as
 to
 li
m
it 
po
ss
ib
le
 h
ar
m
fu
l c
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
to
 th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t; 
to
 g
iv
e 
at
te
nt
io
n 
to
 th
e 
pr
ev
en
tio
n 
of
 a
cc
id
en
ts
 a
nd
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t o
f 
w
as
te
; 
to
 e
st
ab
lis
h 
co
m
m
on
 m
ea
su
re
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
ev
al
ua
tio
n 
an
d 
re
du
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l r
is
ks
 
ar
is
in
g 
o
ut
 o
f 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 i
nv
o
lv
in
g 
th
e 
us
e 
o
f 
ge
ne
tic
al
ly
 m
od
ifi
ed
 o
rg
an
is
m
s;
 to
 la
y 
do
w
n 
th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 c
rit
er
ia
 fo
r 
ris
k 
as
se
ss
m
en
ts
; t
o 
es
ta
bl
ish
 a
 c
ou
nc
il 
fo
r g
en
et
ic
al
ly
 
m
od
ifi
ed
 o
rg
an
is
m
s;
 to
 e
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 g
en
et
ic
al
ly
 
m
od
ifi
ed
 o
rg
an
is
m
s 
ar
e 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 a
nd
 d
o 
no
t p
re
se
nt
 a
 h
az
ar
d 
to
 th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t; 
an
d 
to
 e
st
ab
lis
h 
ap
pr
o
pr
ia
te
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
no
tif
ic
at
io
n 
of
 s
pe
ci
fic
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 in
vo
lv
in
g 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 g
en
et
ic
al
ly
 m
od
ifi
ed
 o
rg
an
is
m
s.
 D
ire
ct
or
at
e 
Bi
os
af
et
y 
is
 r
es
po
ns
ib
le
 fo
r 
th
e 
ad
m
in
is
tra
tio
n 
of
 th
is
 A
ct
.
G
M
O
s 
ar
e 
an
 in
cr
ea
sin
gl
y 
m
or
e 
im
po
rta
nt
 p
he
no
m
en
on
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
lly
 i
n 
di
se
as
e 
pr
ev
en
tio
n 
an
d 
m
ak
in
g 
a
g
ri
cu
lt
ur
a
l 
va
ri
et
ie
s 
m
o
re
 r
es
is
ta
nt
 t
o
 h
a
rs
he
r 
cl
im
at
ic
 c
on
di
tio
ns
, w
he
re
 m
or
e 
an
d 
m
or
e 
ne
ed
 to
 b
e 
ac
hi
ev
ed
 w
ith
 le
ss
 a
nd
 le
ss
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l 
co
nd
uc
iv
en
es
s 
to
 c
om
ba
tin
g 
hu
ng
er
 a
nd
 fe
ed
in
g 
an
 
ex
pl
od
in
g 
W
or
ld
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
pr
oj
ec
te
d 
to
 2
05
0.
 T
he
 
co
un
tr
y 
ha
s 
ra
tif
ie
d 
ke
y 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
C
on
ve
nt
io
ns
 
re
la
tin
g 
to
 G
M
O
s 
an
d 
th
e 
A
RC
’s
 b
us
in
es
s 
m
o
de
l 
lik
ew
is
e 
ke
ep
s 
in
te
rp
re
tin
g 
th
e 
de
m
an
ds
 o
f 
be
in
g 
co
m
pl
ia
nt
 w
ith
 th
is
 S
ta
nc
e 
of
 th
e 
St
at
e,
 e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 a
s 
a 
St
at
e-
ow
ne
d 
In
st
itu
tio
n.
Th
e 
So
ut
h 
Af
ric
an
 C
on
st
itu
tio
n 
al
so
 e
nj
oi
ns
 th
e 
C
ou
nt
ry
 
to
 ra
tif
y 
in
 le
gi
sla
tio
n 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
on
ve
nt
io
ns
 to
 w
hi
ch
 
th
e 
co
un
try
 is
 a
 s
ig
na
to
ry
.
Th
is
 A
ct
 is
 a
 g
oo
d 
ex
am
pl
e 
of
 s
uc
h 
ra
tif
ic
at
io
n.
In
 o
rd
er
 to
 u
nd
er
st
an
d 
th
e 
tru
e 
ra
ng
e 
of
 th
e 
pr
ac
tic
al
 
pu
rp
os
es
 o
f t
he
 A
ct
 in
 a
ct
io
n 
an
d 
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
 p
er
m
its
 
re
gi
m
e,
 it
 is
 b
es
t t
o 
co
ns
id
er
 th
e 
St
at
ut
or
y 
M
an
da
te
 o
f t
he
 
Re
gu
la
to
ry
 C
ou
nc
il 
cr
ea
te
d 
by
 th
e 
Ac
t h
er
ei
n 
w
hi
ch
 is
: 
In
 o
rd
er
 t
o 
ac
hi
ev
e 
its
 o
bj
ec
tiv
es
, 
th
e 
C
ou
nc
il 
m
ay
 
re
qu
ire
 a
ny
 a
pp
lic
an
t f
or
 a
 p
er
m
it 
to
 u
se
 fa
ci
lit
ie
s 
fo
r t
he
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t, 
pr
od
uc
tio
n,
 u
se
 o
r a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
of
 G
M
O
s 
or
 
to
 re
le
as
e 
su
ch
 o
rg
an
ism
s 
in
to
 th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t, 
to
 s
ub
m
it 
to
 th
e 
C
ou
nc
il 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
re
gi
str
ar
, a
n 
as
se
ss
m
en
t o
f t
he
 
ris
k 
an
d,
 w
he
re
 r
eq
ui
re
d,
 a
n 
as
se
ss
m
en
t o
f t
he
 im
pa
ct
 
on
 th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t o
f s
uc
h 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t, 
pr
od
uc
tio
n,
 
us
e,
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
or
 re
le
as
e,
 a
s 
th
e 
ca
se
 m
ay
 b
e;
 re
qu
ire
 
th
e 
re
gi
st
ra
r t
o 
1.
 e
xa
m
in
e 
th
e 
co
nf
or
m
ity
 o
f 
an
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
to
 th
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 o
f t
hi
s 
Ac
t; 
2.
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
a 
re
gi
st
er
 o
f a
ll 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 th
e 
co
nt
ai
ne
d 
us
e 
or
 th
e 
tri
al
 r
el
ea
se
 o
f G
M
O
s;
 
3.
 r
eq
ui
re
 n
ot
ifi
ca
tio
n 
by
 th
e 
ap
pl
ic
an
t o
f a
ny
 in
te
nd
ed
 
ch
an
ge
 in
 th
e 
ty
pe
 o
f a
ct
iv
iti
es
 o
r 
re
le
as
e 
in
vo
lv
in
g 
G
M
O
s 
be
in
g 
un
de
rt
ak
en
 a
t 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s 
fo
r 
w
hi
ch
 
ap
pr
ov
al
 w
as
 g
ra
nt
ed
; 
4.
 a
rra
ng
e 
fo
r t
he
 in
sp
ec
tio
n 
by
 a
n 
in
sp
ec
to
r o
f f
ac
ili
tie
s 
w
he
re
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 w
ith
 o
r 
th
e 
re
le
as
e 
of
 G
M
O
s 
ar
e 
be
in
g 
un
de
rta
ke
n;
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Pi
ec
e 
of
 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
co
nc
er
ne
d
Th
e 
ke
y 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 o
f 
th
e 
ac
t
Le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
bu
si
ne
ss
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
Pe
rm
it 
or
 li
ce
nc
e,
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
or
 o
th
er
 f
or
m
al
 
au
th
or
ity
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
or
 ju
di
ci
al
-c
ou
rt
 p
ro
ce
ss
5.
 a
rr
an
ge
 fo
r 
th
e 
in
sp
ec
tio
n 
of
 a
ll 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 a
s 
he
 o
r 
sh
e 
m
ay
 d
ee
m
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 c
on
ta
in
ed
 u
se
, 
tri
al
 r
el
ea
se
 a
nd
 g
en
er
al
 r
el
ea
se
 to
 e
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 a
ll 
te
rm
s 
an
d 
co
nd
iti
on
s 
at
ta
ch
ed
 to
 a
 p
er
m
it 
is
su
ed
 
un
de
r 
th
is
 A
ct
 a
re
 c
om
pl
ie
d 
w
ith
; 
re
qu
ire
 th
at
 th
e 
us
er
 im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 n
ot
ify
 th
e 
re
gi
st
ra
r b
ot
h 
or
al
ly
 a
nd
 
in
 w
rit
in
g 
of
 a
ny
 a
cc
id
en
t 
in
vo
lv
in
g 
G
M
O
s 
an
d 
re
qu
ire
 th
at
 th
e 
re
gi
str
ar
 b
e 
su
pp
lie
d 
w
ith
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 th
e 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s 
of
 th
e 
ac
ci
de
nt
, 
th
e 
id
en
tit
y 
an
d 
qu
an
tit
y 
of
 g
en
et
ic
al
ly
 m
od
ifi
ed
 o
rg
an
is
m
s 
re
le
as
ed
, 
an
y 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
to
 a
ss
es
s 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f t
he
 a
cc
id
en
t o
n 
th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
em
er
ge
nc
y 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ta
ke
n 
to
 a
vo
id
 o
r m
iti
ga
te
 a
ny
 
ad
ve
rs
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f s
uc
h 
ac
ci
de
nt
 o
n 
th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t; 
re
qu
ire
 th
e 
re
gi
st
ra
r 
to
 a
pp
oi
nt
 a
 p
an
el
 to
 e
nq
ui
re
 
in
to
 a
nd
 re
po
rt 
on
 th
e 
ca
us
es
 o
f a
n 
ac
ci
de
nt
, a
nd
 to
 
m
ak
e 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 to
 th
e 
M
in
is
te
r w
ith
 a
 v
ie
w
 
to
 a
vo
id
in
g 
sim
ila
r a
cc
id
en
ts
 in
 th
e 
fu
tu
re
 a
nd
 w
ith
 a
 
vi
ew
 to
 li
m
iti
ng
 th
e 
ad
ve
rs
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f s
uc
h 
ac
ci
de
nt
s;
 
in
fo
rm
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 c
ou
nt
ry
 o
f a
ny
 a
cc
id
en
t t
ha
t m
ay
 
ha
ve
 a
n 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
th
at
 c
ou
nt
ry
’s
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
t; 
co
-
op
er
at
e 
or
 e
nt
er
 in
to
 a
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 w
ith
 a
ny
 p
er
so
n 
or
 
in
st
itu
tio
n 
up
on
 s
uc
h 
co
nd
iti
on
s 
as
 th
e 
C
ou
nc
il 
an
d 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
 o
r i
ns
tit
ut
io
n 
co
nc
er
ne
d 
m
ay
 a
gr
ee
 u
po
n;
 
pr
om
ot
e 
co
-o
pe
ra
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
Re
pu
bl
ic
 a
nd
 a
ny
 
ot
he
r 
co
un
try
 w
ith
 r
eg
ar
d 
to
 R
&
D
 a
nd
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
 
tra
ns
fe
r 
in
 th
e 
fie
ld
 o
f t
he
 G
M
O
s;
 w
ith
 th
e 
co
ns
en
t 
of
 th
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
ap
pr
ov
e 
an
d 
pu
bl
is
h 
gu
id
el
in
es
 fo
r 
al
l u
se
s 
of
 g
en
et
ic
al
ly
 m
od
ifi
ed
 o
rg
an
is
m
s;
 a
dv
is
e 
th
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
on
- 
1.
 p
ro
hi
bi
tio
ns
; 
2.
 t
he
 a
ut
ho
ris
at
io
n 
an
d 
ex
er
ci
se
 o
f t
he
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 
co
nt
ro
l o
f i
m
po
rts
; 
3.
 t
he
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t, 
pr
od
uc
tio
n,
 u
se
, a
pp
lic
at
io
n,
 
re
le
as
e 
an
d 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 G
M
O
s;
 
4.
 t
he
 a
ut
ho
ris
at
io
n 
or
 n
ot
ifi
ca
tio
n 
of
 c
on
ta
in
ed
 
us
es
; 
5.
 t
he
 a
ut
ho
ris
at
io
n 
of
 tr
ia
l o
r 
ge
ne
ra
l r
el
ea
se
s;
 
6.
 t
he
 c
on
tro
l m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 b
e 
ta
ke
n 
in
 th
e 
ev
en
t o
f 
an
 a
cc
id
en
t;
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Pi
ec
e 
of
 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
co
nc
er
ne
d
Th
e 
ke
y 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 o
f 
th
e 
ac
t
Le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
bu
si
ne
ss
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
Pe
rm
it 
or
 li
ce
nc
e,
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
or
 o
th
er
 f
or
m
al
 
au
th
or
ity
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
or
 ju
di
ci
al
-c
ou
rt
 p
ro
ce
ss
7.
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 m
at
te
r 
w
ith
 r
eg
ar
d 
to
 g
en
et
ic
al
ly
 
m
od
ifi
ed
 o
rg
an
is
m
s;
 m
ak
e 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
to
 th
e 
M
in
is
te
r 
on
 th
e 
ap
po
in
tm
en
t o
f m
em
be
rs
 
to
 th
e 
C
om
m
itt
ee
.
M
ea
t S
af
et
y 
Ac
t 
(A
ct
 4
0 
of
 2
00
0)
To
 p
ro
vi
de
 fo
r m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 p
ro
m
ot
e 
m
ea
t s
af
et
y 
an
d 
th
e 
sa
fe
ty
 o
f a
ni
m
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s;
 to
 e
st
ab
lis
h 
an
d 
m
ai
nt
ai
n 
es
se
nt
ia
l n
at
io
na
l s
ta
nd
ar
ds
 in
 
re
sp
ec
t o
f a
ba
tto
irs
; t
o 
re
gu
la
te
 th
e 
im
po
rta
tio
n 
an
d 
ex
po
rt
at
io
n 
o
f 
m
ea
t;
 t
o
 e
st
ab
lis
h 
m
ea
t 
sa
fe
ty.
 T
he
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 o
f p
ro
pe
r 
st
an
da
rd
s 
of
 
hy
gi
en
e 
in
 th
e 
sl
au
gh
te
rin
g 
of
 a
ni
m
al
s 
an
d 
in
 
th
e 
ha
nd
lin
g 
of
 m
ea
t a
nd
 a
ni
m
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s.
 T
he
 
D
ire
ct
or
at
e 
of
 V
et
er
in
ar
y 
Q
ua
ra
nt
in
e 
an
d 
H
um
an
 
H
ea
lth
 is
 re
sp
on
sib
le
 fo
r t
he
 e
nf
or
ce
m
en
t t
he
re
of
.
A
n 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
fo
r 
re
gi
st
ra
tio
n 
of
 a
 s
la
ug
ht
er
 fa
ci
lit
y 
m
us
t b
e 
su
bm
itt
ed
 to
 th
e 
na
tio
na
l e
xe
cu
tiv
e 
of
fic
er
 in
 
th
e 
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 m
an
ne
r 
an
d 
be
 a
cc
om
pa
ni
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 fe
e.
To
 e
ns
ur
e 
m
ea
t t
o 
be
 s
ol
d 
to
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 is
 h
ea
lth
y 
an
d 
sa
fe
, e
ac
h 
ab
at
to
ir 
in
 th
e 
C
ou
nt
ry
 m
us
t h
ol
d 
a 
cu
rr
en
t 
va
lid
 s
ta
tu
to
ry
 r
eg
is
tra
tio
n 
ce
rti
fic
at
e 
is
su
es
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 
th
e 
Ac
t, 
a 
co
nt
ro
l m
ea
su
re
 fo
r t
he
 u
ph
ol
di
ng
 o
f h
yg
ie
ni
c 
st
an
da
rd
s.
O
w
ne
r o
f a
ba
tto
ir 
re
qu
ire
s 
in
sp
ec
tio
n 
se
rv
ic
e 
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 
by
 th
e 
Ac
t.
‘Im
po
rt 
pe
rm
it’
 re
qu
ire
d 
fo
r m
ea
t i
m
po
rte
d 
fro
m
 o
ut
sid
e 
th
e 
Re
pu
bl
ic
.
A
pp
lic
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
A
ct
 e
xt
re
m
el
y 
w
id
e 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
ga
m
e 
an
d 
ho
rs
e 
m
ea
t f
or
 e
xa
m
pl
e.
An
im
al
 
Id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n 
Ac
t 
(A
ct
 6
 o
f 2
00
2)
Pr
ov
id
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n 
of
 a
ni
m
al
s 
an
d 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 to
 b
e 
fo
llo
w
ed
 w
he
n 
ap
pl
yi
ng
 fo
r 
an
 i
de
nt
ifi
ca
tio
n 
m
ar
k.
 D
ir
ec
to
ra
te
s 
A
ni
m
al
 
Pr
o
d
u
ct
io
n
 a
n
d
 V
et
er
in
a
ry
 Q
u
a
ra
n
ti
n
e 
an
d 
H
um
an
 H
ea
lth
 a
re
 r
es
po
ns
ib
le
 f
o
r 
th
e 
ad
m
in
is
tra
tio
n 
of
 th
is
 A
ct
.
Tr
ac
ea
bi
lit
y 
of
 a
ni
m
al
s 
an
d 
an
im
al
 m
at
er
ia
l f
or
 b
io
sa
fe
ty
 
an
d 
bi
os
ec
ur
ity
 p
ur
po
se
s.
Th
e 
Ac
t p
ro
vi
de
s 
fo
r t
he
 c
om
pu
lso
ry
 m
ar
ki
ng
 o
f d
ef
in
ed
 
an
im
al
s 
an
d 
th
at
 a
ny
 p
er
so
n 
w
ho
 w
an
ts 
to
 m
ar
k 
an
im
al
s 
ot
he
r 
th
an
 h
is
 o
r 
he
r 
ow
n 
an
im
al
s 
fo
r 
fin
an
ci
al
 g
ai
n 
m
us
t a
pp
ly
 in
 th
e 
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 m
an
ne
r 
to
 th
e 
re
gi
st
ra
r 
fo
r 
re
gi
st
ra
tio
n 
as
 a
 m
ar
ki
ng
 o
pe
ra
to
r 
an
d 
pa
y 
th
e 
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 fe
e.
So
 a
ut
ho
ris
at
io
n 
is
 th
at
 a
s 
“m
ar
ki
ng
 o
pe
ra
to
r”
.
Th
e 
An
im
al
 H
ea
lth
 
Ac
t (
Ac
t 7
 o
f 2
00
2)
To
 p
ro
vi
de
 f
or
 m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 p
ro
m
ot
e 
an
im
al
 
he
a
lth
 a
nd
 t
o
 c
o
nt
ro
l 
a
ni
m
a
l 
d
is
ea
se
s;
 t
o 
as
si
gn
 e
xe
cu
tiv
e 
au
th
or
ity
 w
ith
 re
ga
rd
 to
 c
er
ta
in
 
pr
ov
is
io
ns
 o
f t
hi
s 
A
ct
 to
 p
ro
vi
nc
es
; 
to
 r
eg
ul
at
e 
th
e 
im
po
rta
tio
n 
an
d 
ex
po
rta
tio
n 
of
 a
ni
m
al
s 
an
d 
th
in
gs
; t
o 
es
ta
bl
is
h 
an
im
al
 h
ea
lth
 s
ch
em
es
; a
nd
 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 fo
r 
m
at
te
rs
 c
on
ne
ct
ed
 th
er
ew
ith
.
Th
e 
AR
C
 h
as
 to
 k
ee
p 
en
su
rin
g 
th
at
 it
 c
om
pl
ie
s 
w
ith
 th
is
 
St
at
ut
e 
in
 a
ll 
its
 h
an
dl
in
g 
of
 a
ni
m
al
s,
no
t o
nl
y 
be
ca
us
e 
it’
s 
le
ga
l t
o 
do
 s
o,
 b
ut
 a
ls
o 
fo
r r
ep
ut
at
io
na
l r
is
k–
re
la
te
d 
iss
ue
s 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 b
ec
om
in
g 
m
or
e 
an
d 
m
or
e 
im
po
rta
nt
 in
 
th
e 
gl
ob
al
 e
co
no
m
y 
an
d 
in
 w
ho
 c
er
ta
in
 in
st
itu
tio
ns
 a
re
 
w
ill
in
g 
to
 p
ar
tn
er
 w
ith
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 fu
nd
in
g 
an
d 
re
se
ar
ch
 
co
lla
bo
ra
tio
n.
Th
e 
A
ct
 p
re
sc
ri
be
s 
th
at
 n
o 
pe
rs
on
 m
ay
 im
po
rt
 a
ny
 
an
im
al
 o
r t
hi
ng
 in
to
 th
e 
co
un
try
 o
r c
on
ve
y 
an
y 
im
po
rte
d 
an
im
al
 o
r 
th
in
g 
in
 tr
an
si
t t
hr
ou
gh
 th
e 
Re
pu
bl
ic
 e
xc
ep
t 
up
on
 s
uc
ce
ss
fu
l a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
fo
r o
n 
th
e 
an
 im
po
rt 
pe
rm
it 
an
d 
(ii
) a
 tr
an
sit
 p
er
m
it 
ob
ta
in
ab
le
 o
n 
du
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
an
d 
th
e 
pa
ym
en
t o
f a
 p
re
sc
rib
ed
 fe
e 
fo
r m
ov
in
g 
or
 c
on
ve
ya
nc
in
g 
an
im
al
s 
ac
co
m
pa
ni
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 fe
e.
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Pi
ec
e 
of
 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
co
nc
er
ne
d
Th
e 
ke
y 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 o
f 
th
e 
ac
t
Le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
bu
si
ne
ss
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
Pe
rm
it 
or
 li
ce
nc
e,
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
or
 o
th
er
 f
or
m
al
 
au
th
or
ity
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
or
 ju
di
ci
al
-c
ou
rt
 p
ro
ce
ss
Th
e 
Ab
at
to
ir 
H
yg
ie
ne
 A
ct
 
(A
ct
 1
21
 o
f 1
99
2)
Pr
ov
id
es
 fo
r t
he
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 o
f p
ro
pe
r s
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
of
 h
yg
ie
ne
 in
 th
e 
sl
au
gh
te
rin
g 
of
 a
ni
m
al
s 
fo
r t
he
 
pu
rp
os
e 
of
 h
an
dl
in
g,
 k
ee
pi
ng
 c
on
ve
ya
nc
e 
of
 s
uc
h 
m
ee
t f
or
 h
um
an
 a
nd
 a
ni
m
al
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
an
d 
in
 
th
e 
ha
nd
lin
g,
 k
ee
pi
ng
 a
nd
 c
on
ve
ya
nc
e 
of
 s
uc
h 
m
ea
t a
nd
 a
ni
m
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
at
 a
nd
 fr
om
 a
ba
tto
irs
 
w
hi
ch
 c
om
pl
ie
s 
w
ith
 c
er
ta
in
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 w
ith
 
re
ga
rd
 t
o
 t
he
 o
ut
la
y 
an
d 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
 t
he
re
o
f, 
an
d 
th
e 
fix
ed
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t a
nd
 o
th
er
 fa
ci
lit
ie
s 
to
 
be
 in
st
al
le
d 
or
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
an
d 
w
hi
ch
 h
av
e 
be
en
 
ap
pr
ov
ed
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 th
e 
Ac
t t
o 
re
qu
ire
 th
at
 s
uc
h 
m
ea
t 
an
d 
an
im
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
sh
al
l b
e 
ha
nd
le
d 
or
 k
ep
t a
t a
nd
 b
e 
re
m
ov
ed
 f
ro
m
 a
ba
tto
irs
 in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 p
re
sc
rib
ed
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 t
o 
pr
ov
id
e 
th
at
 m
ea
t s
ha
ll 
no
t b
e 
im
po
rte
d 
ex
ce
pt
 
on
 th
e 
au
th
or
ity
 o
f a
 p
er
m
it 
iss
ue
s 
by
 th
e 
D
ire
ct
or
 
an
d 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 fo
r m
at
te
rs
 c
on
ne
ct
ed
 th
er
ew
ith
. 
To
 th
e 
ex
te
nt
 th
at
 A
RC
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 e
nt
ai
l s
la
ug
ht
er
 o
f 
an
im
al
s 
an
d 
po
ul
try
 th
is
 S
ta
tu
te
 h
as
 to
 b
e 
co
m
pl
ie
d 
w
ith
 a
nd
 s
ui
ta
bl
e 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s 
m
us
t k
ee
p 
be
in
g 
re
ne
w
ed
 to
 
en
su
re
 s
ui
ta
bl
e 
co
m
pl
ia
nc
e 
in
 th
at
 r
eg
ar
d.
Pr
ov
id
es
 fo
r t
he
 h
an
dl
in
g 
of
 m
ea
t u
nd
er
 d
ul
y 
au
th
or
ise
d 
ab
at
to
irs
 a
nd
 f
or
 m
ea
t 
im
po
rt
at
io
n 
un
de
r 
st
at
ut
or
y 
pe
rm
it.
Th
is
 i
n 
a 
qu
es
t 
to
 o
pt
im
is
e 
hy
gi
en
e 
an
d 
el
im
in
at
e 
or
 r
ed
uc
e 
di
se
as
e 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
ha
nd
lin
g 
an
d 
co
nv
ey
an
ci
ng
 o
f a
ni
m
al
 m
ea
t.
N
at
io
na
l 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l 
M
an
ag
em
en
t A
ct
 
(A
ct
 1
07
 o
f 1
99
8)
Pr
ov
id
e 
fo
r 
m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 p
re
ve
nt
 p
ol
lu
tio
n 
an
d 
ec
ol
og
ic
al
 d
eg
ra
da
tio
n;
 p
ro
m
ot
e 
co
ns
er
va
tio
n;
 
an
d 
se
cu
re
 e
co
lo
gi
ca
lly
 s
us
ta
in
ab
le
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
an
d 
us
e 
of
 n
at
ur
al
 r
es
ou
rc
es
 w
hi
le
 p
ro
m
ot
in
g 
ju
st
ifi
ab
le
 e
co
no
m
ic
 a
nd
 s
oc
ia
l d
ev
el
op
m
en
t. 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t o
f E
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l A
ffa
irs
 (D
EA
T)
 is
 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
ad
m
in
is
tra
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
Ac
t.
In
 o
rd
er
 t
o 
gi
ve
 e
ffe
ct
 t
o 
th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 o
f 
in
te
gr
at
ed
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l m
an
ag
em
en
t l
ai
d 
do
w
n 
in
 th
is 
ch
ap
te
r, 
th
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l c
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
fo
r o
r i
m
pa
ct
s 
on
 th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t o
f l
ist
ed
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 o
r s
pe
ci
fie
d 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 m
us
t 
be
 c
on
sid
er
ed
, i
nv
es
tig
at
ed
, a
ss
es
se
d 
an
d 
re
po
rte
d 
on
 to
 
th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nt
 a
ut
ho
rit
y 
or
 th
e 
M
in
ist
er
 o
f M
in
er
al
s 
an
d 
En
er
gy
, a
s 
th
e 
ca
se
 m
ay
 b
e,
 e
xc
ep
t i
n 
re
sp
ec
t o
f t
ho
se
 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 th
at
 m
ay
 c
om
m
en
ce
 w
ith
ou
t h
av
in
g 
to
 o
bt
ai
n 
an
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l a
ut
ho
ris
at
io
n 
in
 te
rm
s 
of
 th
is 
Ac
t.
N
at
io
na
l 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l 
M
an
ag
em
en
t: 
Bi
od
iv
er
si
ty
 A
ct
 
(A
ct
 1
0 
of
 2
00
4)
 
an
d 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
 
on
 B
io
pr
os
pe
ct
in
g,
 
Ac
ce
ss
 a
nd
 B
en
ef
it 
Sh
ar
in
g
To
 p
ro
vi
d
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
m
a
na
g
em
en
t 
a
nd
 c
o
n-
se
rv
at
io
n 
of
 S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a’
s 
bi
od
iv
er
si
ty
 w
ith
in
 
th
e 
fr
am
ew
or
k 
of
 th
e 
N
at
io
na
l E
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
A
ct
, 
1
9
9
8
; 
th
e 
pr
o
te
ct
io
n 
o
f 
sp
ec
ie
s 
an
d 
ec
os
ys
te
m
s 
th
at
 w
ar
ra
nt
 n
at
io
na
l 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n;
 th
e 
su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
us
e 
of
 in
di
ge
no
us
 
bi
ol
og
ic
al
 r
es
ou
rc
es
; 
th
e 
fa
ir
 a
nd
 e
qu
ita
bl
e 
sh
ar
in
g 
of
 b
en
ef
its
 a
ris
in
g 
fro
m
 b
io
pr
os
pe
ct
in
g 
in
vo
lv
in
g 
in
di
ge
no
us
 b
io
lo
gi
ca
l 
re
so
ur
ce
s.
 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t o
f E
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l A
ffa
irs
 (D
EA
T)
 is
 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
ad
m
in
is
tra
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
Ac
t.
Th
e 
Ac
t p
ro
vi
de
s 
fo
r 
th
re
e 
ke
y 
ty
pe
s 
of
 p
er
m
its
 
1.
 
Bi
op
ro
sp
ec
tin
g 
pe
rm
its
.
2.
 
In
te
gr
at
ed
 e
xp
or
t a
nd
 b
io
pr
os
pe
ct
in
g 
pe
rm
its
.
3.
 
Ex
po
rt
 p
er
m
it 
fo
r 
re
se
ar
ch
 o
th
er
 t
ha
n 
bi
op
ro
s-
pe
ct
in
g.
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Pi
ec
e 
of
 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
co
nc
er
ne
d
Th
e 
ke
y 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 o
f 
th
e 
ac
t
Le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
bu
si
ne
ss
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
Pe
rm
it 
or
 li
ce
nc
e,
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
or
 o
th
er
 f
or
m
al
 
au
th
or
ity
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
or
 ju
di
ci
al
-c
ou
rt
 p
ro
ce
ss
Fo
od
st
uf
f, 
C
os
m
et
ic
s 
&
 
D
is
in
fe
ct
an
t A
ct
 
(A
ct
 5
4 
of
 1
97
2)
To
 c
on
tro
l t
he
 s
al
e,
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
 a
nd
 im
po
rta
tio
n 
of
 fo
od
st
uf
f, 
co
sm
et
ic
s 
an
d 
di
si
nf
ec
ta
nt
s.
 T
he
 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t 
of
 H
ea
lth
 i
s 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
ad
m
in
is
tra
tio
n 
of
 th
is
 A
ct
.
N
o
 p
er
m
its
 o
r 
lic
en
ce
s 
as
 s
uc
h;
 r
at
he
r 
a 
st
at
ut
o
ry
 
re
gi
m
e 
th
at
 p
ro
hi
bi
ts
 th
e 
sa
le
 o
f c
on
ta
m
in
at
ed
 fo
od
 a
nd
 
em
po
w
er
s 
in
sp
ec
to
rs
 to
 in
sp
ec
t a
nd
 m
ak
es
 it
 o
ffe
nc
es
 
in
 r
es
pe
ct
 o
f o
bs
tru
ct
in
g 
or
 fr
us
tra
tin
g 
in
 a
ny
 w
ay
 th
is
 
in
sp
ec
tio
n 
pr
oc
es
s.
Th
e 
Ph
ar
m
ac
y 
Ac
t 
(A
ct
 5
3 
of
 1
97
4)
To
 p
ro
vi
de
 fo
r 
th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f t
he
 S
ou
th
 
A
fr
ic
an
 P
ha
rm
ac
y 
C
ou
nc
il 
an
d 
fo
r 
its
 o
bj
ec
ts
 
an
d 
ge
ne
ra
l p
ow
er
s;
 to
 e
xt
en
d 
th
e 
co
nt
ro
l o
f t
he
 
co
un
ci
l t
o 
th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 s
ec
to
r;
 a
nd
 to
 p
ro
vi
de
 fo
r 
ph
ar
m
ac
y 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
an
d 
tra
in
in
g,
 re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 
fo
r 
re
gi
st
ra
tio
n,
 th
e 
pr
ac
tic
e 
of
 p
ha
rm
ac
y,
 th
e 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
of
 p
ha
rm
ac
ie
s 
an
d 
th
e 
in
ve
st
ig
at
iv
e 
an
d 
di
sc
ip
lin
ar
y 
po
w
er
s 
of
 th
e 
co
un
ci
l; 
an
d 
to
 
pr
ov
id
e 
fo
r 
m
at
te
rs
 c
on
ne
ct
ed
 th
er
ew
ith
. 
Th
e 
in
st
itu
tio
n 
ha
s 
to
 a
lw
ay
s 
en
su
re
 th
at
 it
s 
ha
nd
lin
g 
o
f 
ph
ar
m
ac
eu
tic
al
s 
in
 i
ts
 r
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
la
bo
ra
to
ry
 
op
er
at
io
ns
 is
 c
om
pl
ia
nt
 w
ith
 th
is
 S
ta
tu
te
 a
nd
 s
ec
to
r 
be
st
 p
ra
ct
ic
e.
Th
e 
A
ct
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
re
gi
st
ra
tio
n 
an
d 
di
sc
ip
lin
in
g 
o
f 
p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
ls
 i
n 
th
e 
p
ha
rm
a
cy
 d
is
ci
p
lin
e 
a
nd
 
fo
r 
th
e 
re
gi
st
ra
tio
n 
of
 p
ha
rm
ac
eu
tic
al
s 
ou
tle
ts
 a
nd
 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
ts
.
Th
is
, 
w
it
h 
a
 v
ie
w
 t
o
 p
ro
te
ct
in
g
 t
he
 p
ub
lic
 f
ro
m
 
un
re
gu
la
te
d 
an
d 
un
pr
ot
ec
te
d 
ac
ce
ss
 to
 p
ha
rm
ac
eu
tic
al
 
pr
od
uc
ts
 a
nd
 t
he
 p
os
si
bl
e 
ab
us
e 
of
 s
uc
h 
pr
od
uc
ts
 
ca
us
in
g 
di
se
as
e 
to
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
.
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t 
of
 L
ab
ou
r
H
az
ar
do
us
 
Su
bs
ta
nc
es
 A
ct
 
(A
ct
 1
5 
of
 1
97
3)
To
 p
ro
vi
de
 fo
r 
th
e 
co
nt
ro
l o
f s
ub
st
an
ce
s 
w
hi
ch
 
m
ay
 c
au
se
 in
ju
ry
 o
r 
ill
-h
ea
lth
 t
o 
or
 d
ea
th
 o
f 
hu
m
an
 b
ei
ng
s 
by
 re
as
on
 o
f t
he
ir 
to
xi
c,
 c
or
ro
siv
e,
 
irr
ita
nt
, s
tro
ng
ly
 s
en
si
tis
in
g 
or
 fl
am
m
ab
le
 n
at
ur
e 
or
 th
e 
ge
ne
ra
tio
n 
of
 p
re
ss
ur
e 
th
er
eb
y 
in
 c
er
ta
in
 
ci
rc
um
st
an
ce
s,
 a
nd
 f
or
 th
e 
co
nt
ro
l o
f 
ce
rt
ai
n 
el
ec
tro
ni
c 
pr
od
uc
ts
; 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 fo
r 
th
e 
di
vi
si
on
 
of
 s
uc
h 
su
bs
ta
nc
es
 o
r 
pr
od
uc
ts
 in
to
 g
ro
up
s 
in
 
re
la
tio
n 
to
 th
e 
de
gr
ee
 o
f d
an
ge
r;
 to
 p
ro
vi
de
 fo
r 
th
e 
pr
oh
ib
iti
on
 a
nd
 c
on
tro
l o
f t
he
 im
po
rta
tio
n,
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
, s
al
e,
 u
se
, o
pe
ra
tio
n,
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n,
 
m
o
di
fic
at
io
n,
 d
is
po
sa
l 
o
r 
du
m
pi
ng
 o
f 
su
ch
 
su
bs
ta
nc
es
 a
nd
 p
ro
du
ct
s.
 T
he
 D
ep
ar
tm
en
t o
f 
H
ea
lth
 is
 r
es
po
ns
ib
le
 fo
r 
th
e 
ad
m
in
is
tra
tio
n 
of
 
th
is
 A
ct
.
Th
e 
Ac
t p
ro
vi
de
s 
th
at
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 c
er
ta
in
 o
f i
ts
 p
ro
vi
si
on
s 
of
 t
he
 D
ir
ec
to
r-
G
en
er
al
 m
ay
 o
n 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
in
 t
he
 
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 m
an
ne
r 
an
d 
on
 p
ay
m
en
t o
f t
he
 p
re
sc
rib
ed
 
fe
e 
(if
 a
ny
) a
nd
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 a
nd
 
su
ch
 fu
rth
er
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 a
s 
th
e 
D
ire
ct
or
-G
en
er
al
 m
ay
 in
 
ea
ch
 c
as
e 
de
te
rm
in
e,
 is
su
e 
to
 a
ny
 p
er
so
n 
a 
lic
en
ce
 -
(a
) 
to
 c
ar
ry
 o
n 
bu
si
ne
ss
 a
s 
a 
su
pp
lie
r 
of
 G
ro
up
 I 
ha
za
rd
ou
s 
su
bs
ta
nc
es
; 
(b
) 
to
 s
el
l, 
le
t, 
us
e,
 o
pe
ra
te
 o
r 
ap
pl
y 
an
y 
G
ro
up
 II
I 
ha
za
rd
ou
s 
su
bs
ta
nc
e;
 
(c
) 
to
 in
st
al
l a
 G
ro
up
 II
I h
az
ar
do
us
 s
ub
st
an
ce
 o
n 
an
y 
pr
em
is
es
 m
en
tio
ne
d 
in
 s
uc
h 
lic
en
ce
.
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Pi
ec
e 
of
 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
co
nc
er
ne
d
Th
e 
ke
y 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 o
f 
th
e 
ac
t
Le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
bu
si
ne
ss
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
Pe
rm
it 
or
 li
ce
nc
e,
 r
eg
is
tr
at
io
n 
or
 o
th
er
 f
or
m
al
 
au
th
or
ity
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
or
 ju
di
ci
al
-c
ou
rt
 p
ro
ce
ss
So
ut
h 
A
fr
ic
an
 P
ol
ic
e 
Se
rv
ic
es
Pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
of
 
C
on
st
itu
tio
na
l 
D
em
oc
ra
cy
 a
ga
in
st
 
Te
rr
or
is
t a
nd
 
Re
la
te
d 
Ac
tiv
iti
es
 
Ac
t (
Ac
t 3
3 
of
 
20
04
)
To
 p
ro
vi
de
 fo
r m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 p
re
ve
nt
 a
nd
 c
om
ba
t 
te
rr
or
is
t 
an
d 
re
la
te
d 
ac
tiv
iti
es
; 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 f
or
 
an
 o
ffe
nc
e 
o
f 
te
rr
o
ri
sm
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 o
ffe
nc
es
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 o
r 
co
nn
ec
te
d 
w
ith
 te
rr
or
is
t a
ct
iv
iti
es
; 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 f
o
r 
C
o
nv
en
tio
n 
o
ffe
nc
es
; 
to
 g
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
 to
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l i
ns
tru
m
en
ts
 d
ea
lin
g 
w
ith
 
te
rr
or
is
t 
an
d 
re
la
te
d 
ac
tiv
iti
es
; 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 f
or
 
a 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
ith
 U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 
Se
cu
rit
y 
C
ou
nc
il 
Re
so
lu
tio
ns
, w
hi
ch
 a
re
 b
in
di
ng
 
on
 m
em
be
r 
St
at
es
, 
in
 r
es
pe
ct
 o
f t
er
ro
ris
t a
nd
 
re
la
te
d 
ac
tiv
iti
es
; 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 f
or
 m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 
pr
ev
en
t a
nd
 c
om
ba
t t
he
 fi
na
nc
in
g 
of
 te
rr
or
is
t 
an
d 
re
la
te
d 
ac
tiv
iti
es
; t
o 
pr
ov
id
e 
fo
r i
nv
es
tig
at
iv
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
in
 r
es
pe
ct
 o
f 
te
rr
o
ri
st
 a
nd
 r
el
at
ed
 
ac
tiv
iti
es
; 
an
d 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 fo
r 
m
at
te
rs
 c
on
ne
ct
ed
 
th
er
ew
ith
.
Th
e 
ke
y 
em
er
ge
nt
 c
ha
lle
ng
e 
fo
r 
an
 i
ns
tit
ut
io
n 
in
 
th
is
 r
eg
ar
d 
is
 r
em
ot
e 
an
d 
th
at
 is
 th
e 
ve
ry
 fa
r-
fe
tc
he
d 
p
o
ss
ib
il
it
y 
th
a
t 
a
n
 e
m
p
lo
ye
e 
co
u
ld
 n
o
t 
to
ta
ll
y 
in
co
nc
ei
va
bl
y 
se
cr
et
ly
 u
se
 f
ac
ili
tie
s 
to
 p
ro
du
ce
 a
 
bi
o
lo
gi
ca
l 
w
ea
po
n 
w
ith
o
ut
 t
he
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
o
f 
hi
s 
su
p
er
io
rs
. 
Th
er
e 
is
 a
 n
ee
d
 t
o
 a
lw
a
ys
 b
e 
vi
g
ila
nt
 
ab
ou
t s
uc
h 
un
la
w
fu
l c
on
du
ct
 e
ve
n 
th
ou
gh
 it
 is
 p
ur
el
y 
de
m
on
st
ra
tiv
e 
an
d 
hy
po
th
et
ic
al
 a
s 
a 
m
at
te
r t
o 
w
hi
ch
 th
is 
Ac
t a
pp
lie
s 
an
d 
is
 s
o 
un
lik
el
y 
to
 o
cc
ur
 a
s 
to
 b
e 
al
m
os
t 
im
po
ss
ib
le
 w
ith
 p
re
va
ili
ng
 a
cr
id
ity
 o
n 
re
se
ar
ch
 fa
ci
lit
ie
s 
by
 E
xe
cu
tiv
e 
an
d 
Se
ni
or
 M
an
ag
er
s.
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Appendix 3:  Human infectious agents and the regulations in 
which they are specifically named highlighted in colour
Agent name (or disease)
Ty
pe
 o
f 
ag
en
t 
(v
ir
us
/ 
ba
ct
er
ia
/f
un
gu
s)
U
S 
H
H
S 
&
 U
SD
A
 s
el
ec
t 
ag
en
ts
 &
 t
ox
in
s 
7
 C
FR
 
pa
rt
 3
3
1
, 
9
 C
FR
 p
ar
t 
1
2
1
, 
 &
 4
2
 C
FR
 p
ar
t 
7
3
N
ot
ifi
ab
le
 in
 S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
– 
hu
m
an
 li
st
So
ut
h 
A
fr
ic
an
 N
on
-
Pr
ol
ife
ra
tio
n 
of
 W
ea
po
ns
 
of
 M
as
s 
D
es
tr
uc
tio
n 
A
ct
O
cc
up
at
io
na
l H
ea
lth
 a
nd
 
Sa
fe
ty
 A
ct
, 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
 
fo
r 
H
az
ar
do
us
 B
io
lo
gi
ca
l 
A
ge
nt
s
O
H
SA
, 
1
9
9
3
, 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
 f
or
 
H
az
ar
do
us
 B
io
lo
gi
ca
l 
A
ge
nt
s 
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n
Clostridium botulinum Bacteria Yes Yes Yes Yes 2
Yersinia pestis Bacteria Yes Yes Yes Yes 3
Ebola virus Virus Yes Yes Yes Yes 4
Lassa fever virus Virus Yes Yes Yes Yes 2
Marburg virus Virus Yes Yes Yes Yes 4
Variola major virus (smallpox) Virus Yes Yes Yes Yes 4
Variola minor virus (alastrim) Virus Yes Yes Yes Yes 4
Rickettsia prowazekii Bacteria Yes Yes Yes 3
Junin Virus Yes Yes Yes
Tick-bourne encephalitis 
complex (flavi) viruses Virus Yes Yes Yes 3
Abrin Toxin Yes Yes
Botulinum neurotoxins Toxin Yes Yes
Conotoxins Toxin Yes Yes
Diacetoxyscirpenol toxin Toxin Yes Yes
Ricin (biotoxin) Toxin Yes Yes
Saxitoxin Toxin Yes Yes
Staphylococcal enterotoxins Toxin Yes Yes
T-2 toxin Toxin Yes Yes
Tetrodotoxin Toxin Yes Yes
Far Eastern tick-bourne 
encephalitis virus (formerly 
known as Russian Spring and 
Summer encephalitis) Virus Yes Yes
Guanarito Virus Yes Yes
Kyasanur forest disease virus Virus Yes Yes
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Agent name (or disease)
Ty
pe
 o
f 
ag
en
t 
(v
ir
us
/ 
ba
ct
er
ia
/f
un
gu
s)
U
S 
H
H
S 
&
 U
SD
A
 s
el
ec
t 
ag
en
ts
 &
 t
ox
in
s 
7
 C
FR
 
pa
rt
 3
3
1
, 
9
 C
FR
 p
ar
t 
1
2
1
, 
 &
 4
2
 C
FR
 p
ar
t 
7
3
N
ot
ifi
ab
le
 in
 S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
– 
hu
m
an
 li
st
So
ut
h 
A
fr
ic
an
 N
on
-
Pr
ol
ife
ra
tio
n 
of
 W
ea
po
ns
 
of
 M
as
s 
D
es
tr
uc
tio
n 
A
ct
O
cc
up
at
io
na
l H
ea
lth
 a
nd
 
Sa
fe
ty
 A
ct
, 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
 
fo
r 
H
az
ar
do
us
 B
io
lo
gi
ca
l 
A
ge
nt
s
O
H
SA
, 
1
9
9
3
, 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
 f
or
 
H
az
ar
do
us
 B
io
lo
gi
ca
l 
A
ge
nt
s 
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n
Lujo virus Virus Yes Yes
Machupo Virus Yes Yes
Monkeypox virus Virus Yes Yes
Omsk haemorrhagic fever Virus Yes Yes
Sabia Virus Yes Yes
Chapare Virus Yes
Reconstructed 1918 influenza Virus Yes
SARS-associated coranavirus Virus Yes
South American 
haemorrhagic fever virus Virus Yes
Clostridium perfingens 
epsilon toxin-producing types Bacteria Yes Yes Yes 2
Clostridium tetani Bacteria Yes Yes Yes 2
Legionella pneumophila 
(OHSA HBA reg 
Fluorobacter) Bacteria Yes Yes Yes 2
Salmonella typhi Bacteria Yes Yes Yes 3
Vibrio cholerae Bacteria Yes Yes Yes 2
Yellow fever Virus Yes Yes Yes 3
Cholera toxin Toxin Yes Yes
Clostridium perfringens toxin Toxin Yes Yes
Tetanus toxin Toxin Yes Yes
Bacillus cereus Bacteria Yes Yes 2
Bordetella pertussis Bacteria Yes Yes 2
Chlamydia trachomatis Bacteria Yes Yes 2
Corynebacterium diphtheria Bacteria Yes Yes 2
Haemophilus influenza Bacteria Yes Yes 2
Mycobacterium leprae Bacteria Yes Yes 3
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Agent name (or disease)
Ty
pe
 o
f 
ag
en
t 
(v
ir
us
/ 
ba
ct
er
ia
/f
un
gu
s)
U
S 
H
H
S 
&
 U
SD
A
 s
el
ec
t 
ag
en
ts
 &
 t
ox
in
s 
7
 C
FR
 
pa
rt
 3
3
1
, 
9
 C
FR
 p
ar
t 
1
2
1
, 
 &
 4
2
 C
FR
 p
ar
t 
7
3
N
ot
ifi
ab
le
 in
 S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
– 
hu
m
an
 li
st
So
ut
h 
A
fr
ic
an
 N
on
-
Pr
ol
ife
ra
tio
n 
of
 W
ea
po
ns
 
of
 M
as
s 
D
es
tr
uc
tio
n 
A
ct
O
cc
up
at
io
na
l H
ea
lth
 a
nd
 
Sa
fe
ty
 A
ct
, 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
 
fo
r 
H
az
ar
do
us
 B
io
lo
gi
ca
l 
A
ge
nt
s
O
H
SA
, 
1
9
9
3
, 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
 f
or
 
H
az
ar
do
us
 B
io
lo
gi
ca
l 
A
ge
nt
s 
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n
Mycobacterium tuberculosis Bacteria Yes Yes 3
Neisseria meningitidis Bacteria Yes Yes 2
Streptococcus spp (Rheumatic 
fever is notifiable) Bacteria Yes Yes 2
Treponema spp Bacteria Yes Yes 2
Malaria (Plasmodium 
falciparum) Parasite Yes Yes 3
Hepatitis A (Human 
enterovirus type 72) Virus Yes Yes 2
Hepatitis B Virus Yes Yes 3
Hepatitis C Virus Yes Yes 3
Hepatitis D Virus Yes Yes 3
Hepatitis E Virus Yes Yes 3
Measles Virus Yes Yes 2
Polioviruses Virus Yes Yes 2
Bartonella quintana Bacteria Yes Yes 2
Enterohaemorrhagic 
escherichia coli, serotype 
0157 and other verotoxin-
producing sub-types Bacteria Yes Yes 2
Rickettsia rickettsii Bacteria Yes Yes 3
Shigella dysenteriae Bacteria Yes Yes 3
Yersinia pseudotuberculosis Bacteria Yes Yes 2
Chikungunya Virus Yes Yes 3
Dengue Virus Yes Yes 3
Hanta virus Virus Yes Yes 3
Coccidioides posadasii/
Coccidioides immitis Fungi Yes
Aflatoxin Toxin Yes
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Agent name (or disease)
Ty
pe
 o
f 
ag
en
t 
(v
ir
us
/ 
ba
ct
er
ia
/f
un
gu
s)
U
S 
H
H
S 
&
 U
SD
A
 s
el
ec
t 
ag
en
ts
 &
 t
ox
in
s 
7
 C
FR
 
pa
rt
 3
3
1
, 
9
 C
FR
 p
ar
t 
1
2
1
, 
 &
 4
2
 C
FR
 p
ar
t 
7
3
N
ot
ifi
ab
le
 in
 S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
– 
hu
m
an
 li
st
So
ut
h 
A
fr
ic
an
 N
on
-
Pr
ol
ife
ra
tio
n 
of
 W
ea
po
ns
 
of
 M
as
s 
D
es
tr
uc
tio
n 
A
ct
O
cc
up
at
io
na
l H
ea
lth
 a
nd
 
Sa
fe
ty
 A
ct
, 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
 
fo
r 
H
az
ar
do
us
 B
io
lo
gi
ca
l 
A
ge
nt
s
O
H
SA
, 
1
9
9
3
, 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
 f
or
 
H
az
ar
do
us
 B
io
lo
gi
ca
l 
A
ge
nt
s 
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n
Mictocystin (Cyanginosin) Toxin Yes
Modeccin toxin Toxin Yes
Mycotoxin Toxin Yes
Shiga toxins Toxin Yes
Verotoxin Toxin Yes
Viscum album lectin 1 Toxin Yes
Volkensin Toxin Yes
Dandenong Virus Yes
Flexal Virus Yes
Murray valley encephalitis Virus Yes
Oropouche virus Virus Yes
Rocio Virus Yes
St Louis encephalitis virus Virus Yes
Acinetobacter calcoaeceticus Bacteria Yes 2
Acinetobacter iwoffi Bacteria Yes 2
Actinobacillus 
actinomycetemcomitans Bacteria Yes 2
Actinomadura madurae Bacteria Yes 2
Actinomadura pelletieri Bacteria Yes 2
Alcaligines spp Bacteria Yes 2
Arcanobacterium 
haemolyticum 
(Corynebacterium 
haemolyticum) Bacteria Yes 2
Bacteroides spp Bacteria Yes 2
Bartonella spp Bacteria Yes 2
Bordetella parapertussis Bacteria Yes 2
Borellia burgdorferi Bacteria Yes 2
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Agent name (or disease)
Ty
pe
 o
f 
ag
en
t 
(v
ir
us
/ 
ba
ct
er
ia
/f
un
gu
s)
U
S 
H
H
S 
&
 U
SD
A
 s
el
ec
t 
ag
en
ts
 &
 t
ox
in
s 
7
 C
FR
 
pa
rt
 3
3
1
, 
9
 C
FR
 p
ar
t 
1
2
1
, 
 &
 4
2
 C
FR
 p
ar
t 
7
3
N
ot
ifi
ab
le
 in
 S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
– 
hu
m
an
 li
st
So
ut
h 
A
fr
ic
an
 N
on
-
Pr
ol
ife
ra
tio
n 
of
 W
ea
po
ns
 
of
 M
as
s 
D
es
tr
uc
tio
n 
A
ct
O
cc
up
at
io
na
l H
ea
lth
 a
nd
 
Sa
fe
ty
 A
ct
, 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
 
fo
r 
H
az
ar
do
us
 B
io
lo
gi
ca
l 
A
ge
nt
s
O
H
SA
, 
1
9
9
3
, 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
 f
or
 
H
az
ar
do
us
 B
io
lo
gi
ca
l 
A
ge
nt
s 
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n
Burkholderia cepacia Bacteria Yes 2
Cardiobacterium hominis Bacteria Yes 2
Corynebacterium 
minutissimum Bacteria Yes 2
Ehrlichia spp Bacteria Yes 3
Eikenella corrodens Bacteria Yes 2
Eneterobacter spp Bacteria Yes 2
Enterococcus spp Bacteria Yes 2
Flavobacterium 
meningosepticum Bacteria Yes 2
Fusobacterium spp Bacteria Yes 2
Gardnerella vaginalis Bacteria Yes 2
Haemophilus ducreyi Bacteria Yes 2
Haemophilus spp Bacteria Yes 2
Helicobacter pylori Bacteria Yes 2
Klebsiella oxytoca Bacteria Yes 2
Klebsiella pneumoniae Bacteria Yes 2
Klebsiella spp Bacteria Yes 2
Moraxella catarrhalis Bacteria Yes 2
Moraxella lacunata Bacteria Yes 2
Morganella moganii Bacteria Yes 2
Mycobacterium africanum Bacteria Yes 3
Mycobacterium bovis (BCG 
strain) Bacteria Yes 2
Mycobacterium chelonae Bacteria Yes 2
Mycobacterium fortuitum Bacteria Yes 2
Mycobacterium kansasii Bacteria Yes 3
Mycobacterium malmoense Bacteria Yes 3
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Agent name (or disease)
Ty
pe
 o
f 
ag
en
t 
(v
ir
us
/ 
ba
ct
er
ia
/f
un
gu
s)
U
S 
H
H
S 
&
 U
SD
A
 s
el
ec
t 
ag
en
ts
 &
 t
ox
in
s 
7
 C
FR
 
pa
rt
 3
3
1
, 
9
 C
FR
 p
ar
t 
1
2
1
, 
 &
 4
2
 C
FR
 p
ar
t 
7
3
N
ot
ifi
ab
le
 in
 S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
– 
hu
m
an
 li
st
So
ut
h 
A
fr
ic
an
 N
on
-
Pr
ol
ife
ra
tio
n 
of
 W
ea
po
ns
 
of
 M
as
s 
D
es
tr
uc
tio
n 
A
ct
O
cc
up
at
io
na
l H
ea
lth
 a
nd
 
Sa
fe
ty
 A
ct
, 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
 
fo
r 
H
az
ar
do
us
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Mycobacterium marinum Bacteria Yes 2
Mycobacterium scrofulaceum Bacteria Yes 3
Mycobacterium szulgai Bacteria Yes 3
Mycobacterium ulcerans 
(Buruli ulcer) Bacteria Yes 3
Mycoplasma hominis Bacteria Yes 2
Mycoplasma pneumoniae Bacteria Yes 2
Neisseria gonorrhoeae Bacteria Yes 2
Nocardia spp Bacteria Yes 2
Pasteurella spp Bacteria Yes 2
Peptrostreptococcus spp Bacteria Yes 2
Plesiomonas shigelioides Bacteria Yes 2
Prevotella spp Bacteria Yes 2
Proteus mirabilis Bacteria Yes 2
Proteus penneri Bacteria Yes 2
Proteus vulgaris Bacteria Yes 2
Providencia spp Bacteria Yes 2
Pseudomonas aeruginosa Bacteria Yes 2
Serratia liquefaciens Bacteria Yes 2
Serratia marcescens Bacteria Yes 2
Shigella boydi Bacteria Yes 2
Shigella flexneri Bacteria Yes 2
Shigella sonnei Bacteria Yes 2
Staphylococcus aureus Bacteria Yes 2
Stenotrophomonas 
maltophilia Bacteria Yes 2
Strepobacillus moniliformis 
(Rat bite fever) Bacteria Yes 2
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Ureaplasma urealyticum Bacteria Yes 2
Vibrio parahaemolyticus Bacteria Yes 2
Vibrio spp Bacteria Yes 2
Yersinia enterocolitica Bacteria Yes 2
Yersinia spp Bacteria Yes 2
Acanthamoeba spp Parasite Yes 2
Ancylostoma duodenale Parasite Yes 2
Ascaris lumbricoides Parasite Yes 2
Balantidium coli Parasite Yes 2
Blastocystis homines Parasite Yes 2
Brugia spp Parasite Yes 2
Capillaria spp Parasite Yes 2
Cyclospora cayetanensis Parasite Yes 2
Dientamoeba fragilis Parasite Yes 2
Dracunculus medinensis Parasite Yes 2
Entamoeba histolytica Parasite Yes 2
Entamoeba vermicularis Parasite Yes 2
Isopora belli Parasite Yes 2
Loa loa Parasite Yes 2
Mansonella ozzardi Parasite Yes 2
Mansonella perstans Parasite Yes 2
Mansonella streptocoerca Parasite Yes 2
Naegleria fowleri Parasite Yes 3
Necator americanus Parasite Yes 2
Onchocerca volvulus Parasite Yes 2
Schistosoma spp Parasite Yes 2
Strongyloides spp Parasite Yes 2
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Trichomonas vaginalis Parasite Yes 2
Trichuris trichiura Parasite Yes 2
Wuchereria bancrofti 
(Lymphatic filariasis) Parasite Yes 2
Unconventional agents 
associated with Gerstmann-
Strussler-Scheinker PRION Yes 3
Unconventional agents 
associated with Kuru PRION Yes 3
Acute haemorrhagic 
conjunctivitis virus Virus Yes 2
Adenoviridae Virus Yes 2
Alphavirus Virus Yes 2
Astroviridae Virus Yes 2
BK and JC viruses Virus Yes 2
Blood-borne hepatitis viruses 
not yet identified Virus Yes 3
Coronaviridae Virus Yes 2
Coxsackie viruses Virus Yes 2
Cytomegalovirus Virus Yes 2
Echoviruses Virus Yes 2
Epstein-Barr Virus Yes 2
Flaviviruses known to be 
pathogenic Virus Yes 2
Herpes simplex type 1 and 2 Virus Yes 2
Herpesvirus varicella-zoster Virus Yes 2
Human herpesvirus type 6 Virus Yes 2
Human herpesvirus type 7 Virus Yes 2
Human immunodeficiency 
viruses Virus Yes 3
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Human papillomaviruses Virus Yes 2
Human parvovirus (B19) Virus Yes 2
Human rotaviruses Virus Yes 2
Human T-cell lymphotropic 
virus Virus Yes 3
Influenza types A, B and C2 Virus Yes 2
Lymphocytic chloriomeningitis Virus Yes 3
Mobala Virus Yes 2
Molluscum contagiosum virus Virus Yes 2
Monkeypox Virus Yes 3
Mopeia Virus Yes 3
Mumps Virus Yes 2
Norwalk (Norovirus) Virus Yes 2
O'nyong-nyong Virus Yes 2
Other Calciviridae Virus Yes 2
Parainfluenza (Types 1 to 4) Virus Yes 2
Respiratory syncytial virus Virus Yes 2
Rhinoviruses Virus Yes 2
Rubella Virus Yes 2
Spondweni Virus Yes 3
Vaccinia (including strains 
originally classified as 
rabbitpox) Virus Yes 2
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African horse sickness 
(Orbivirus serogroup L) Virus Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 2
Rinderpest Virus Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 4
Bluetongue (Orbivirus 
serogroup L) Virus Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 2
Classical swine fever 
(Hog cholera) Virus Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foot and mouth disease Virus Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lumpy skin disease Virus Yes Yes Yes Yes
Porcine enterovirus 
type 9 (Swine vesicular 
disease) Virus Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sheep pox virus Virus Yes Yes Yes Yes
African swine fever Virus Yes Yes Yes Yes
Avian influenza Virus Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mycoplasma capricolum Bacteria Yes Yes Yes
Mycoplasma mycoides Bacteria Yes Yes Yes
Goat pox virus Virus Yes Yes Yes
Peste des petits ruminants Virus Yes Yes Yes
Porcine herpesvirus 
(Aujeszky's disease) Virus Yes Yes Yes
Mycobacterium 
paratuberculosis 
(Johne's disease) Bacteria Yes Yes Yes 2
Salmonella gallinarum 
(Fowl typhoid) Bacteria Yes Yes Yes 2
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Salmonella pullorum Bacteria Yes Yes Yes 2
Trypanosoma brucei 
brucei (Nagana) Parasite Yes Yes Yes 2
Contagious equine 
metritis Bacteria Yes Yes
Glanders Bacteria Yes Yes
Haemorrhagic 
septicaemia Bacteria Yes Yes
Dourine Parasite Yes Yes
Bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy PRION Yes Yes
Scrapie PRION Yes Yes
Equine infectious 
anaemia Virus Yes Yes
Equine influenza Virus Yes Yes
Equine viral arteritis Virus Yes Yes
Porcine reproductive 
and respiratory 
syndrome virus Virus Yes Yes
Porcine enterovirus 
type 1 (Teschen disease) Virus Yes Yes
Vesicular stomatitis virus 
(VSV-IN2, VSV-IN3) Virus Yes Yes
Pasteurella multocida 
(Fowl cholera) Bacteria Yes Yes 2
Pasteurella multocidia 
(Atrophic rhinitis of 
swine) Bacteria Yes Yes 2
Salmonella abortusovis Bacteria Yes Yes 2
Bovine babesiosis 
(Babesia divergens) Parasite Yes Yes 2
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Ehrlichia ruminantium 
(Heartwater) Bacteria Yes Yes 3
West Nile fever Virus Yes Yes 3
Bovine anaplasmosis Bacteria Yes
Bovine genital 
campylobacteriosis Bacteria Yes
Caprine and ovine 
brucellosis (excluding 
Brucella ovis) Bacteria Yes
Contagious agalactia Bacteria Yes
Contagious bovine 
pleuropneumonia Bacteria Yes
Contagious caprine 
pleuropneumonia Bacteria Yes
Dermatophilosis Bacteria Yes
Enzootic abortion 
of ewes (Ovine 
chlamydiosis) Bacteria Yes
Melissococcus plutonius 
(European foulbrood of 
honey bees) Bacteria Yes
Mycoplasma 
gallisepticum, M. 
synoviae (Avian 
mycoplasmosis) Bacteria Yes
Ovine epididymitis 
(Brucella ovis) Bacteria Yes
Paenibacillus larvae 
(American foulbrood of 
honey bees) Bacteria Yes
Porcine brucellosis Bacteria Yes
Trichomoniasis (animal) Bacteria Yes
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Chrysomya bezziana 
(Old World screwworm) Fly Yes
Cochliomyia 
hominivorax (New 
World screwworm) Fly Yes
Epizootic lymphangitis Fungi Yes
Nosemosis of bees Fungi Yes
Small hive beetle 
infestation Insect Yes
Acarapisosis of honey 
bees Mite Yes
Horse mange Mite Yes
Mange Mite Yes
Tropilaelaps infestation 
of honey bees Mite Yes
Varroosis of honey bees Mite Yes
Trypanosoma evansi 
infections Parasite Yes
Equine piroplasmosis Parasite Yes
Theileriosis Parasite Yes
Birnavirus (Infectious 
bursal disease – 
Gumboro disease) Virus Yes
Border disease Virus Yes
Bovine viral diarrhea Virus Yes
Bunyaviral disease of 
animals (excluding Rift 
valley fever) Virus Yes
Camelpox Virus Yes
140
Agent name (or disease)
Ty
pe
 o
f 
ag
en
t 
(v
ir
us
/b
ac
te
ri
a/
fu
ng
us
)
O
IE
 T
er
re
st
ri
al
 M
an
ua
l 2
0
1
2
 
fo
r 
A
ni
m
al
 H
ea
lth
U
S 
H
H
S 
&
 U
SD
A
 s
el
ec
t 
ag
en
ts
  
&
 t
ox
in
s 
7
 C
FR
 p
ar
t 
3
3
1
, 
9
 C
FR
 p
ar
t 
1
2
1
, 
&
 4
2
 
C
FR
 p
ar
t 
7
3
So
ut
h 
A
fr
ic
an
 A
ni
m
al
 
D
is
ea
se
s 
A
ct
 3
5
 o
f 
1
9
8
4
, 
Li
st
 
of
 C
on
tr
ol
le
d 
&
 N
ot
ifi
ab
le
 
A
ni
m
al
 D
is
ea
se
s 
(2
0
1
0
)
So
ut
h 
A
fr
ic
an
 N
on
-
Pr
ol
ife
ra
tio
n 
of
 W
ea
po
ns
 o
f 
M
as
s 
D
es
tr
uc
tio
n 
A
ct
 8
7
 o
f 
1
9
9
3
, 
am
en
de
d 
2
0
1
0
O
cc
up
at
io
na
l H
ea
lth
 a
nd
 
Sa
fe
ty
 A
ct
 8
5
 o
f 
1
9
9
3
, 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
 f
or
 H
az
ar
do
us
 
Bi
ol
og
ic
al
 A
ge
nt
s
O
H
SA
, 
1
9
9
3
, 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
 f
or
 
H
az
ar
do
us
 B
io
lo
gi
ca
l A
ge
nt
s 
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n
Caprine arthritis/
encephalitis and Maedi-
visna Virus Yes
Duck virus enteritis Virus Yes
Enzootic bovine leukosis Virus Yes
Equine 
rhinopneumonitis Virus Yes
Fowl pox virus Virus Yes
Infectious bovine 
rhinotracheitis/infectious 
pustular vulvovaginitis Virus Yes
Marek’s disease Virus Yes
Menangle virus Virus Yes
Myxomatosis Virus Yes
Nairobi sheep disease 
virus Virus Yes
Ovine pulmonary 
adenocarcinoma Virus Yes
Rabbit haemorrhagic 
disease Virus Yes
Swine influenza Virus Yes
Transmissible 
gastroenteritis Virus Yes
Turkey 
rhinotracheitis (avian 
metapheumovirus) Virus Yes
Alcelaphine herpesvirus 
type 1 (Malignant 
catarrhal fever) Virus Yes
Avian infectious 
bronchitis virus Virus Yes
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Avian infectious 
laryngotracheitis 
herpesvirus Virus Yes
Teschovirus 
encephalomyelitis 
(previously Enterovirus 
encephalomyelitis or 
Teschen/Talfan disease) Virus Yes
Zoonoses transmissible 
from non-human 
primates Yes
Erysipelothrix 
rhusiopathiae (Swine 
erysipelas) Bacteria Yes Yes 2
Bacterial kidney disease 
(fish) Bacteria Yes
Bovine contagious 
pleuropneumonia Bacteria Yes
Contagious 
haemopoetic necrosis 
(fish) Bacteria Yes
Contagious pancreatic 
necrosis (fish) Bacteria Yes
Corridor or buffalo 
disease Bacteria Yes
Johne's disease Bacteria Yes
Psittacosis Bacteria Yes
Streptoccocus equi 
(Strangels) Bacteria Yes
Sheep scab Mite Yes
Bovine malignant 
catarrhal fever Virus Yes
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East Coast fever Virus Yes
Skin conditions in sheep Yes
Bordetella broncispetica Bacteria Yes 2
Corynebacterium 
pseudotuberculosis Bacteria Yes 2
Serpulina spp Bacteria Yes 2
Ascaris suum Parasite Yes 2
Trypanosoma rangeli Parasite Yes 2
Hazara Virus Yes 2
Middelburg Virus Yes 2
Ndumu Virus Yes 2
Yatapox (Tana & Yaba) Virus Yes 2
Israel turkey virus Virus Yes 3
Mokola virus Virus Yes 3
Simian 
immunodeficiency virus Virus Yes 3
Akabane Virus Yes 3
Akabane virus Virus Yes 3
Canine distemper Virus Yes
Unconventional agents 
associated with strains 
including whitepox virus Virus Yes
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Appendix 5:  Human and animal infectious agents and the regulations 
in which they are specifically named highlighted in colour
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Bacillus anthracis Bacteria Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 3
Brucella abortus Bacteria Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 3
Brucella melitensis Bacteria Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 3
Brucella suis Bacteria Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 3
Rift valley fever Virus Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 3
Newcastle disease Virus Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 2
Coxiella burnetii 
(Q fever) Bacteria Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 3
Francisella tularensis 
(Tuleremia) Bacteria Yes Yes   Yes Yes 2
Hendra virus 
(Equine 
morbillivirus) Virus Yes Yes   Yes Yes 3
Eastern equine 
encephalitis virus Virus Yes Yes   Yes  
Nipah virus 
encephalitis Virus Yes Yes   Yes  
Venezuelan equine 
encephalomyelitis Virus Yes Yes   Yes  
Bacillus anthracis 
(Pasteur strain) Bacteria Yes Yes     
Crimean-Congo 
haemorrhagic fever Virus  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 4
Burkholderia mallei 
(Pseudomonas 
mallei) Bacteria  Yes   Yes Yes 3
Burkholderia 
pseudomallei 
(Pseudomonas 
pseudomallei) Bacteria  Yes  Yes Yes 3
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Rabies Virus Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 3
Salmonella 
enteritidis Bacteria Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 2
Japanese 
encephalitis Virus Yes    Yes  
Western equine 
encephalitis virus Virus Yes    Yes  
Leishmaniosis Bacteria Yes     Yes 3
Mycobacterium 
avium/intracellulare Bacteria Yes     Yes 3
Mycobacterium 
bovis Bacteria Yes     Yes 3
Echinococcosis/
Hydatidosis Parasite Yes     Yes 3
Leishmania 
brasiliensis Parasite Yes     Yes 3
Leishmania 
donovani Parasite Yes     Yes 3
Taenia solium 
(Cystercicosis) Parasite Yes     Yes 3
Campylobacter 
jejuni and C. Coli Bacteria Yes     Yes 2
Leptospirosis Bacteria Yes     Yes 2
Listeria 
monocytogenes Bacteria Yes     Yes 2
Leishmania major Parasite Yes     Yes 2
Leishmania tropica Parasite Yes     Yes 2
Taenia saginata 
(Bovine 
cysticercosis) Parasite Yes     Yes 2
Toxoplasma gondii 
(Toxoplasmosis) Parasite Yes     Yes 2
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Trichinella nativa Parasite Yes     Yes 2
Trichinella nelsoni Parasite Yes     Yes 2
Trichinella 
pseudospiralis Parasite Yes     Yes 2
Trichinella spiralis Parasite Yes     Yes 2
Cysticercosis Parasite Yes      
Cryptosporidiosis Parasite Yes      
Salmonella 
paratyphi Bacteria Yes   Yes   
Chlamydia psittaci 
(Avian strains) Bacteria Yes    Yes Yes 3
Lyssaviruses Virus     Yes  
Ippy 2 Virus      Yes 4
Mycobacterium 
microti Bacteria      Yes 3
Mycobacterium 
simiae Bacteria      Yes 3
Mycobacterium 
xenopi Bacteria      Yes 3
Rickettsia spp Bacteria      Yes 3
Trypanosoma cruzi 
(Chagas disease) Parasite      Yes 3
Bhanja Virus      Yes 3
Duvenhage Virus      Yes 3
Germiston Virus      Yes 3
Herpesvirus simaie 
(B virus) Virus      Yes 3
Lagos bat Virus      Yes 3
Semliki forest Virus      Yes 3
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Unconventional 
agents associated 
with Creutzfeldt-
Jakob disease Virus      Yes 3
Wesselsbron Virus      Yes 3
Actinomyces spp Bacteria      Yes 2
Borellia spp Bacteria      Yes 2
Chlamydia psittaci 
(Non-avian strains) Bacteria      Yes 2
Porphyromonas spp Bacteria      Yes 2
Rhodococcus equi Bacteria      Yes 2
Salmonella arizona Bacteria      Yes 2
Angiostrongylus 
cantonensis Parasite      Yes 2
Angiostrongylus 
cantonensis Parasite      Yes 2
Babesia microti Parasite      Yes 2
Cyclospora species Parasite      Yes 2
Diphyllobothrium 
latum Parasite      Yes 2
Enterocytozon 
bieneusi Parasite      Yes 2
Fasciola gigantica Parasite      Yes 2
Fasciola hepatica Parasite      Yes 2
Fasciolopsis buski Parasite      Yes 2
Giardia lamblia Parasite      Yes 2
Hymenolepsis 
diminuta Parasite      Yes 2
Hymenolepsis nana Parasite      Yes 2
Opisthorcis fellineus Parasite      Yes 2
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Opisthorcis sinensis 
(Chlonorchis 
sinensis) Parasite      Yes 2
Opisthorcis viverrini 
(Chlonorchis 
viverrini) Parasite      Yes 2
Opsithorcis spp Parasite      Yes 2
Paragonimus Parasite      Yes 2
Plasmodium spp 
(human and simian) Parasite      Yes 2
Sarcocystis 
suihominis Parasite      Yes 2
Toxocara canis Parasite      Yes 2
Toxocara cati Parasite      Yes 2
Trichostrongylus 
orientalis Parasite      Yes 2
Trichostrongylus spp Parasite      Yes 2
Trypanosoma brucei 
gambiense Parasite      Yes 2
Trypanosoma brucei 
rhodesiense Parasite      Yes 2
Buffalopox Virus      Yes 2
Bunyamwera Virus      Yes 2
Coltivirus Virus      Yes 2
Cowpox Virus      Yes 2
Dhori and Thogoto Virus      Yes 2
Milker's nodes Virus      Yes 2
Reoviruses Virus      Yes 2
Sindbis Virus      Yes 2
Toroviridae Virus      Yes 2
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Appendix 6:  Plant infectious agents and the regulations in which 
they are specifically named highlighted in colour
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Ralstonia solanacearum (Race 3, 
biovar 2) Bacteria Yes Yes   
Xanthomonas oryzae Bacteria Yes Yes   
Peronosclerospora philippinesis 
(Peronosclerospora sacchari) Oomycete Yes    
Rathayibacter toxicus Bacteria Yes    
Phoma glycinicola (Pyrenochaeta 
glycines) Fungi Yes    
Sclerophthora rayssiae var zeae Fungi Yes    
Synchytrium endobioticum Fungi Yes    
Clavibacter michiganensis Bacteria  Yes   
Xanthomonas albilineans Bacteria  Yes   
Xanthomonas campestris Bacteria  Yes   
Xylella fastidiosa (Citrus 
variegated chlorosis strain) Bacteria  Yes   
Cochliobolus miyabeanus Fungi  Yes   
Colletotrichum kahawae Fungi  Yes   
Deuterophonas tracheiphila Fungi  Yes   
Magnaporthe grisea Fungi  Yes   
Microcyclus ulei Fungi  Yes   
Monilia rorei Fungi  Yes   
Puccinia graminis Fungi  Yes   
Puccinia striiformis Fungi  Yes   
Banana bunchy top virus Virus  Yes   
Potato andean latent tymovirus Virus  Yes   
Potato spindle tuber viroid Virus  Yes   
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Appendix 7:  Life sciences mapping information sheet
The Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf) invites you to take part in a mapping 
study on life science research and diagnostic facilities in South Africa which will assess 
the distribution, types and research focus of laboratories within the country. This 
mapping study is voluntary; however you are strongly encouraged to participate as 
the information you provide will significantly contribute towards understanding the 
distribution of life science research in South Africa.
In order to build a clear understanding of laboratory-based life science research in 
South Africa we request that you fill in this survey on behalf of your diagnostic facility 
or research department. The study consists of 10 questions and will take no more 
than 5 minutes to complete. The results of the survey will form a database which will 
be stored at the Academy of Science of South Africa. The results will be securely held, 
and will not be distributed to any third party for commercial gain.
This database resulting from this survey will be used for a subsequent survey which 
will assessing the extent to which systems are in place in to ensure high-quality, safe, 
secure and responsible life science research and assess the penetrance of biosafety, 
biosecurity and bioethics knowledge amongst the scientific community. Participants 
for this later survey will be identified from the database, although participation in 
each survey is independent and voluntary.
Researchers:
If you have any questions or queries about taking part you can contact the principle 
researchers: Prof Jill Farrant and Dr Chandre Gould.
Contact addresses: 
Prof Jill Farrant Dr Chandre Gould
Department of Molecular and Cell Biology Institute for Security Studies
University of Cape Town PO Box 192
Private Bag X3, Rondebosch, 7701 Hoekwil, 6538
Email: jill.farrant@uct.ac.za  Email: cgould@issafrica.org
This research is being undertaken by the ASSAf.
Contact address:
The Academy of Science of South Africa
1st Floor Block A, The Woods, 41 de Havilland Crescent, Persequor Park,  
Meiring Naude Road, Lynnwood, Pretoria, 0020
Dr Louise Bezuidenhout E-mail: Louiseb@assaf.org.za
Thank you for taking the time to contribute to this research.
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Appendix 8:  Participation information sheet for qualitative 
interviews
Participant Information Sheet
You are invited to take part in a study on responsible life science research. This 
study examines biosafety, biosecurity and bioethics provisions within South African 
laboratories and the strengths and weaknesses of current national policies that guide 
this risk management.
This interview will focus on your experience of current biosafety and biosecurity 
management policies in South Africa, and your perceptions of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the current regulatory system. This is a voluntary interview and the 
information you provide will be treated as confidential. 
If you agree to participate the interview will last approximately 15 minutes. 
Purpose of the study
This project seeks to: 
• Contribute to knowledge about laboratory research and diagnostic capacity in 
South Africa;
• Contribute to assessing the extent to which systems are in place to ensure high-
quality, safe, secure and responsible life science research; and
• Identify the needs and capacities of laboratories and to assist laboratories to 
develop appropriate system to access the services and expertise that exists at 
national and international levels.
Voluntary participation 
Participation in this interview is entirely voluntary and you are entitled to terminate 
the interview at any time. You are free to withdraw from the interview process at any 
time, and this action will not have any effect on your current or future employment. 
As a voluntary process, participants will not be remunerated for their involvement.
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Data Management and Confidentiality
The interview may be digitally recorded and your consent for this process is required 
on the attached consent sheet. If for any reason you would prefer not to be recorded 
please let the researcher know prior to the commencement of the interview.
The information you provide to us will be treated as strictly confidential. You will 
not be identified in any of the transcripts or publications unless you agree to being 
quoted. Your data will be stored on the password protected Academy of Science of 
South Africa server and will be destroyed at the end of the project. Access to the data 
will be limited to the researchers involved in the project.
Researchers
If you have any questions or queries about taking part you can contact the principal 
researchers: Prof Jill Farrant and Dr Chandre Gould, or the contracted researcher 
Dr Nandi Siegfried. 
Contact:
Prof Jill Farrant jill.farrant@uct.ac.za 
Dr Chandre Gould cgould@issafrica.org 
Dr Nandi Siegfried Nandi.Siegfried@gmail.com 
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Appendix 9:  Question guide for semi-structured interviews 
regarding responsiveness to infectious disease outbreaks in 
South Africa
Interview Schedule
These questions serve to guide the interview. Should the interviewee raise other 
concerns these will be addressed if relevant to the topic. The interview will be tailored 
to the experience and knowledge of the interviewee.
1. Please describe your work to me as it relates to detection, identification, response 
and/or recording of infectious disease outbreaks.
2. Please explain your involvement nationally or internationally, with regard to 
developing or contributing to policies and procedures for the detection, identification, 
response and/or recording of infectious disease outbreaks?
3. Could you talk about the policies and regulations for the detection, identification, 
response and/or recording of infectious disease outbreaks in SA?
4. Strengths and weaknesses in current implementation strategies
o From your experience, what is currently done well when it comes to implementation 
of strategies to manage disease outbreaks at a national level?
o Are there any problems with implementing the strategies nationally?
o What do you think could be done to improve the implementation of national 
strategies to manage disease outbreaks?
5. From your experience, do you have any comments on:
o Cross-sectoral co-operation with respect to implementation of policies and 
strategies?
o Overall co-ordination nationally and provincially?
o Are there opportunities for information-sharing between sectors?
o If not, what are the obstacles to sharing information?
6. Areas for future development
o What do you think should be done in the future to better manage disease 
outbreaks nationally?
7. Do you wish to raise any other issues related to this topic?
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Appendix 10:  Informed consent form for qualitative interviews
Life Science Research and Diagnostic Laboratories in South Africa
Consent form for interviewees
Please tick the boxes, fill in the lines below and sign the form. Thank you for your 
help. Please note that this consent form is accompanied by an information sheet 
detailing the nature of this project.
[  ] I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the above 
study and have had the opportunity to ask questions about participating in the 
research. 
[  ] My questions concerning participation in this study have been answered by the 
Academy of Science of South Africa researcher to my satisfaction. 
[  ] I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time, without giving any reason. 
[  ] I agree to take part in the research and to the use of my data for the purposes 
of the study specified in the information sheet. 
[  ] I agree to any interviews being recorded and understand that the data will be 
kept securely and will remain confidential except in the case of legal subpoena. 
[  ] Should any quotes be used, I will not be identified in any subsequent transcription 
or publication unless I indicate otherwise. 
Name of Interviewee:  _____________________________________________________
Organisation:  ___________________________________________________________
Contact Email:  __________________________________________________________
Date:  __________________________________________________________________
Signature:  ______________________________________________________________
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Appendix 11:  Information sheet and questionnaire for mapping 
life science facilities
QUESTIONNAIRE
Responsible life sciences research for global health security
You are invited to take part in a study on responsible life science research. Answering 
this questionnaire will contribute to assessing the capacity of life science research, 
diagnostic and manufacturing facilities in South Africa. This is a voluntary survey and 
the information you provide will be treated as confidential. If you agree to answer this 
questionnaire, it will take you between 10 to 20 minutes to complete.
By completing the questionnaire you will be contributing to research that aims at 
assessing diagnostic, research and manufacturing capacities in South Africa. You will 
be contributing to the identification and promotion of best practices for responsible 
life science research.
When you have completed this survey please return it to louiseb@assaf.org.za. 
Purpose
This project seeks to: 
• Contribute to knowledge about life science research, diagnostic and manufacturing 
capacity in South Africa; and
• Contribute to assessing the extent to which systems are in place in to ensure high-
quality, safe, secure and responsible life science research. 
Voluntary responses 
This is a voluntary survey so you do not have to take in part, but if you do it will be of 
great help to us. We are interested in your opinion so there are no “wrong” or “right” 
answers. The questionnaire should take about 10 to 20 minutes to complete. If you 
do not have the answer to all the questions, you can simply put a cross next to the 
“don’t know” box. Please note that you will not be paid for your participation in this 
study. No known disadvantages or risk are associated with taking part in this research.
Confidentiality 
The information you provide to us will be treated as strictly confidential. You do 
not need to put your name on the questionnaire. We do ask that you tell us your 
position in the facility so that we are able to distinguish between the answers given by 
managers, junior staff, senior staff and technical staff. This is important in order for 
us to understand the perspective of each level of employee. This information should 
not identify you. If you do provide any information which might identify you, it will be 
kept securely and separately by the researchers. Moreover, the research findings will 
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be reported in an aggregate manner and in such a way that the specific results of 
the survey for each laboratory will not be linked to the laboratory or facility by name. 
Your completed questionnaire will be handed to the researchers who will capture the 
data on a computer. Your answers will be kept confidential by the researchers and 
will only be reported as part of an overall report to the facility.
Results of the study
The results of the survey for each laboratory will be made available to all staff in the 
institution and will be discussed with the managers of the facility. At the end of the 
research project the overall research results will be published in a report. The results 
will be presented at meetings to discuss and promote best practices on responsible 
life sciences research. You will not be identifiable from any report or publication.
Researchers
If you have any questions or queries about taking part you can contact the principle 
researchers: 
Prof Jill Farrant and Dr Chandre Gould. 
Contact address: 
Prof Jill Farrant Dr Chandre Gould
Department of Molecular and Cell Biology Institute for Security Studies
University of Cape Town 
Email: jill.farrant@uct.ac.za  Email: cgould@issafrica.org
This research is being undertaken by the Academy of Science of South Africa (ASSAf).
Contact address:
ASSAf
c/o Dr Louise Bezuidenhout
1st Floor Block A, The Woods, 41 de Havilland Crescent, 
Persequor Park, Meiring Naude Road, Lynnwood, Pretoria, 0020
Email: louiseb@assaf.org.za
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Preliminary data – please complete the following:
i. Province in which you work 1. Eastern Cape [  ]
2. Free State [  ]
3. Gauteng [  ]
4. KwaZulu-Natal [  ]
5. Limpopo [  ]
6. Mpumalanga [  ]
7. Northern Cape [  ]
8. North-West [  ]
9. Western Cape [  ]
ii. Type of life science activities you are 
engaged in
1. Publically-funded research [  ]
2. Publically-funded diagnostics [  ]
3. Commercial research [  ]
4. Commercial diagnostics [  ]
5. Other (therapeutics, forensics etc.) [  ]
Please specify:
ii. Your position within the institution 1. Senior researcher [  ] 
2. Junior researcher (less than 5 years’ 
work experience) [  ]
3. Senior technicians [  ]
4. Junior technician (less than 5 years’ 
work experience) [  ]
5. Support staff [  ]
6. Postgraduate student [  ]
7. NHLS Laboratory manager [  ]
8. NHLS technologist [  ]
9. NHLS technician [  ]
ii. Gender 1. Male [  ]
2. Female [  ]
3. Undisclosed [  ]
iii. Main focus of your work 1. Plant [  ]
2. Animal [  ]
3. Human [  ]
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Your responses to the following survey questions should reflect your perceptions of 
your current work environment and your activities as a life scientist. Please put a cross 
in the box next to the answer that you choose. Where answer boxes are marked with 
PTO, please turn over the page for more options.
PILLAR 1: RESEARCH EXCELLENCE
1.1 Scientific collaboration is encouraged within your department 
1. Always [  ]
2. Often [  ]
3. Sometimes [  ]
4. Rarely [  ]
5. Never [  ]
6. Not applicable [  ]
7. Don’t know [  ]
1.2 Scientific collaboration is encouraged within your institution
1. Always [  ]
2. Often [  ]
3. Sometimes [  ]
4. Rarely [  ]
5. Never [  ]
6. Not applicable [  ]
7. Don’t know [  ]
1.3 Scientific collaboration between your institution and other institutions is facilitated
1. Always [  ]
2. Often [  ]
3. Sometimes [  ]
4. Rarely [  ]
5. Never [  ]
6. Not applicable [  ]
7. Don’t know [  ]
1.4 Your institution makes efforts to make any funding it receives transparent
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
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1.5 Accountability is required (e.g. through regular reporting of financial expenditure 
as well as scientific progress)
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
1.6 Your institution clearly states its research priorities
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
1.7 Research findings are routinely published
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
1.8 Good communication exists between policymakers at your facility and the life 
science community
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
1.9 Good communication exists between policymakers at a national level and the 
life science community
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
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5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
1.10 On-going formal and/or informal research training takes place (that is not for 
postgraduate degree purposes)
1. Always [  ]
2. Often [  ]
3. Sometimes [  ]
4. Rarely [  ]
5. Never [  ]
6. Not applicable [  ]
7. Don’t know [  ]
1.11 Junior researchers and/or staff are nurtured and supported
1. Always [  ]
2. Often [  ]
3. Sometimes [  ]
4. Rarely [  ]
5. Never [  ]
6. Not applicable [  ]
7. Don’t know [  ]
1.12 Staff conducting research have been properly trained
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree  [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
1.13 Quality control is conducted within the institution for relevant diagnostic tests 
or experiments to avoid false positives or negative results
1. Always [  ]
2. Often [  ]
3. Sometimes [  ]
4. Rarely [  ]
5. Never [  ]
6. Not applicable [  ]
7. Don’t know [  ]
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1.14 Quality control is conducted between institutions for relevant diagnostic tests 
or experiments to avoid false positives or negative results
1. Always [  ]
2. Often [  ]
3. Sometimes [  ]
4. Rarely [  ]
5. Never [  ]
6. Not applicable [  ]
7. Don’t know [  ]
1.15 Samples and reagents are checked to ensure that they match accompanying 
documentation 
1. Always [  ]
2. Often [  ]
3. Sometimes [  ]
4. Rarely [  ]
5. Never [  ]
6. Not applicable [  ]
7. Don’t know [  ]
1.16 Measures are in place to double check results before they are given to patients/
clinicians (for diagnostic laboratories) or published (for research laboratories)
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
1.17 Education and/or training is offered on dual-use issues. This refers to the 
potential for data that was generated for beneficial purposes to be misused for 
malicious purposes by a third party.
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
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1.18 Skilled staff are valued and retained
1. Always [  ]
2. Often [  ]
3. Sometimes [  ]
4. Rarely [  ]
5. Never [  ]
6. Not applicable [  ]
7. Don’t know [  ]
1.19 National legislation and policy fosters scientific development and freedom 
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
PILLAR 2: ETHICS
2.1 Education and/or training is offered on research ethics including issues such 
as scientific misconduct (falsification, fabrication and plagiarism)
1. Always [  ]
2. Often [  ]
3. Sometimes [  ]
4. Rarely [  ]
5. Never [  ]
6. Not applicable [  ]
7. Don’t know [  ]
2.2 Appropriate ethical research guidelines and practices have been published
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
2.3 Appropriate ethical research guidelines and practices are implemented 
1. Always [  ]
2. Often [  ]
3. Sometimes [  ]
162
4. Rarely [  ]
5. Never [  ]
6. Not applicable [  ]
7. Don’t know [  ]
2.4 Adequate mechanisms exist for investigating and responding to non-adherence 
to ethical standards
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
2.5 Measures are in place to prevent non-laboratory individuals from obtaining 
access to samples or biological materials
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
2.6 Measures are in place to prevent non-laboratory individuals from providing 
confidential information to people outside the laboratory
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
2.7 Discussions in the facility focus on the broader implications of your life science 
activities for society in general
1. Always [  ]
2. Often [  ]
3. Sometimes [  ]
4. Rarely [  ]
5. Never [  ]
6. Not applicable [  ]
7. Don’t know [  ]
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2.8 Researchers are competent to assess the potential broader implications of their 
life science activities for society in general
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
2.9 Research is subject to a risk assessment that includes considerations of the 
broader implications of their life science activities for the environment
1. Always [  ]
2. Often [  ]
3. Sometimes [  ]
4. Rarely [  ]
5. Never [  ]
6. Not applicable [  ]
7. Don’t know [  ]
2.10 Researchers are competent to make the assessment of the broader implications 
of their life science activities for the environment
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
2.11 Potential for misuse of the research is considered at all stages of research/
diagnostic processes and appropriate action taken if necessary
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
2.12 Researchers know how to assess whether the risk outweighs the benefit of 
continuing with their research activities
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
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3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
2.13 A code of conduct/practice for life scientists exists at an institutional level
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
2.14 A code of conduct/practice for life scientists exists at a national level
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
2.15 Researchers are aware of and informed about national and international 
conventions, laws and regulations related to their research
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
2.16. An ethics committee assesses research proposals involving human subjects
1. Always [  ]
2. Often [  ]
3. Sometimes [  ]
4. Rarely [  ]
5. Never [  ]
6. Not applicable [  ]
7. Don’t know [  ]
2.17 An ethics committee assesses research proposals involving animal subjects
1. Always [  ]
2. Often [  ]
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3. Sometimes [  ]
4. Rarely [  ]
5. Never [  ]
6. Not applicable [  ]
7. Don’t know [  ]
2.18 A review process exists to assess ethical issues raised by research proposals not 
involving human or animal subjects 
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
2.19 Information about the national and international conventions and regulations 
related to all fields of science is easily accessible 
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
2.20 National legislation and policy relevant to the life sciences provides protection 
against the misuse of science
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
PILLAR 3: LABORATORY BIOSAFETY AND BIOSECURITY
3.1. Facilities and equipment are appropriate to the level of work being done and 
are adequately maintained
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
166
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
3.2 Training of staff is appropriate to the facilities and equipment and the work 
being conducted
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
3.3 Researchers have somewhere to turn to get competent advice if they have safety 
or security questions relating to their research
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
3.4 National legislation/regulation exists that sets safety and security practices and 
procedures for laboratories 
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
3.5 An assessment of the biosafety and biosecurity risk associated with research 
activities is conducted
1. Always [  ]
2. Often [  ]
3. Sometimes [  ]
4. Rarely [  ]
5. Never [  ]
6. Not applicable [  ]
7. Don’t know [  ]
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3.6 Risk assessments are able to identify requirements for risk reduction measures 
including the level of containment required
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
3.7 Biosafety training is provided to all those working in laboratories when 
appropriate
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
3.8 Biosecurity training is provided to all those working in laboratories when 
appropriate
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
3.9 Biosafety training includes a test of competence
1. Always [  ]
2. Often [  ]
3. Sometimes [  ]
4. Rarely [  ]
5. Never [  ]
6. Not applicable [  ]
7. Don’t know [  ]
3.10 Biosecurity training includes a test of competence
1. Always [  ]
2. Often [  ]
3. Sometimes [  ]
4. Rarely [  ]
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5. Never [  ]
6. Not applicable [  ]
7. Don’t know [  ]
3.11 Standard Operating Procedures have been developed (in your facility)
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
3.12 Staff are trained to work according to the Standard Operating Procedures
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
3.13 Staff are regularly tested to ensure competence in the Standard Operating 
Procedures
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
3.14 Legislation/regulations exist to address hazardous waste disposal
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
3.15 Legislation/regulations regarding hazardous waste disposal are followed
1. Always [  ]
2. Often [  ]
3. Sometimes [  ]
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4. Rarely [  ]
5. Never [  ]
6. Not applicable [  ]
7. Don’t know  [  ]
3.16 Occupational health surveillance mechanisms exist and are followed (at 
institutional level)
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
3.17 Occupational health reporting mechanisms effective at institutional level 
1. Always [  ]
2. Often [  ]
3. Sometimes [  ]
4. Rarely [  ]
5. Never [  ]
6. Not applicable [  ]
7. Don’t know [  ]
3.18 Staff are required to report laboratory accidents, and incidents
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
3.19 A record of research projects exists and is maintained at institutional level
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
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3.17 A record of hazardous biological materials exists and is maintained at 
institutional level
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
3.18 Hazardous biological material is safely and securely stored
1. Always [  ]
2. Often [  ]
3. Sometimes [  ]
4. Rarely [  ]
5. Never [  ]
6. Not applicable [  ]
7. Don’t know [  ]
3.19 Mechanisms exist for staff to report unlawful or irregular conduct (i.e. whistle-
blowing mechanisms exist)
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
3.20 Measures exist to protect staff who report unlawful or irregular conduct from 
occupational detriment 
1. Strongly agree [  ]
2. Agree [  ]
3. Disagree [  ]
4. Strongly disagree [  ]
5. Not applicable [  ]
6. Don’t know [  ]
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Appendix 12:  Data tables of responses to survey questions
All figures are percentages of total (n).
I. Research Excellence 
1. Scientific collaboration is encouraged within your department
Always and 
often
Sometimes Rarely and 
never
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=350) 74.57 14.86 8.57 1.14 0.86
Senior staff (n=213) 73.71 16.43 7.98 0.47 1.41
Junior staff (n=135) 75.56 12.59 9.63 1.48 0.74
Technical staff (n=64) 65.63 21.88 6.25 3.13 3.13
Research staff (n=284) 76.41 13.38 9.15 0.35 0.70
2. Scientific collaboration is encouraged within your institution
Always and 
often
Sometimes Rarely and 
never
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=348) 72.99 17.53 8.05 0.29 1.15
Senior staff (n=213) 73.71 18.31 6.57 0.47 0.94
Junior staff (n=133) 71.43 16.54 10.53 0.00 1.50
Technical staff (n=64) 76.56 14.06 7.81 0.00 1.56
Research staff (n=282) 71.99 18.44 8.16 0.35 1.06
3. Scientific collaboration between your institution and other institutions is facilitated
Always and 
often
Sometimes Rarely and 
never
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=348) 54.31 27.87 12.93 0.86 4.02
Senior staff (n=207) 53.62 32.37 8.21 0.48 5.31
Junior staff (n=122) 63.93 22.95 11.48 0.00 1.64
Technical staff (n=64) 56.25 25.00 9.38 1.56 7.81
Research staff (n=282) 54.26 28.01 13.83 0.71 3.19
4. Your institution makes efforts to make any funding it receives transparent
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don’t know
 All responses (n=350) 57.71 24.86 4.00 13.43
Senior staff (n=213) 58.22 24.41 5.63 11.74
Junior staff (n=135) 56.30 25.93 1.48 16.30
Technical staff (n=64) 51.56 20.31 9.38 18.75
Research staff (n=284) 58.80 26.06 2.82 12.32
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I. Research Excellence 
5. Accountability is required (e.g. through regular reporting of financial expenditure 
as well as scientific progress)
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=348) 89.08 5.17 1.44 4.31
Senior staff (n=212) 91.51 3.77 1.89 2.83
Junior staff (n=134) 85.07 7.46 0.75 6.72
Technical staff (n=63) 82.54 4.76 0.00 12.70
Research staff (n=283) 90.46 5.30 1.77 2.47
6. Your institution clearly states its research priorities
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=348) 75.29 18.10 3.45 3.16
Senior staff (n=211) 71.56 19.91 5.21 3.32
Junior staff (n=135) 80.74 15.56 0.74 2.96
Technical staff (n=64) 73.44 9.38 9.38 7.81
Research staff (n=282) 75.53 20.21 2.13 2.13
7. Research findings are routinely published
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=349) 82.52 10.03 5.16 2.29
Senior staff (n=212) 80.19 10.85 7.08 1.89
Junior staff (n=135) 86.67 8.15 2.22 2.96
Technical staff (n=64) 67.19 10.94 17.19 4.69
Research staff (n=283) 86.22 9.54 2.47 1.77
8. Good communication exists between policymakers at your facility and the life 
science community
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=344) 38.08 45.35 2.33 14.24
Senior staff (n=207) 37.20 47.83 3.86 11.11
Junior staff (n=133) 38.35 42.11 0.00 19.55
Technical staff (n=64) 42.19 34.38 3.13 20.31
Research staff (n=278) 37.05 47.84 2.16 12.95
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I. Research Excellence 
9. Good communication exists between policymakers at a national level and the life 
science community
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=347) 21.61 52.45 4.03 21.90
Senior staff (n=211) 21.80 54.50 6.16 17.54
Junior staff (n=134) 21.64 49.25 0.00 29.10
Technical staff (n=64) 28.13 31.25 3.13 37.50
Research staff (n=281) 20.28 57.30 3.91 18.51
10. On-going formal and/or informal career training takes place (that is not for 
postgraduate degree purposes)
Always and 
often
Sometimes Rarely and 
never
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=347) 44.67 32.56 16.43 2.88 3.46
Senior staff (n=212) 46.70 34.91 13.68 1.89 2.83
Junior staff (n=133) 41.35 28.57 21.05 4.51 4.51
Technical staff (n=64) 45.31 25.00 17.19 3.13 9.38
Research staff (n=281) 44.48 34.16 16.37 2.85 2.14
11. Junior researchers and/or staff are nurtured and supported
Always and 
often
Sometimes Rarely and 
never
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=346) 52.31 29.19 14.45 1.73 2.31
Senior staff (n=211) 56.40 25.59 16.11 1.42 0.47
Junior staff (n=133) 45.11 35.34 12.03 2.26 5.26
Technical staff (n=63) 39.68 44.44 9.52 1.59 4.76
Research staff (n=281) 54.80 25.98 15.66 1.78 1.78
12. Staff conducting life science activities have been properly trained
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=345) 75.07 16.81 2.03 6.09
Senior staff (n=210) 73.33 18.10 2.86 5.71
Junior staff (n=133) 77.44 15.04 0.75 6.77
Technical staff (n=63) 69.84 17.46 3.17 9.52
Research staff (n=280) 76.07 16.79 1.79 5.36
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I. Research Excellence 
13. Quality control is conducted within the institution for relevant diagnostic tests or 
experiments to avoid false positives or negative results
Always and 
often
Sometimes Rarely and 
never
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=344) 53.49 12.79 9.01 12.21 12.50
Senior staff (n=209) 54.07 11.96 7.66 15.79 10.53
Junior staff (n=133) 51.88 14.29 11.28 6.77 15.79
Technical staff (n=63) 74.60 4.76 4.76 6.35 9.52
Research staff (n=279) 48.39 14.70 10.04 13.62 13.26
14. Quality control is conducted between institutions for relevant diagnostic tests or 
experiments to avoid false positives or negative results
Always and 
often
Sometimes Rarely and 
never
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=344) 37.21 12.21 10.47 15.99 24.13
Senior staff (n=209) 35.89 12.92 10.53 20.57 20.10
Junior staff (n=133) 38.35 11.28 10.53 9.02 30.83
Technical staff (n=62) 50.00 11.29 4.84 8.06 25.81
Research staff (n=280) 33.93 12.50 11.79 17.86 23.93
15. Samples and reagents are checked to ensure that they match accompanying 
documentation
Always and 
often
Sometimes Rarely and 
never
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=346) 60.40 10.69 5.78 12.14 10.98
Senior staff (n=210) 57.62 10.48 4.76 14.76 12.38
Junior staff (n=134) 64.18 11.19 7.46 5.22 11.94
Technical staff (n=63) 74.60 7.94 4.76 1.59 11.11
Research staff (n=281) 56.94 11.39 6.05 13.17 12.46
16. Measures are in place to double check results before they are given to patients/
clinicians (for diagnostic laboratories) or published (for research laboratories)
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=344) 58.14 8.14 21.51 12.21
Senior staff (n=209) 55.98 6.70 27.27 10.05
Junior staff (n=133) 60.90 10.53 12.78 15.79
Technical staff (n=63) 69.84 1.59 20.63 7.94
Research staff (n=279) 55.20 9.68 21.86 13.26
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17. Education and/or training is offered on dual-use issues. This refers to the 
potential for data that was generated for beneficial purposes to be misused for 
malicious purposes by a third party.
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=344) 28.20 18.31 18.31 35.17
Senior staff (n=211) 26.54 21.33 22.27 29.86
Junior staff (n=132) 30.30 13.64 12.12 43.94
Technical staff (n=64) 32.81 14.06 17.19 35.94
Research staff (n=279) 26.88 19.35 18.64 35.13
18. Skilled staff are valued and retained
Always and 
often
Sometimes Rarely and 
never
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=347) 31.70 38.04 25.36 0.58 4.32
Senior staff(n=211) 29.38 40.76 28.91 0.00 0.95
Junior staff (n=146) 20.55 21.23 47.26 8.90 2.05
Technical staff (n=64) 35.94 28.13 32.81 0.00 3.13
Research staff (n=281) 30.60 40.21 23.84 0.71 4.63
19. National legislation and policy fosters scientific development and freedom
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=336) 41.37 39.58 1.19 17.86
Senior staff (n=206) 39.32 42.72 0.97 16.99
Junior staff (n=128) 45.31 34.38 1.56 18.75
Technical staff (n=61) 40.98 37.70 3.28 18.03
Research staff (n=273) 41.76 39.93 0.73 17.58
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1. Education and/or training is offered on research ethics including issues such as 
scientific misconduct (falsification, fabrication and plagiarism)
Always and 
often
Sometimes Rarely and 
never
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=323) 43.65 29.10 23.84 1.55 1.86
Senior staff (n=197) 39.09 31.98 24.87 2.03 2.03
Junior staff (n=151) 41.72 19.21 34.44 1.32 3.31
Technical staff (n=59) 35.59 33.90 22.03 1.69 6.78
Research staff (n=262) 45.80 28.24 23.66 1.53 0.76
2. Appropriate ethical research guidelines and practices have been published
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=323) 63.78 17.96 6.81 11.46
Senior staff (n=211) 56.40 21.33 13.27 9.00
Junior staff (n=124) 70.16 9.68 6.45 13.71
Technical staff (n=59) 59.32 10.17 11.86 18.64
Research staff (n=262) 65.27 19.47 5.73 9.54
3. Appropriate ethical research guidelines and practices are implemented
Always and 
often
Sometimes Rarely and 
never
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=322) 66.77 14.91 3.11 6.21 9.01
Senior staff (n=197) 66.50 15.23 3.05 7.11 8.12
Junior staff (n=123) 67.48 14.63 3.25 4.88 9.76
Technical staff (n=59) 66.10 13.56 1.69 5.08 13.56
Research staff (n=261) 67.05 15.33 3.45 6.51 7.66
4. Adequate mechanisms exist for investigating and responding to non-adherence to 
ethical standards
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=350) 48.57 20.57 3.14 19.43
Senior staff (n=213) 51.17 20.66 1.88 18.31
Junior staff (n=135) 30.37 24.44 22.22 5.19
Technical staff (n=64) 43.75 20.31 3.13 25.00
Research staff (n=284) 49.65 20.42 3.17 18.31
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5. Measures are in place to prevent non-laboratory individuals from obtaining access 
to samples or biological materials
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=350) 62.57 14.29 7.14 7.43
Senior staff (n=213) 61.03 13.62 8.92 7.98
Junior staff (n=135) 64.44 15.56 5.19 5.93
Technical staff (n=64) 71.88 10.94 1.56 6.25
Research staff (n=284) 60.21 15.14 8.80 7.39
6. Measures are in place to prevent non-laboratory individuals from providing 
confidential information to people outside the laboratory
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=350) 54.00 13.71 12.86 10.86
Senior staff (n=213) 61.03 13.62 8.92 7.98
Junior staff (n=135) 64.44 15.56 5.19 5.93
Technical staff (n=64) 71.88 10.94 1.56 6.25
Research staff (n=284) 60.21 15.14 8.80 7.39
7. Discussions in the facility focus on the broader implications of your life science 
activities for society in general
Always and 
often
Sometimes Rarely and 
never
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=322) 38.20 30.43 22.36 3.73 5.28
Senior staff (n=196) 34.69 31.12 25.51 5.10 3.57
Junior staff (n=124) 42.74 29.84 17.74 1.61 8.06
Technical staff (n=58) 36.21 27.59 17.24 6.90 12.07
Research staff (n=262) 38.17 31.30 23.66 3.05 3.82
8. Scientists are competent to assess the potential broader implications of their life 
science activities for society in general
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=350) 70.29 14.00 6.29 1.71
Senior staff (n=213) 69.01 15.02 2.35 6.10
Junior staff (n=135) 71.85 12.59 6.67 1.48
Technical staff (n=64) 65.63 14.06 3.13 9.38
Research staff (n=284) 71.13 14.08 1.41 5.63
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9. Research is subject to a risk assessment that includes considerations of the 
broader implications of their life science activities for the environment
Always and 
often
Sometimes Rarely and 
never
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=320) 44.38 22.50 15.31 4.69 13.13
Senior staff (n=196) 45.92 20.92 16.33 6.63 10.20
Junior staff (n=122) 40.98 25.41 13.93 1.64 18.03
Technical staff (n=59) 44.07 20.34 10.17 5.08 20.34
Research staff (n=259) 44.02 23.17 16.60 4.63 11.58
10. Scientists are competent to make the assessment of the broader implications of 
their life science activities for the environment
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=350) 66.86 10.29 3.14 10.57
Senior staff (n=213) 65.26 12.21 3.76 10.33
Junior staff (n=135) 68.89 7.41 2.22 11.11
Technical staff (n=64) 59.38 7.81 6.25 17.19
Research staff (n=284) 68.31 10.92 2.46 9.15
11. Potential for misuse of the research is considered at all stages of research/
diagnostic processes and appropriate action taken if necessary
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=350) 50.00 17.71 8.29 16.29
Senior staff (n=213) 48.83 18.31 9.86 15.49
Junior staff (n=135) 51.85 16.30 5.93 17.78
Technical staff (n=64) 42.19 18.75 10.94 20.31
Research staff (n=284) 51.76 17.25 7.75 15.49
12. Researchers know how to assess whether the risk outweighs the benefit of 
continuing with their research activities
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=350) 54.86 19.14 10.86 8.29
Senior staff (n=213) 52.11 20.66 7.98 10.80
Junior staff (n=135) 58.52 17.04 4.44 11.11
Technical staff (n=64) 43.75 15.63 10.94 21.88
Research staff (n=284) 57.04 20.07 8.45 1.76
179
II. Ethics
13. A code of conduct/practice for life scientists exists at an institutional level
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=350) 57.71 16.29 1.14 17.14
Senior staff (n=213) 54.93 19.72 1.41 16.43
Junior staff (n=135) 62.22 11.11 0.74 17.78
Technical staff (n=64) 54.69 18.75 0.00 18.75
Research staff (n=284) 58.45 15.85 1.41 16.55
14. A code of conduct/practice for life scientists exists at a national level
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=350) 36.86 14.29 0.57 40.29
Senior staff (n=213) 36.15 16.90 0.94 38.03
Junior staff (n=135) 38.52 10.37 0.00 42.96
Technical staff (n=64) 42.19 10.94 0.00 39.06
Research staff (n=284) 35.92 15.14 0.70 40.14
15. Researchers are aware of and informed about national and international 
conventions, laws and regulations related to their research
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=350) 47.43 28.00 1.43 15.14
Senior staff (n=213) 47.42 27.70 2.35 14.55
Junior staff (n=135) 48.15 28.15 0.00 15.56
Technical staff (n=64) 51.56 21.88 1.56 17.19
Research staff (n=284) 46.83 29.23 1.41 14.44
16. An ethics committee assesses research proposals involving human subjects
Always and 
often
Sometimes Rarely and 
never
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=322) 69.88 3.11 0.31 19.88 6.83
Senior staff (n=197) 69.04 4.57 0.00 22.84 3.55
Junior staff (n=123) 72.36 0.81 0.81 13.82 12.20
Technical staff (n=58) 53.45 5.17 0.00 31.03 10.34
Research staff (n=262) 74.05 2.67 0.38 16.79 6.11
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17. An ethics committee assesses research proposals involving animal subjects
Always and 
often
Sometimes Rarely and 
never
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=323) 80.80 1.24 1.24 11.15 5.57
Senior staff (n=197) 81.22 1.52 1.02 11.68 4.57
Junior staff (n=124) 79.84 0.81 1.61 10.48 7.26
Technical staff (n=59) 67.80 5.08 0.00 16.95 10.17
Research staff (n=262) 83.59 0.38 1.53 9.92 4.58
18. A review process exists to assess ethical issues raised by research proposals not 
involving human or animal subjects
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=350) 44.57 12.86 7.43 26.57
Senior staff (n=213) 44.60 15.49 7.98 23.47
Junior staff (n=135) 44.44 8.15 6.67 31.85
Technical staff (n=64) 40.63 3.13 14.06 32.81
Research staff (n=284) 45.42 14.79 5.99 25.35
19. Information about the national and international conventions and regulations 
related to all fields of science is easily accessible
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=350) 38.57 32.57 0.29 20.57
Senior staff (n=213) 37.56 32.86 0.47 21.60
Junior staff (n=135) 40.74 31.11 0.00 19.26
Technical staff (n=64) 35.94 29.69 0.00 26.56
Research staff (n=284) 39.44 32.75 0.35 19.37
20. National legislation and policy relevant to the life sciences provides protection 
against the misuse of science
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=350) 34.86 17.71 1.14 38.00
Senior staff (n=213) 35.21 19.25 1.41 36.15
Junior staff (n=135) 34.07 15.56 0.74 40.74
Technical staff (n=64) 29.69 15.63 1.56 45.31
Research staff (n=284) 35.92 18.31 1.06 36.27
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1. Facilities and equipment are appropriate to the level of work being done and are 
adequately maintained
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't 
know
All responses (n=305) 72.79 23.93 1.31 1.97
Senior staff (n=190) 69.47 26.32 2.11 2.11
Junior staff (n=113) 77.88 20.35 0.00 1.77
Technical staff (n=57) 87.72 8.77 0.00 3.51
Research staff (n=246) 69.11 27.64 1.63 1.63
2. Training of staff is appropriate to the facilities and equipment and the work being 
conducted
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't 
know
All responses (n=304) 77.96 18.09 1.32 2.63
Senior staff (n=190) 77.89 17.89 2.11 2.11
Junior staff (n=112) 77.68 18.75 0.00 3.57
Technical staff (n=56) 76.79 14.29 1.79 7.14
Research staff (n=246) 78.05 19.11 1.22 1.63
3. Researchers have somewhere to turn to get competent advice if they have safety 
or security questions relating to their research
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't 
know
All responses (n=303) 69.31 21.78 1.65 7.26
Senior staff (n=188) 67.02 22.87 2.66 7.45
Junior staff (n=113) 72.57 20.35 0.00 7.08
Technical staff (n=57) 73.68 14.04 1.75 10.53
Research staff (n=244) 68.03 23.77 1.64 6.56
4. National legislation/regulation exists that sets safety and security practices and 
procedures for laboratories
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't 
know
All responses (n=304) 64.47 10.86 2.63 22.04
Senior staff (n=189) 64.02 11.11 4.23 20.63
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Junior staff (n=113) 65.49 10.62 0.00 23.89
Technical staff (n=57) 68.42 7.02 1.75 22.81
Research staff (n=245) 63.67 11.84 2.86 21.63
5. An assessment of the biosafety and biosecurity risk associated with research 
activities is conducted
Always 
and often
Sometimes Rarely and 
never
N/A Don't 
know
All responses (n=305) 43.61 20.33 15.08 6.56 14.43
Senior staff (n=190) 43.68 20.53 14.74 8.95 12.11
Junior staff (n=113) 42.48 20.35 15.93 2.65 18.58
Technical staff (n=57) 40.35 28.07 14.04 3.51 14.04
Research staff (n=246) 43.90 18.70 15.45 7.32 14.63
6. Risk assessments are able to identify requirements for risk reduction measures 
including the level of containment required 
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't 
know
All responses (n=298) 59.40 11.07 8.72 20.81
Senior staff (n=184) 57.07 12.50 11.41 19.02
Junior staff (n=112) 63.39 8.93 3.57 24.11
Technical staff (n=56) 67.86 7.14 0.00 25.00
Research staff (n=240) 57.50 12.08 10.42 20.00
7. Biosafety training is provided to all those working in laboratories when 
appropriate
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't 
know
All responses  (n=300) 66.00 17.33 6.00 10.67
Senior staff (n=188) 62.77 19.15 8.51 9.57
Junior staff (n=110) 70.91 14.55 1.82 12.73
Technical staff (n=57) 77.19 12.28 1.75 8.77
Research staff (n=241) 63.07 18.67 7.05 11.20
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8. Biosecurity training is provided to all those working in laboratories when 
appropriate
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't 
know
All responses  (n=300) 66.00 17.33 6.00 10.67
Senior staff (n=189) 44.97 29.63 11.11 14.29
Junior staff (n=113) 59.29 16.81 4.42 19.47
Technical staff (n=57) 66.67 17.54 1.75 14.04
Research staff (n=245) 46.53 26.53 10.20 16.73
9. Biosafety training includes a test of competence
Always and 
often
Sometimes Rarely and 
never
N/A Don't 
know
All responses (n=302) 26.82 12.91 23.51 10.93 25.83
Senior staff (n=188) 25.00 13.83 22.34 13.83 25.00
Junior staff (n=112) 29.46 11.61 25.89 5.36 27.68
Technical staff (n=57) 40.35 21.05 19.30 1.75 17.54
Research staff (n=243) 23.46 11.11 24.69 12.76 27.98
10. Biosecurity training includes a test of competence
Always 
and often
Sometimes Rarely and 
never
N/A Don't 
know
All responses (n=346) 19.36 9.83 21.97 24.86 23.99
Senior staff (n=188) 25.00 13.83 22.34 13.83 25.00
Junior staff (n=112) 29.46 11.61 25.89 5.36 27.68
Technical staff (n=57) 40.35 21.05 19.30 1.75 17.54
Research staff (n=243) 23.46 11.11 24.69 12.76 27.98
11. Standard operating procedures have been developed (in your facility)
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't 
know
All responses (n=300) 75.00 15.33 4.33 5.33
Senior staff (n=187) 74.87 13.37 5.88 5.88
Junior staff (n=111) 74.77 18.92 1.80 4.50
Technical staff (n=57) 87.72 7.02 0.00 5.26
Research staff (n=241) 71.78 17.43 5.39 5.39
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12. Staff are trained to work according to the standard operating procedures
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't 
know
All responses (n=301) 66.45 18.60 6.64 8.31
Senior staff (n=188) 66.49 17.02 9.57 6.91
Junior staff (n=111) 65.77 21.62 1.80 10.81
Technical staff (n=56) 78.57 12.50 0.00 8.93
Research staff (n=243) 63.37 20.16 8.23 8.23
13. Staff are regularly tested to ensure competence in the standard operating 
procedures
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't 
know
All responses (n=304) 29.93 48.36 8.55 13.16
Senior staff (n=190) 30.00 50.00 11.58 8.42
Junior staff (n=112) 29.46 45.54 3.57 21.43
Technical staff (n=57) 54.39 36.84 1.75 7.02
Research staff (n=284) 20.77 44.01 8.80 12.68
14. Legislation/regulations exist to address hazardous waste disposal
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't 
know
All responses (n=302) 87.75 4.64 1.66 5.96
Senior staff (n=185) 88.65 4.32 2.70 4.32
Junior staff (n=112) 85.71 5.36 0.00 8.93
Technical staff (n=57) 92.98 3.51 0.00 3.51
Research staff (n=284) 73.94 4.23 1.76 5.63
15. Legislation/regulations regarding hazardous waste disposal are followed
Always 
and often
Sometimes Rarely and 
never
N/A Don't 
know
All responses (n=301) 74.42 9.30 3.65 2.99 9.63
Senior staff (n=188) 76.06 6.91 3.72 4.26 9.04
Junior staff (n=111) 71.17 13.51 3.60 0.90 10.81
Technical staff (n=57) 78.95 10.53 3.51 0.00 7.02
Research staff (n=242) 73.14 9.09 3.72 3.72 10.33
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16. Occupational health surveillance mechanisms exist and are followed (at 
institutional level)
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't 
know
All responses (n=303) 61.39 21.78 2.97 13.86
Senior staff (n=189) 66.14 21.16 2.65 10.05
Junior staff (n=112) 52.68 23.21 3.57 20.54
Technical staff (n=57) 71.93 19.30 0.00 8.77
Research staff (n=284) 50.35 19.37 3.17 13.03
17. Occupational health reporting mechanisms effective at institutional level
Always 
and often
Sometimes Rarely and 
never
N/A Don't 
know
All responses (n=299) 44.15 20.74 12.37 1.34 21.40
Senior staff (n=188) 43.62 23.40 13.30 2.13 17.55
Junior staff (n=109) 44.04 16.51 11.01 0.00 28.44
Technical staff (n=55) 54.55 25.45 9.09 0.00 10.91
Research staff (n=242) 41.32 19.83 13.22 1.65 23.97
18. Staff are required to report laboratory accidents and incidents
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't 
know
All responses (n=302) 89.07 3.97 4.97 1.99
Senior staff (n=189) 89.95 4.76 2.65 2.65
Junior staff (n=111) 87.39 2.70 0.90 9.01
Technical staff (n=56) 96.43 0.00 0.00 3.57
Research staff (n=284) 75.00 4.23 2.11 4.58
19. A record of research projects exists and is maintained at institutional level
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't 
know
All responses (n=302) 68.54 12.58 2.32 16.56
Senior staff (n=188) 65.43 13.30 3.19 18.09
Junior staff (n=112) 73.21 11.61 0.89 14.29
Technical staff (n=57) 73.68 5.26 3.51 17.54
Research staff (n=284) 57.39 12.32 1.76 14.08
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20. A record of hazardous biological materials exists and is maintained at 
institutional level
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=302) 51.99 16.89 5.96 25.17
Senior staff (n=213) 44.13 15.02 7.51 22.07
Junior staff (n=135) 45.93 14.07 0.74 21.48
Technical staff (n=64) 60.94 9.38 1.56 17.19
Research staff (n=284) 41.20 15.85 5.63 22.89
21. Hazardous biological material is safely and securely stored
Always and 
often
Sometimes Rarely and 
never
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=305) 68.20 9.51 2.95 7.21 12.13
Senior staff (n=190) 69.47 7.89 2.63 9.47 10.53
Junior staff (n=113) 66.37 12.39 3.54 2.65 15.04
Technical staff (n=57) 71.93 14.04 3.51 3.51 7.02
Research staff (n=246) 67.48 8.54 2.85 7.72 13.41
22. Mechanisms exist for staff to report unlawful or irregular conduct (i.e. whistle-
blowing mechanisms exist) 
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=302) 64.24 15.89 0.99 18.87
Senior staff (n=213) 62.91 11.27 0.94 13.62
Junior staff (n=135) 43.70 17.78 0.74 20.00
Technical staff (n=64) 65.63 14.06 0.00 7.81
Research staff (n=284) 53.17 13.73 1.06 17.96
23. Measures exist to protect staff who report unlawful or irregular conduct from 
occupational detriment
Strongly 
agree and 
agree
Disagree 
and 
strongly 
disagree
N/A Don't know
All responses (n=298) 37.25 21.48 0.34 40.94
Senior staff (n=213) 33.80 17.37 1.41 35.21
Junior staff (n=135) 28.15 20.00 0.74 34.07
Technical staff (n=64) 40.63 18.75 0.00 29.69
Research staff (n=284) 29.58 18.31 1.41 35.92
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